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Soviet Union

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Second Round of 'Open Skies' Begins in Budapest

LD2404215290 Moscow TASS in English 2048 GMT
24 Apr 90

["Open Skies Conference—TASS comment" by TASS military news analyst]

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—The second round of the conference on Open Skies opened in Budapest. Taking part in the conference are 23 member-countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They have assembled to continue the discussion of drafts of an agreement that would allow unarmed aircraft with observers on board to fly over other states territories with the aim of inspecting their military activities.

Open air flights are expected to be performed in accordance with accepted rules after preliminary notification of the inspected country about the route, the use of agreed equipment and the observance of other requirements established during the negotiations. The conference's task is to solve all these issues.

At the previous stage in Ottawa, the sides agreed about the advisability and the plausibility of the Open Skies. Differences also came to light during the first stage of those first-ever negotiations. Some of the differences were of principled significance.

One of the central tasks of the second stage is to find ways out of the impasses that would preclude turning inspection flights into purely reconnaissance missions. This is why, Soviet specialists believe, there is no need to outfit the aircraft with equipment which can be used above all for purposes incompatible with the tasks envisaged by the Open Skies plan. At the same time, flights must facilitate to a maximum degree the prevention of surprise attacks by one side against another and locate concentrations of troops obviously poised to attack.

During the negotiations in Ottawa, the U.S. delegation insisted on granting each country the right to collect information using own aircraft and keeping this information to itself. This would have placed participating countries in unequal positions. Not every country has adequate technical equipment to secure effective observation flights. This is why the Soviet Union believes that a common data bank should be established to contain information culled during inspection flights, equally accessible to all treaty member-countries without exception. It is noteworthy that the approval of the Soviet proposal would enable each country to save considerable resources.

Washington insists on complete exclusion from aerial inspections of American military bases deployed in countries which are not NATO members, like Japan, for instance. According to the U.S. proposal, the United States would be granted the right to fly over Soviet territory in the Far East from Cape Uelen to Vladivostok, while the Soviet Union will have no right to inspect U.S. military activity at the major bases at close proximity to its borders. This is certainly not fair.

The second stage of the Open Skies Conference has to settle a number of disputes. However, none of them appears to be impossible to settle.

Grinevskiy Assesses Vienna Talks, Disarmament

AU2404105290 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
24 Apr 90 p 3

[Interview with Oleg Grinevskiy, Soviet chief negotiator at the Vienna disarmament talks, by Burkhard Bischof in Vienna; date not given: "Europe's Security Concerns Us All"]

[Text] [Bischof] Mr. Ambassador, NATO representatives say that—in contrast to the USSR—they have already put all their proposals for a treaty on conventional armed forces in Vienna on the negotiating table.

[Grinevskiy] If the NATO representatives claim this, I am sorry. Because there are still many unanswered technical questions, for instance, concerning information and verification—also with regard to the Western viewpoints.

The Soviet Union is working consistently; within a few days we will, in all likelihood, present our proposals for the destruction of the weapons systems which are to be eliminated and on the conversion of the armament companies. Concerning conversion the Western side has not made any proposal at all.

[Bischof] Recently one has heard NATO diplomats say with increasing frequency that the Soviet Union has adopted a more restrained position at the Vienna negotiations—be it because of the unsolved German question or because of the conflict concerning Lithuania. How do you see this?

[Grinevskiy] I do not think that it is good for one side to start attributing blame; in any case, I do not want to blame anybody. A completely new field of negotiations has been entered at the talks in Vienna. Sometimes the technical approach to the negotiations by experts unfortunately gains dominance over the political approach.

[Bischof] Western delegation heads were also concerned that the Soviet Union has still not given a clear answer to NATO's compromise proposal concerning the sensitive issue of aircraft. May one expect Soviet initiatives in this respect?

[Grinevskiy] Concerning this question, too, Western concerns seem, in my view, to be a bit tainted by propaganda. With regard to the often discussed interceptors and the combat-capable training planes, we have made proposals, but the West has not reacted to them.

In my view, we certainly do not have any great conceptual differences concerning the issue of airplanes. However, there are great differences in opinion with regard to the upper limit for interceptors: The NATO proposal says 500; 1,500 is our position. We simply need this number to defend our country.

[Bischof] The question of troop reductions seemed to be settled after the agreement of the superpowers in Ottawa. But then the USSR made the additional proposal to

reduce all troops in central Europe to 750,000 men on each side. Is it correct that this proposal is aimed particularly at reducing the German Bundeswehr?

[Grinevskiy] Of course it also concerns the German Bundeswehr, because the potential military consequences of the unification of the two German states cannot be ignored. And, in this connection, everybody is aware of the fact that there must be certain limits to the strength of the German armed forces. The question is how this can be incorporated into the Vienna agreement or whether this question has to be solved in another way.

[Bischof] How, in your view, should the two-plus-four talks and the CFE be related? What must be settled at the two-plus-four talks and what must be settled at the military negotiations in Vienna?

[Grinevskiy] It seems to me that no one knows at the moment. The two-plus-four talks, which are to deal with the military-political aspects of German unification, have not yet started. We cannot make decisions in Vienna on the political-military future of Germany, but we must take the results of the two-plus-four talks into consideration.

In my view, waiting for these results is not a reason for delaying the Vienna negotiations. We can resolve a number of questions and technical details in the meantime.

[Bischof] It seems to be becoming more difficult for the Warsaw Pact states to find common positions. Has work become more difficult for you because of this?

[Grinevskiy] In some respects yes, but this is a natural thing. Sometimes it makes work easier if there are a number of ideas and proposals for arriving at solutions.

Despite the variety of ideas, all countries of the Warsaw Pact have one common goal: We are striving for a successful conclusion of the Vienna negotiations; this is in the national interest of us all.

[Bischof] Does the Soviet Union already have its own ideas about the date, the agenda, and the venue of the planned CSCE summit?

[Grinevskiy] I think that all states consider the signing of the agreement on conventional armed forces as a priority issue for the summit agenda. We have every possibility to conclude the treaty in Vienna by the end of the year. Furthermore, an agreement on further confidence- and security-building measures is a realistic prospect.

In addition, the situation in Europe and the establishment of new European institutions must be discussed. Whether one calls what we are striving for a European home or confederation is of secondary importance; the important thing is the substance.

With regard to the venue of the summit: This is a delicate question, but it will certainly be possible to solve it.

[Bischof] Should conventional disarmament—after the signing of the first agreement—continue to be a matter for the 23 alliance members only, or do you visualize the participation of the other 12 CSCE states in a second stage?

[Grinevskiy] The decision about the further course of the disarmament negotiations should also be made at the summit.

If talks about the bases of new European security structures are involved, neutral and nonaligned states must also be included. The earlier the better. European security concerns us all.

Col Gen Chervov Denies 'Covert Struggle'

LD2404122790 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] How have the arms reduction talks in Vienna and Geneva been going on? The Soviet Union has been accused of reluctance to compromise. How justified are these charges? Radio Moscow put this question to the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, Colonel General Nikolay Chervov [as heard].

This campaign of accusations against the Soviet Union reflects a certain tactic, says Nikolay Chervov. An attempt has been made to call in question the Soviet Union's readiness to reach agreement in Geneva and Vienna. All this distorts this country's real attitude to disarmament. Besides this is an obstacle in the way of the talks at a very crucial moment when the Soviet and American presidents, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, are to meet in less than a month. As for the real state of affairs, the Soviet Union has been looking for mutually acceptable options; it is ready to initial the treaty on strategic offensive arms.

Some say that the Soviet Union's harder line is evidence on differences between the country's political and military leaders, was the next question.

General Chervov said these allegations about covert struggle between the military and political leadership is nothing but an attempt to make what is only desirable seem like a hard fact [as heard]. The country's top political leaders have always taken into account the opinion of the Soviet high command. Defense Ministry officials participate directly in all disarmament talks. A biased approach is ruled out. Neither the Foreign Ministry nor the Defense Ministry have ever made unilateral decisions. All resolutions take into account the opinion of different agencies.

What is the main feature of the current phase of negotiations in Vienna and Geneva?

General Chervov said that all questions were being studied closely so as to rule out situations which could be used to gain unilateral advantages. For that reason both sides will have to display a great degree of responsibility at the final stage of the talks.

Pact Commander Interviewed on German Unification

*LD2404130690 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1105 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Text] Moscow, 24 Apr (TASS)—“The process of rapprochement between the FRG and the GDR, and subsequently a united Germany, must not carry an inherent threat to the national interests and security of neighbors, or to anyone at all,” said Army General Petr Lushev, commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Organization. He gave an interview to TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy at the end of his visit to the GDR and the end of his talks with Rainer Eppelmann, GDR minister of disarmament and defense.

In General Lushev's opinion, the process of unification of Germany must take place synchronously with the formation of a fundamentally new system of security in Europe based on the transformation of military-political alliances, with a subsequent progress into collective nonbloc structures.

The commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact noted that “the German question affects the fundamental interests of the entire international community, and the Soviet Union, together with other countries, has the right to

seek unconditional guarantees which would ensure the preservation of peace and stability in Europe.”

Speaking about the processes currently taking place in East Europe, General Lushev stressed that the fundamental attitude to them is determined by the circumstances that “these are our neighbors and allies.” In the new situation, the general considers, the accent in cooperation between our countries must clearly be increasingly shifted to the interstate sphere. These relations will be built in a spirit of mutual trust and sincerity. Petr Lushev added that “the principles of respect for sovereignty, noninterference, consideration of mutual interests, and recognition of the right of the people of each country to choose its own path of development, must remain the definitive ones in our mutual relations.”

In the opinion of the Warsaw Pact commander in chief, the East European states can be sure of the main point: The relations of alliance with the USSR will not be a brake on their independent development. “The Warsaw Pact remains a factor of stability and a guarantee of security for the peoples of the allied countries. This is attested to by the entire history of the Warsaw Pact Organization, the 35th anniversary of which will be marked in May this year,” Army General Petr Lushev said in conclusion.

Perfilyev 24 Apr Briefing on World Issues**Gorbachev-Li Peng Meeting**

*LD2404141890 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1336 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Text] Moscow, 24 Apr (TASS)—This morning there was a meeting between president of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev and Li Peng, premier of the State Council of the PRC who is in the Soviet Union on an official visit. This was reported by Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, opening today's briefing at the USSR Foreign Ministry's press center.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman also informed journalists that Xu Xin, deputy chief of general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, had a conversation at the USSR Ministry of Defense today with Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Also today, Konstantin Katushev, minister of foreign economic relations of the USSR, met with Li Lanning, vice minister of foreign economic relations and trade of the PRC.

Vadim Perfilyev said that the talks begun on Monday between Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Li Peng, premier of the State Council of the PRC, will be continued in the afternoon.

Status of Albanian Relations

*LD2404144990 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT
24 Apr 90*

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—The Soviet Union has taken notice of a statement made by Ramiz Alia, leader of the Party of Labour of Albania (PLA) the president of the Presidium of Albania's People's Assembly, at the plenum of the PLA Central Committee, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing here today.

The Albanian leader expressed his country's interest in restoring diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet side regards the statement of the Albanian leadership as an important positive step in normalising the relations between the two countries and confirms its readiness to restore and develop friendly ties with Albania on the basis of mutual benefit, full equality, respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

"The restoration of good relations between our countries would meet the interests of the Soviet and Albanian people and would strengthen peace and international cooperation," Perfilyev emphasised.

Disarmament in Middle East

*LD2404162190 Moscow TASS in English 1552 GMT
24 Apr 90*

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—The Soviet Union attaches much importance to efforts to improve the situation in the Middle East and to curtail the regional arms race, particularly weapons of mass destruction, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing here today.

He commented on the Egyptian foreign minister's recent proposal for the United Nations to discuss the elimination of all kinds of weapons of mass annihilation—nuclear, chemical and biological—in the Middle East.

The proposal was sent to the UN secretary-general.

"The Soviet Union has repeatedly called for the beginning of specific work on the creation of nuclear- and chemical-free zones in the Middle East," Perfilyev said.

He expressed support for the Egyptian proposal and said the Soviet Union was ready to "promote its implementation, using UN mechanisms."

The spokesman said Middle East countries that are not parties to the nuclear non-proliferation pact should join the treaty and place their nuclear materials and facilities under the guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Agency. These would be important steps towards disarmament in the region.

"Above all, this refers to Israel, the nuclear ambitions of which give rise to well-founded concern among Arab countries," Perfilyev said.

He added that the chemical weapons problem would be less acute if countries in the region joined a future convention on a chemical weapon ban.

Settlement in Nicaragua

*LD2404170290 Moscow TASS in English 1642 GMT
24 Apr 90*

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev welcomed the agreement on a ceasefire and the full demobilisation of contras by June 10, signed on April 19 by representatives of the Sandinista Government, President-elect Violeta Chamorro and Nicaraguan armed resistance leaders.

Speaking at a news briefing here today, Perfilyev described the agreement as a "new step towards the ultimate solution of the contras problem and the establishment of peace in the country."

"The agreement is the logical continuation of previously-concluded documents, including the Toncontin Agreement. It offers further proof of the sincere interest of the Sandinista leaders in transferring power to the president-elect within the set terms and in fulfilling their commitments," he said.

At the same time, he expressed concern over the fact that the transition of power and the first months of Chamorro's rule will proceed when "there are thousands of armed contras in Nicaragua, whose actions are difficult to predict."

Perfilyev expressed hope that contra leaders and all participants in the political life in Nicaragua "will feel responsible and make every effort to complete the process of national reconciliation and to prevent further senseless bloodshed."

"The Soviet Union supported a decision by the Security Council to extend the range of authority of the UN observer group in Central America," the spokesman said.

"The United Nations' active efforts to end the armed confrontation in Nicaragua, stabilise the situation and establish peace there help promote a peaceful settlement in Central America.

"These efforts point to the revived role of the United Nations in settling difficult regional conflicts and to its peace-making potential."

U.S. Troop Cuts in Pacific

LD2404181190 Moscow TASS in English 1754 GMT
24 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev welcomed the U.S. announcement of a planned reduction of American armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region by 15,000 troops—by 10 per cent.

Speaking at a news briefing here today, he noted, however, that "even according to American military assessments, this step is to a large extent symbolic and does not entail any change in the forward-base strategy."

"The Asia-Pacific region is flooded with armaments. The level of military confrontation there is still very high, and there is no negotiating mechanism to search for ways to reduce tension and discuss confidence-building measures in the military sphere," Perfilyev said.

"The Soviet Union already made a number of unilateral steps to reduce its armed forces in the east. The time has now come to begin specific talks on regional military problems with the participation of all interested parties.

"Efforts should be made to form a structure for the sides' political interaction, capable of ensuring stability and security in the region not through reliance on force, but on the basis of the balance of interests and mutual respect."

TASS Summary

LD2404200190 Moscow TASS in English 1933 GMT
24 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev met visiting Chinese Premier Li Peng this morning, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing here today.

He also said that Li Peng and Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov would continue the talks that began on Monday later today.

Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev welcomed the agreement on a ceasefire and the full demobilisation of contras by June 10, signed on April 19 by representatives of the Sandinista Government, President-elect Violeta Chamorro and Nicaraguan armed resistance leaders. Perfilyev described the agreement as a "new step towards the ultimate solution of the Contras problem and the establishment of peace in the country."

"The agreement is the logical continuation of previously-concluded documents, including the Toncontin Agreement. It offers further proof of the sincere interest of the Sandinista leaders in transferring power to the president-elect within the set terms and in fulfilling their commitments," he said.

Perfilyev said that the Soviet Union had taken notice of a statement made by Ramiz Alia, leader of the Party of Labour of Albania (PLA) and president of the Presidium of Albania's People's Assembly, at the plenum of the PLA Central Committee.

The Albanian leader expressed his country's interest in restoring diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet side regards the statement of the Albanian leadership as an important positive step in normalising the relations between the two countries and confirms its readiness to restore and develop friendly ties with Albania on the basis of mutual benefit, full equality, respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Perfilyev expressed the Soviet Union's concern about the violent seizure in Jerusalem of a building belonging to the patriarchate of Jerusalem. He condemned the violent action and expressed the hope that the rights and security of all churches, confessions and individuals would be guaranteed in this major international religious center in future.

The Soviet Union was glad to hear the news about the release of a 55-year-old professor of the American University in Beirut who had been held as a hostage, Perfilyev went on to say. He emphasised that the Soviet Union is against the very method of taking hostages as a means to achieve political and other goals, especially in such an explosive region as the Middle East.

Perfilyev said that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev today received Mongolia's ambassador in the Soviet Union Tserengiyn Gurbadam who briefed Rogachev on the results of the recent Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. The sides also discussed bilateral relations and international situation.

Foreign Ministry Official Assesses UN's Role

*LD2404125890 Moscow TASS in English 1228 GMT
24 Apr 90*

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—A conference of 50 founding countries opened in San Francisco 45 years ago, on April 25, 1945. It resulted in the most widely representative and authoritative international body in October of the same year, Andrey Kozyrev, head of the International Organisations Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, told TASS.

Speaking of the importance of the conference, Kozyrev said that the documents that it endorsed and the UN Charter embodied high democratic standards, principles of universal human ethics and civilised contacts between states.

The world and the United Nations Organisation have substantially changed over the past 45 years. UN membership has more than trebled. Namibia, which just became the 160th UN member, was able to traverse the long way to freedom and independence only with the active support of the international community, Kozyrev emphasised.

Post-war development and mounting democratisation processes in all regions reaffirm the correctness and everlasting importance of the UN's founding principles and goals.

Nowadays the United Nations seeks to base its work on the balance of interests and to suggest universally acceptable approaches to problems, Kozyrev said.

In recent years UN peace-keeping operations were launched in view of the Afghan settlement, the cessation of hostilities between Iraq and Iran. In southwestern Africa, and in central America, experience indicates that the fastest way to a peaceful settlement lies through dialogue, Kozyrev stressed.

Speaking of UN prestige, he pointed out that nowadays even great powers cannot fail to reckon with the opinion of the international community. "We became convinced of that from our own sad experience," he said.

The decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan was also greatly influenced by the UN stand. The UN continues its efforts to bring the Afghan government and rebels to the negotiating table. It has been universally recognised that if free elections are announced in that country, they will be held under UN supervision, Kozyrev added.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman focused on the new UN role that began to manifest itself in recent years.

Previously UN peace-keeping forces played the role of "buffer" during the disengagement of warring sides, whereas now the United Nations tackles the tasks of reconciliation inside countries on a democratic basis. This manifest itself most vividly in Namibia and Nicaragua during the elections under the supervision of UN representatives.

Romania requested that observers be sent to monitor the forthcoming elections.

Soviet legislative bodies are also considering inviting UN representatives in the event of holding referenda on secession from the USSR.

"We optimistically view prospects for UN activities and increasingly count on them in day-to-day politics," Kozyrev said, answering a question about further utilisation of the UN mechanism in international politics.

He said that, objectively, the United Nations has a great future. An increasing number of states are coming to realise that the United Nations organisation, as never before, is in need of support and commitment to its lofty goals and principles.

The Soviet diplomat quoted Mikhail Gorbachev who, upon taking the office of an executive president, again reaffirmed the immense importance of the United Nations and said that the revival of the UN role and stimulation of its peace-making functions are major components in the movement towards a peaceful future in mankind's history.

United States & Canada

Bush, Congress Reject Trade Slowdown With USSR

PM2504085190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
25 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report under the "Foreign News" rubric: "G. Bush on Situation in Lithuania"]

[Text] Washington, 24 Apr—President Bush met today with U.S. Congressional leaders and discussed the Lithuanian situation with them. According to administration representatives, the meeting examined the possibility of slowing down the development of trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union in response to the ending of oil supplies and the reduction of gas supplies to Lithuania. However, as Senator Claiborne Pell reported after meeting with the President, G. Bush told the legislators that he is not prepared to take such an action because it "could lead to an escalation" of tension around Lithuania. As Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman C. Pell stressed, the participants in the meeting supported the President's opinion that such an "escalation could damage" U.S.-USSR relations.

Issues Prior to U.S.-Soviet Summit Viewed

PM2404094190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
23 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by own correspondent V. Linnik: "Difficult Lead-In Days"]

[Excerpts] New York, April— With the announcement of the date for the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting here, there has been a marked animation in the debate over relations between the USSR and the United States. And, of course, it is not only that this news is always a refined dish for local political and journalistic gourmets. A stir in the mass media inevitably accompanies any epoch-making step in relations between the two states. I think, however, that this time there are more grounds for heightened interest than ever before. This is connected primarily with the critical stage through which perestroika is passing in the Soviet Union. The extreme drama of the present stage is clearly revealed in the Lithuania situation and the country's extremely tense economic position. "The worst is yet to come," is the opinion of THE NEW YORK TIMES of our economy. "Is the worst really still to come?" For the time being that is how one can sum up the opinion of the U.S. mass media regarding the tangle of problems generated by the well-known decision of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Here they naturally hint the slide toward violence is a real alternative during the solution of the Lithuanian problem. [passage omitted]

What are the local assessments of the sides' positions prior to the summit meeting? The U.S. mass media have paid a great deal of attention to what Shevardnadze and Baker described as "certain difficulties" during their recent consultations. It cannot be ruled out, as the U.S.

mass media now believe, that at the two presidents' meeting there will only be talk of signing the fundamental principles of an agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms and not of the actual text of the agreement.

What is this about here? What stumbling blocks were encountered by the strategic offensive arms talks which have been under way for several years now? Quotations attributed to unnamed high-ranking representatives of the administration draw the following picture. A month ago the United States put forward proposals for banning mobile MIRV'd ICBM's within the framework of the present strategic offensive arms agreement. Of itself this idea was a departure from the previously reached understanding according to which discussion of the future of these missiles is deferred to the following stage of the talks.

Considering the historically formed structure of the strategic arsenals of the USSR and United States, this proposal seemed one-sided even to the U.S. press. The point is that if it is adopted we would have to reduce part of our mobile ICBM's already in existence. But the Americans would simply save on the deployment of their mobile Midgetmen missiles and MX missiles on flatcars.

During the strategic offensive Arms-2 talks, according to the current U.S. idea, it is planned to ban all ground-launched MIRV'd ICBM's. This U.S. plan would compel us to make large-scale changes to the structure of our strategic forces whose results would have an extremely adverse effect on our potential for ensuring the country's security. In addition, this procedure would be so expensive that expenditure on it would outweigh if not the entire saving from the reductions at least the lion's share of that saving.

"A sensible idea in principle," the U.S. newspapers and journals said with one voice. Multiple warheads are one of the most destabilizing elements in the two countries' arsenals since they increase the temptation to deliver a first strike. Ridding ourselves of them is a direct road to a more secure future.

It is hard to argue with this as long as we do not forget an important little detail—the determining U.S. predominance in terms of sea-launched and air-launched multiple launchers. To the honor of a number of the biggest U.S. publications, they have not accepted the administration's logic in this matter. "The U.S. proposal is two one-sided for the Soviets to accept it," THE NEW YORK TIMES noted on this subject. "The new idea goes too far, giving preference to the U.S. nuclear arsenal," wrote P. Warnke, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Indeed, today the Soviet Union has approximately 6,000 multiple warheads on ground-launched ICBM's while the United States has only 2,000. The United States' superiority in terms of these warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles and in terms of air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles is put between brackets by the administration as

a sphere not subject to discussion. But is it not clear why? You note that all this is taking place against the background of already agreed considerable concessions by the Soviet Union for these missiles within the framework of the talks under way. We agreed to halve the number of our superheavy SS-18 ground-launched missiles and to count one strategic bomber (of which the United States has considerably more—V.L.) for one warhead irrespective of how many bombs and cruise missiles it carries. Finally, we agreed to reckon 20 cruise missiles on aircraft for 10 warheads. In brief, we have traveled over half the path on the road to compromise. In response we receive the recent U.S. ideas....

Where is the logic? Where is the principle of equal security? As diplomats are accustomed to put it, none of this can be discerned in the U.S. position. When the Soviet side put forward in response the proposal on setting quotas for cruise missiles, people here began to speak with one voice of the "toughening" of the Soviet position, explaining it by some "growing resistance from the USSR military leadership." Actually, in commenting in a television interview on the present situation at the talks, U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney expressed the hope that the USSR will ultimately "agree" to the U.S. option and will not insist on the adoption of its own option.

Our sensible concessions are being interpreted by the Americans merely as an invitation to new demands on their part. That is the price we are paying today for what has happened in East Europe, for what has happened to our economy, for the sociopolitical instability within the country now approaching the danger mark. The United States is not even thinking of renouncing its favorite from a position of strength approach. And dragging out the talks by putting forward deliberately unacceptable proposals is merely done in the calculation that against the background of our troubles the United States will be able to conclude tomorrow an agreement more advantageous to itself. The temptation to take advantage of what people here have started to call "the USSR's strategic weakness" is too great. The administration is quite unable to resist it. But after all, everything has its limits. Washington should not forget that.

Our attempts to impose the new political thinking on some states and politicians are sometimes reminiscent of the efforts of some laboratory which has decided to introduce a new "vegetarian" species of tiger. In its regular scientific reports this laboratory cheerfully reports successes in fulfilling its task. It says that scientific observations show that the tiger has already rejected meat on several occasions. It also notes that the tiger has begun to cast tender looks when it sees grass and seems to look with affection on those laboratory assistants who, inspiring him by their personal example, have long switched to two meals a day consisting of kasha and carrot cutlets. The fact that the tiger continues to obstinately demand meat every day is explained by scientific staffers by the force of habit in the irrational predator

and also by the fact that they have spent too long setting him a bad example by eating meat for years....

Breaking a natural essence or complaining about it is futile. All that is needed is to understand it and accept it as given. Just like the fact that the transition to a "vegetarian" era in relations between states is a laudable and alluring but extremely prolonged matter measured in no way by the number of loud programs for the renunciation of meat consumption.

Obviously, one of the central questions on the agenda of the Soviet-U.S. meeting will be the problem of Lithuania. People here realize that an extraordinarily great deal depends on how the "Lithuanian knot" is untangled. Its solution, people here believe, will determine the nature of the internal evolution of the Soviet Union and the prospects of international relations.

The administration's initial approach toward this question cannot be said to lack a laudable restraint.

We treat the problem of Lithuania with understanding, but we can do little—that is approximately how G. Bush summed up the thrust of the official U.S. approach. But the development of events and pressure from congress are leading to the point where the White House is gradually being drawn into confrontation over this issue. As of today the local mass media are discussing a whole package of possible measures by the administration as a reaction to the events in Lithuania.

After his return from Moscow G. Mitchell, the leader of the Democrats in the Senate, was not embarrassed to state that everything—from the state of trade to the cancellation of the summit itself—is being examined as retaliatory measures to the toughening of Moscow's stance on Lithuania. It is hard to say what these statements contain more of—demagoguery or the partisan desire to hurt the administration as painfully as possible. Because it is perfectly obvious that, for instance, the cancellation of the meeting would be a very major political embarrassment to the Republicans.

A long-standing U.S. habit—approaching oneself with one yardstick and everyone else with another—is also being manifested in the discussion under way here on Lithuania. When the United States bombs Panama that, according to U.S. concepts, is one thing. And it is quite another when Soviet armored personnel carriers even simply appear on the streets of Vilnius. When the United States instantly organizes economic blockades against regimes that do not suit it—that is one story. It is quite another story when Moscow merely starts talking about economic sanctions against the Lithuanian nationalists. This list could be extended. But the thrust is clear even so. It is not for the Americans, who drove the continent's first inhabitants—the Indians—into reservations, who in the past took California and Texas from Mexico, to teach others the rules of communal living and morality. Yet this latter fact simply does not enter into the American awareness. Hence the extreme complexity of dealing

with the United States. Dialogue with it has always demanded and demands today truly gigantic restraint and self-possession.

Incidentally, many Americans share Moscow's position with regard to Lithuania. President Lincoln entered into the Civil War to preserve the union, I was told by many Americans. So that the Soviet President's most resolute actions on this question are not only not condemned by many people but are welcomed with understanding.

The need for Soviet-U.S. dialogue is great today. And not only because of the tectonic changes which have taken place in the past year in European politics. Other regional problems, in particular the aggravated situation in the Near East, also require the maximum mutual understanding between the USSR and the United States now.

So that whichever way you look at it, there is no shortage of drama in the present international situation. But what I have said nonetheless does not mean that matters are extremely bad. The good groundwork created in recent years in Soviet-U.S. relations is not a bad basis for making headway. There has begun to be more common sense in these relations and the "tolerance threshold" has risen. Americans also understand the importance of the success of perestroika in our country. So that the difficult days leading up to the meeting should in no way be interpreted as a prediction of its failure.

The development of relations, especially between two such different countries as the United States and ourselves, cannot be on the ascendant perpetually—that is axiomatic. And today's problems, well.... They are, if you like, merely confirmation of the old truism which states that nothing good in life comes without effort, of its own accord.

Rogachev Receives U.S. Businessmen

PM2004151990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 18 April USSR Deputy Foreign Minister I.A. Rogachev received R. Fairbanks, president of the American National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation, and K. Dam, member of the committee and vice president of IBM, who are visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet National Committee for Asian and Pacific Economic Cooperation.

Ambassador Matlock Comments on Turkmenistan Visit

90UF0012A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report on interview with Jack F. Matlock, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the United States to the USSR, by IZVESTIYA staff correspondent V. Kuleshov, Ashkhabad; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA

introduction; date and place of interview not specified: "I Will Keep Coming Back..."]

[Text] Jack Faust Matlock, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the United States to the USSR, spent several days in Ashkhabad, arriving here for meetings with the leaders of Turkmenistan and other republic representatives.

[Kuleshov] This is not your first trip here, is it Mr. Ambassador?

[Matlock] No, I was here in 1961, escorting a prominent U.S. senator. At the time I was working in our embassy in Moscow and was sent here to act as an adviser to him. The truth of the matter is it was a very short trip. But even then I was amazed at the richness of the republic's natural landscape—the majestic Kopetdag Mountains and immense desert they refer to here as the "Solar Power Station," the marvelous Caspian Sea which looks so completely different when seen from Baku. To this day I continue to be astonished at the richness of this region.

I will also state frankly that my astonishment extends to the people here as well, who from earliest times have possessed a vital wisdom, balance, and wonderful dignity which are incompatible with the bustle and haste of copying new-fashioned trends and tendencies of various sorts. In my earlier visit to the republic as well as now, I had occasion to see various collectives in Ashkhabad and Mary. I was told a great deal about the respect young people have for older persons, whose wisdom and experience have always been respected among the Turkmen, about educating the young generation in the spirit of loathing senseless quarrels and strife, deploring actions not well thought out which might bring harm to peoples of other nations.

[Kuleshov] How would you personally assess interethnic relations in the regions of Central Asia—and in other places as well? What predictions do you have on this account, Mr. Matlock?

[Matlock] It seems to me a great many diverse matters have come up here which are usually considered to fall within a single expression—interethnic relations. Certain phenomena are observed in the Baltic region, other phenomena in the Transcaucasus, and still others in Central Asia. And if we are talking about the disturbances in Fergana, Novyy Uzen, or Tajikistan, it is my view that the deciding role there has been played by socioeconomic conditions—unemployment, a lack of housing, the poor material conditions people have to live under. These factors have become the firewood to which someone, for some reason, if you believe the rumors—local mafia or even criminals—has put a lighted match. In the Transcaucasus, of course, things are different. It is still not clear to me, quite honestly, why these tragic events arose between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but it seems to me that the traditions of respect shown one nation by another were violated. This is quite sad. I noticed there was never any talk in Armenia about the

fact that there are Azeri monuments there. In Azerbaijan you see a map showing ancient cities and ancient monuments. But again—not a word about Armenian monuments. I cannot help but think that a certain role here is played by the intelligentsia of both republics. Perhaps they have been focused only on their own traditions. I have great respect for Chingis Aytmatov, who told me this was one of the causes of the situation in the Transcaucasus. The issues there are extremely complex indeed....

[Kuleshov] But things are not that easy to resolve in the Baltic either.

[Matlock] The Baltic region is another matter—there are no disturbances there. There it is a political question. But you are right—it is not simple. Of course, the United States never recognized the annexation of the Baltic republics to the Soviet Union. We recognize all other borders of your country, but not these because we considered that forcible annexation took place in 1940, against the will of the peoples, or if not against their will—the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian peoples all the same did not have the opportunity to express their will. This does not mean, of course, that we automatically recognize the existing government in Lithuania. But we believe these questions must be resolved through negotiations and peaceful means, that there should not be any use of force by either side. And in this situation we are striving not to act in a way which would cause someone to believe we are being provocative, or that we wish to take advantage of the situation. We understand there exist forces inside the Soviet Union that would like to use this situation to oppose perestroika. We do not want to encourage such fervor. We do not favor destabilization of the Soviet Union or the undermining of perestroika. But, in the final analysis, our sympathies lie with Lithuania—this must be stated openly....

[Kuleshov] I understand. For you—Americans—the Baltic is much closer, much more understandable than Central Asia. Of course you know the European portion of the Soviet Union better than, let us say, Turkmenia.... But here and now you have a personal, specific concept of Turkmenia. Are there here, in your view, any prospects in the sphere of creating and expanding economic cooperation between your firms and local enterprises? Or perhaps there is something interfering with the expansion of such contacts?

[Matlock] In principle, we are interested in economic cooperation wherever there is an economic foundation for it. Turkmenia, I have become convinced, is not a poor republic. It has something to trade, something to offer. Yesterday we visited the "Komsomol" [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] horse farm where they raise an astonishing variety of Akhaltekin horses. Beauties! What fortune it is to have them. I know that a horse farm has been set up in Wellington for breeding this kind of Akhaltekin, horses I was told were purchased here. I am also amazed by Turkmen carpets, which cannot be compared with any other in their design and

durability. And your astrakhan fur, natural silk, melons whose taste I will probably never forget.... The republic is rich. And I know that many of our firms are already privately engaged in specific activity directed towards setting up contacts. They do not always explain to us what they are doing here. I also know that in July, Aman Bayramov, chairman of the Ashkhabad Gorispolkom [city party executive committee], will travel to Albuquerque, in central New Mexico, to arrange sister-city contacts there. Of course, he will also have discussions with specialists and the business people of Albuquerque. I can only welcome this. And I think such ties should be expanded with all the means we have at our disposal. We should visit each other more frequently and get to know one another better, learn from one another. We cannot get around this if we want to live in peace and accord.

But it is a strange thing that of the many business people who come to Moscow from America today—almost 90 percent return disappointed. Why? Because of obstacles rooted in the Soviet economic system which have become serious impediments to interstate economic ties. One of these—which our firms have to confront right away with you—is the problem of currency. Everyone knows that the Soviet ruble is nonconvertible. Well—this is a big problem when you are talking about joint enterprise. In trade it is not such a big thing. You can sell something and receive dollars. But in establishing a joint enterprise that begins to bring in a profit in...Soviet rubles—what is an American businessman to do with that? He has to find something to purchase in the Soviet Union and exchange that for some other goods.... It is complicated! And all the more so because most of our firms are not trading firms....

Another problem is all the red tape. You have a huge bureaucracy. Our bureaucracy is like yours, the only difference being that ours is much smaller. Of course, with independence of the republics, like Turkmenia, with their transition to self-government, broad vistas for cooperation will open. But for the time being, no one in Moscow wants to take responsibility for concluding agreements. It seems to me that the Ministry of Foreign Economic ties has lost some of its authority, and business people are required to go around to various institutions, from ministry level to the Bank for Foreign Economic Activities, to sign a single piece of paper. Of course, we see reflected here the costs of the transition period, when the old economic system is no longer functioning and the new one is not yet operating at full power. It would be nice if this stage passed by quickly. Then there is another problem which will have to be resolved—the fact that not all our American businessmen know about specific opportunities available in the republics, of Central Asia let us say. Not all correctly view the situation for doing business here....

[Kuleshov] I think that, for you personally, Turkmenia is now far from being an unknown land. And this visit you have made is evidence of the fact that your fellow countrymen will now be making more frequent trips to Central Asia....

[Matlock] I will be watching this. There are quite a few points of overlap for our cooperation, quite a few common interests. And I believe these will soon begin being put to practical use. Well, I leave Turkmenia with a feeling of genuine gratitude to this wonderful region, and with a feeling of great respect for its people. My wife and I will have something to tell our children in America. We have five, by the way—four sons and a daughter. All are grown up and, incidentally, have also been to the Soviet Union on more than one occasion. One of our sons is married to a Russian, born in Leningrad. And so there is quite a lot which ties us to the Soviet land. And I think that even if my stay here as ambassador ends, I will keep returning to the Soviet Union. I will visit Moscow, Leningrad, and perhaps come back to Turkmenia....

Canadian, Soviet Solons View Human Rights

LD2304163290 Moscow TASS in English 1535 GMT
23 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS—A delegate from the Standing Committee for Foreign Policy and International Trade at the Canadian House of Commons, in Moscow at the invitation of Canadian ambassador to the Soviet Union Vernon Turner, today met members of the Soviet parliamentary Committee for International Affairs.

They discussed the exercise of human rights in this country, above all emigration issues.

Soviet legislators said there were no obstacles to people wishing to leave the Soviet Union. Certain restrictions on the right to emigrate apply only to two categories of people—those who know state secrets *ex officio* and people who have violated the criminal code.

Vladimir Kravets, deputy chairman of the Soviet committee and foreign minister of the Ukraine, said 235,000 soviets left the country last year. In 1990, 70,000 people have already received exit visas and another 30,000 applications are being processed.

Kravets pointed out that many Soviet citizens, who have received exit visas, cannot obtain entry visas from other countries.

Soviet legislators told the Canadian delegation about a new Soviet emigration bill, which was approved in the first reading by parliament and which is expected to be passed at the current parliamentary session.

The bill fully accords with generally-accepted international norms: It provides for neither exit quotas, nor ethnic restrictions. All emigrants wishing to preserve Soviet citizenship will be allowed to do this.

Soviet parliamentarians also said about five million Soviets will visit other countries as tourists this year.

China

Li Peng's Official Visit to Moscow Continues

More on Arrival in Moscow

PM2404124790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Official Visit"]

[Excerpt] At the Soviet Government's invitation, Li Peng, member of the CPC Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee and premier of the PRC State Council, arrived in Moscow 23 April for an official visit.

Li Peng was greeted at Vnukovo airport by N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister; N.P. Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; M.S. Shkabaridnya, administrator of affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers; USSR ministers; O.A. Troyanovskiy, USSR ambassador to the PRC, and other officials.

The welcoming party included Yu Hongliang, PRC ambassador to the USSR.

The state flags of the PRC and USSR were hoisted at the airport. An honor guard of troops from the Moscow garrison was mounted on the airfield. A band played the two countries' national anthems.

N.I. Ryzhkov and Li Peng reviewed the Soviet troop formation.

The ceremonial part of the meeting ended with a march past by the honor guard. From the airport a cavalcade of cars accompanied by an honor motorcycle escort set out for Li Peng's residence.

A written statement by Li Peng was distributed at the airport for journalists. [passage omitted]

Ryzhkov, Li Peng Sign Agreements

PM2504095790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
Second Edition 25 Apr 90 p 5

[TASS report: "Completion of Soviet-Chinese Talks"]

[Text] Moscow, 24 Apr (TASS)—Talks between N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, who is in Moscow on an official visit continued 24 April in the Kremlin.

They exchanged information on the situation in both states, and on the direction of changes that are taking place in various spheres of life in the Soviet Union and in China.

N.I. Ryzhkov described specific features of the present-day stage of perestroika in the Soviet Union and dwelt

on the results of the special, third, Congress of USSR People's Deputies' work, USSR Supreme Soviet sessions, and the latest CPSU Central Committee plenums.

He underscored that in the present extremely responsible and crucial stage of development in the Soviet Union the need has arisen to implement an entire phase of complicated mutually linked reforms. The chief direction of these reforms is to form a new socialist model in which workers will not be alienated from the means of production and which will allow people to show creative initiative. Radicalizing economic reforms and completely elaborating on the concept of a stage-by-stage transfer to a regulated market economy, combined with measures to stabilize the economy, will serve to attain this aim.

Forming a new model of mutual relations between the center and the republics is also part of the renewal of socialism and of revealing the possibilities laid down in it.

Li Peng expressed sincere wishes for the success of perestroika in the USSR. In turn, he gave a detailed briefing of the main aspects of CPC and Chinese Government internal policy. In 11 years of reform China has achieved significant successes in socialist construction. Of course the country's road forward has been uneven. Positive experiences have been accumulated but various difficulties also exist. The latest decisions of the CPC Central Committee plenums and the all-Chinese assembly of people's representatives and PRC State Council sessions, are intended to guarantee sociopolitical consolidation and stability in the country. The three-year course which is now being implemented in the PRC to regulate and improve the economy has already brought initial results.

The USSR Government head noted the Soviet Union's invariable interest in the course of economic transformations in the People's Republic of China and pointed to the importance of deepening the mutual exchange of reform experiences.

Participants in the talks agreed that now, when there are serious changes in the world, personal contacts between leaders of our states and governments make it possible to compare views and positions on key present day problems and on topical questions of socialist construction and are particularly important.

After exchanging views on key international questions, N.I. Ryzhkov and Li Peng emphasized the efforts of the USSR and the PRC to assist the cause of strengthening peace on earth and to settle existing disputes by political means. They spoke out for expanding cooperation between peoples with the aim of resolving global, economic, social, and ecological problems.

The talks took place in a friendly atmosphere of goodwill, frankness, and mutual understanding.

After the talks ended, Soviet-Chinese documents were signed.

On behalf of the governments of the two countries, N.I. Ryzhkov and Li Peng signed a long-term program for the development of economic and scientific and technological cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China. They also signed an agreement between the USSR and PRC Governments on cooperation in the area of research and the use of space for peaceful purposes.

E.A. Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, and Qian Qichen, PRC foreign affairs minister, signed an agreement between the governments of the two countries on the leading principles on the mutual reductions of armed forces and strengthening trust in the military sphere along the Soviet-Chinese border. They also signed a protocol on consultations between the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry and the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

K.F. Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations, and Li Lanqing, PRC deputy minister of foreign economic relations and trade, signed an intergovernmental agreement on state credit for the deliveries of consumer goods from the PRC to the USSR, and a memorandum of cooperation on the construction of an atomic power station in the PRC and the Soviet Union's offer of state credit to China.

Soviet-Chinese Agreements Detailed

LD2404180390 Moscow TASS in English 1746 GMT
24 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—Soviet and Chinese Prime Ministers Nikolay Ryzhkov and Li Peng ended their talks here today after signing two documents to boost bilateral cooperation.

One was a long-term programme to promote economic, scientific and technological cooperation.

It stated the two nations' desire to continue steadily upgrading relations in the economy, research and engineering on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, and charted ways and areas of developing bilateral cooperation until the year 2000.

The document said two countries would jointly concentrate on improving the living and cultural standards of their people.

The programme focuses on such priority areas as the fuel and power industries, metallurgy, transport, communications, the consumer goods industry, agriculture, farm produce processing, mechanical engineering, radio electronics, forestry, the wood-working and pulp-and-paper industries, the chemical industry, and environmental protection.

The two countries will also cooperate in health services, the medical industry, biotechnology, construction, new materials, hydrometeorology, ocean studies, space exploration, remote sensing, automation, laser technology, and other fields.

Ryzhkov and Li also signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

In addition, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen signed an intergovernmental agreement on basic principles for the mutual reduction of armed forces and military confidence-building measures along the Soviet-Chinese border.

The agreement reiterated the principle of the mutual non-use of force or threats of force. It also voiced the two nations' conviction that the mutual scaling down of their armed forces along the shared border to a minimum corresponding to normal good-neighbourly relations is an important condition for developing such relations and will contribute towards a stronger peace in the Asian Pacific region and throughout the world.

The signed document also included a protocol on consultations between the Soviet and Chinese Foreign Ministries, which provides for extensive discussion of international problems and bilateral issues. Soviet-Chinese consultations in international organisations and at international conferences are going to become regular.

Soviet External Economic Relations Minister Konstantin Katushev and Chinese Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Li Lanqin signed an intergovernmental agreement on state credits for Chinese supplies of consumer goods and an intergovernmental memorandum on cooperation in building a nuclear power station in China and on a Soviet state credit to China.

Gorbachev, Li Peng Hold Talks

LD2404171990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1605 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 24 April (TASS)—M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR, met in the Kremlin today with Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, who is in the USSR on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

M.S. Gorbachev expressed satisfaction at the fact that, at the intergovernmental talks just begun, progress was noted in the whole spectrum of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations. This is the result of the implementation of the fundamental accords reached at the Soviet-Chinese summit meeting in the spring of last year which, figuratively speaking, "closed the past and opened the future." There is every basis to expect a considerable qualitative and quantitative growth in Soviet-Chinese cooperation in the economic, cultural, scientific, technological, ecologic and other areas of activity. Headway is also being made in coordinating positions on questions of arms reduction in the region of the Soviet-Chinese border and the settlement of border questions.

Li Peng subscribed to this assessment, stressing that Soviet-Chinese relations have a big reserve of possibilities, whose utilization would benefit both countries. That and the very fact of their extensive contiguity and the complementary nature of their economies and the rich traditions of contacts between the two peoples. [sentence as heard] The Chinese leadership is inclined to conduct matters on an ascending curve here.

The interlocutors agreed that, even given all the objectively existing favorable opportunities, it is necessary to make energetic efforts on both sides. It is a question of signing concrete agreements, oriented towards commercial exchange, joint production and new forms of economic links.

Questions of the modern development of the USSR and the PRC were touched upon in the conversation. M.S. Gorbachev described the present stage of perestroika, and drew particular attention to the measures to normalize the situation on the consumer market and to resolve acute social problems. He said: We are looking at our past, at our present, at the world around us, are drawing lessons; some things we are borrowing from others, but we are going along our own path. At present, discussions are underway in the country on the subject of political perestroika. Those who began this policy, and naturally, I count myself among them, are following the aim of renewing and ennobling our society, while preserving the socialist choice. In its scale and depth, the turn which has taken place is not inferior to the October Revolution. We are striving to keep it within the channel of reforms, the legal process, and to avoid confrontation which is fraught with violence. That is the main thing now.

Throwing light upon the situation in China, Premier Li Peng recalled the serious consequences of the "cultural revolution," which threw the country back greatly. It has been possible to put right a great deal, thanks to the economic reform which has taken place in the PRC, although, here, too, there have been certain errors. The country's leadership proceeds from the need to carry out all-embracing transformations in the future as well, and intends to continue the policy of reforms and openness toward the outside world while guaranteeing social stability.

The participants in the conversation expressed the shared opinion that there are no models and patterns of how to implement socialist ideas and principles that are universally obligatory. Each country has its own history, its own specific features and its initial level of development, and it is impossible not to take this into consideration.

It was noted in the conversation that the dynamic development of the USSR and the PRC and full-blooded good-neighbor cooperation between them are in the interests of all other countries and are an important constant of stability of the world political order. In particular, the agreement which has been drawn up on

the guiding principles for reducing armed forces and strengthening trust in the military sphere in the region of the Soviet-Chinese border is a matter of great importance for strengthening security in Asia.

M.S. Gorbachev and Li Peng noted the proximity of the positions of the two states on a broad range of topical international problems. This refers, in the first place, to the tasks, of concern to all peoples, of restricting the arms race and averting the nuclear threat.

In connection with the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, the PRC premier stated that China would welcome an agreement on reducing strategic nuclear weapons.

It was reaffirmed that certain differences which remain between the sides in their approaches to the resolution of particular questions are not an obstacle to the further development of mutually useful dialogue and cooperation.

Concluding the conversation, M.S. Gorbachev said: "We attach great significance to your visit. Soviet people have a strong inclination for cooperation and friendship with the Chinese people. We hope that they successfully resolve the problems facing them and achieve the prosperity of their homeland."

Present at the conversation on the Soviet side were: E.A. Shevardnadze, O.A. Troyanovskiy, G.Kh. Shakhnazarov; on the Chinese side Qian Qichen, PRC minister of foreign affairs and Yu Hongliang, PRC ambassador to the USSR.

That same day M.S. Gorbachev and R.M. Gorbacheva gave a luncheon in honor of Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, and his wife Zhu Lin.

Li Peng Speaks on Friendship

LD2404193690 Moscow TASS in English 1817 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—By TASS diplomatic correspondent.

Visiting Chinese Premier Li Peng met representatives of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society and Soviet experts working in China at Moscow's House of Friendship today.

At the entrance to the House the Chinese premier and his wife were met by a group of Moscow schoolchildren. They carried the bunches of red roses and said greetings in the Chinese language.

The Chinese guests were welcomed by President of the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Ties With Foreign Countries Valentina Tereshkova. She pointed out the development of contacts between representatives of the Soviet and Chinese people in recent years.

She said that the Soviet people were watching with interest the achievements of the Chinese working people in creating a powerful contemporary industry, transforming the agrarian relations and enriching the spiritual culture of the Chinese society.

In his speech Li Peng said that the Chinese people had always been friendly to the Soviet people, both in times of difficulties in bilateral relations and in good times. It is important to develop and preserve this feeling of friendship and pass it on from generation to generation.

Speaking about his talks with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, Li Peng said that their results had obliged the two sides to promote mutual understanding between China and the Soviet Union. He said that the development of Soviet-Chinese relations would serve the interests of peace and would be good for the Chinese and Soviet people.

Li Peng, Lukyanov Discuss Relations

LD2504081790 Moscow TASS in English 0742 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 25 TASS—By TASS diplomatic correspondent:

Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, on an official visit to the Soviet Union, began the third day of his stay by meeting Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov.

The two discussed a wide range of issues, expressing satisfaction over the progress and dynamic character of Sino-Soviet relations.

Li Peng's talks with the Soviet leadership, his meeting with President Mikhail Gorbachev and agreements reached during the visit will help further expand cooperation and strengthen good neighbourly relations and friendship between the Soviet Union and China for the benefit of the two peoples and global peace, it was said.

Li and Lukyanov spoke positively about the state of parliamentary contacts between the two countries and discussed the prospects for their development. [TASS International Service in Russian at 1100 GMT on 25 April adds the following sentence: "The conversation took place in a warm and friendly atmosphere"]

Li also visited Vladimir Lenin's museum-apartment in the Kremlin and signed the visitor's book.

More on Visit to Lenin's Apartment

LD2504115290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1012 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Moscow, 25 Apr (TASS)—TASS diplomatic correspondent reports:

Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, who is in the Soviet Union on an official visit, visited the "Vladimir

Lenin office and apartment" museum in the Kremlin today, and made an entry in the register of honored guests. [passage omitted]

Li Peng also made a trip today to the little town of Zvezdny, which is situated not far from Moscow. [passage omitted]

Today's program for Li Peng's stay in Moscow envisages the PRC State Council premier holding a press conference in the USSR Foreign Ministry press center.

In the evening the Chinese guest will attend Tchaikovsky's "Swan Lake" ballet in the USSR Bolshoy Theater.

Northeast Asia

Rogachev Interviewed on Asia-Pacific Policy

OW2104212190 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 1400 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Report read by unidentified announcers on an interview with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev, by the (SOVIET WORKERS' FORUM); from the "World Today" program]

[Text] [Male announcer] Listeners, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev granted an interview with a reporter from the (SOVIET WORKERS FORUM).

[Female announcer] The reporter asked him: Can you say that the Soviet diplomacy today is oriented toward the Asia-Pacific region?

[Male announcer] The Soviet deputy foreign minister replied: Gorbachev expounded the general policy toward this region in his 28 July 1986 speech delivered in Vladivostok. At that time, he set forth three tasks: normalizing relations with Asia-Pacific countries, seeking ways to reconcile regional conflicts, and easing military confrontation. Over the past four years, the Soviet Union has improved, resumed, or established relations with the vast majority of the countries in this region. As everyone knows, the Soviet Union has withdrawn all its troops from Afghanistan while continuing to do as much as possible toward the settlement of the Afghan question. It has also done a lot of work in mediating the Cambodia issue, resulting in the continued relaxation of the military situation in that area. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is trimming its armed forces in the Far East. An agreement on the total troop withdrawal from Mongolia has been signed, and a measure is being implemented to reduce our country's military presence in Vietnam. What is left to be desired, Rogachev pointed out, is that we are unable, for the time being, to establish a mechanism for major countries in this region to discuss important questions on Asia-Pacific security as we have done in Europe.

[Female announcer] How about Soviet-Chinese relations?

[Male announcer] The Soviet deputy foreign minister said: Without doubt, the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations is the most important achievement of our Asia-Pacific policy. Both sides insist on faithful compliance with the basic principles in the joint statement signed on Gorbachev's visit to China last May, and they have proved this with their concrete action. Since then, we have been busy working to lay a foundation for taking new major steps to develop cooperation between the two countries, the two parties, and the two peoples. Of course, Chinese Premier Li Peng's visit to the Soviet Union, which will begin in a few days, will be the most important event in Soviet-Chinese relations this year. The two sides will hold high-level talks and sign a series of new agreements which will greatly consolidate the legal basis of Soviet-Chinese relations. Here I wish to particularly point out the talks on the questions of reducing the armed forces along the Soviet-Chinese border and strengthening mutual confidence in the military field. We hope that this will become a prelude to talks among various parties aimed at easing the military confrontation in the whole Asia-Pacific region.

[Female announcer] In your opinion, what are the main obstacles to developing the ties between the Soviet Union and Japan?

[Male announcer] The Soviet deputy foreign minister said: We should not think that Soviet-Japanese relations are marking time. In fact, their relations have taken a turn for the better. Political confrontation has been changed to constant dialogue. After our discussions, we have decided to open talks on drafting a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. And Gorbachev is scheduled to visit Japan in 1991.

[Female announcer] Can we say that the Soviet-Japanese difference on the so-called northern-territory issue will not affect their high-level meeting?

[Male announcer] Rogachev said: You are quite right.

[Female announcer] Moreover, Rogachev pointed out that the Soviet relations with ASEAN is taking a turn for the better. In particular, he stressed: In developing relations with this group of countries, the Soviet Union has no intention at all to disrupt the international-relations setup that has already taken shape in this area. The Soviet Union will not disrupt the Asia-Pacific countries' relations with the United States and Japan. As for South Korea, it is not right to ignore that country. Instead, the Soviet Union should develop economic ties with it.

Referring to the prospects for development in the Asia-Pacific region, the Soviet deputy foreign minister said he did not think that the center of international relations, presently in the Atlantic, would suddenly move to the Pacific. Instead, it should be said that interregion ties will be strengthened, and that the speed of development will become even throughout the world. Likewise, development of various areas in the Soviet Union will gradually become even. The Far Eastern part of the Soviet

Union, he said, will eventually catch up with the level of development in the European part—at least, it is entirely possible to accomplish this in the early 21st century.

Japan's Nakayama Views Confidence-Building Plans

LD2404183690 Moscow TASS in English 1751 GMT
24 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Solntsev]

[Text] Tokyo April 24 TASS—Japan's Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama expressed Tokyo's readiness to discuss confidence-building measures in the military field with the Soviet Union at the Budget Commission of the House of Representatives.

Nakayama said the problem could be discussed while exchanging views on regional arms control and disarmament during Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's forthcoming visit to Japan this year.

The Japanese minister announced "agreement in principle to create an atmosphere of trust in relations between Japan and the Soviet Union." At the same time he referred again to the alleged "build-up of Soviet naval might in the Sea of Japan" and the "unlawful occupation of Northern territories", the local appellation of a number of South Kuril Islands whose possession by the Soviet Union is disputed by Japan.

The Japanese minister was speaking in response to a direct question from a Komeito party deputy about whether the Japanese Government was planning confidence-building measures with relation to the Soviet Union, including the exchange of military information, visits by the two countries' military representatives, notification about exercises and mutual inspection of military bases.

The opposition and the liberal press have lately been pressing the government to modify its military policy in line with the growing tendency of easing tensions and passing over from East-West confrontation to dialogue. The need to change approaches towards relations with the Soviet Union has lately been voiced even by members of the ruling liberal democratic party.

A Japanese Foreign Ministry high-ranking official confirmed in the parliament last week press reports that the Foreign Ministry and the National Defence Administration had begun to study the possibility of reaching an accord with the Soviet Union on matters relating to confidence-building measures.

The KYODO TSUSHIN NEWS AGENCY connects this decision by the Foreign Ministry and the National Defence Administration with the growing awareness of the fact that the Soviet Union's peace offensive has monopolized the initiative in the reduction of tension.

According to Japanese Government sources cited by the TOKYO SHIMBUN newspaper, this peace offensive may gain additional momentum as President Mikhail

Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Japan, scheduled for next year, draws closer. It forces Tokyo to work out return measures.

In a recent interview with TASS and the KYODO TSUSHIN NEWS AGENCY, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy said that "as regards confidence-building measures, the Soviet Union is open to a broad dialogue with the Japanese side" and is ready to consider any confidence-building measures that could facilitate changes in the military and political climate in the region.

Petrovskiy said the sides could begin with measures relating to the naval aspect of the matter, including an agreement to prevent incidents at sea. The Soviet Union has such agreements with a number of countries, including the United States.

Responding to a question about Tokyo's attitude to specific Soviet proposals for confidence-building measures at today's briefing here, Japanese Foreign Ministry Official spokesman Taizo Watanabe said the Japanese Government has not made any decisions on this score and sees no need to create any special negotiations mechanism for this purpose.

"We," the spokesman said, "are exchanging views on questions of this kind. As consultation's progress, other subjects can crop up. However, today we are not thinking of any new aspects but are simply striving for mutual understanding through dialogue."

Soviet, Japanese Officials on UN 'Efficiency'

PM2404153190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Apr 90 Moscow Evening Edition p 4

[TASS report: "At Consultations in Tokyo"]

[Text] Tokyo, 20 Apr—Soviet-Japanese consultations took place in Tokyo today, at which the Soviet delegation was headed by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy, and the Japanese delegation by N. Akao, director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's UN Affairs Department. A wide range of questions relating to the state of affairs at the United Nations and in its specialized agencies was discussed during the consultations, which were held in an amicable atmosphere. Broad spheres of agreement were revealed with regard to enhancing the efficiency and rationalizing the activity of the entire UN system, making better use of its material and intellectual resources, enhancing the role of UN peacekeeping operations, and including preventive diplomacy mechanisms in the UN system.

In the context of a discussion of multifaceted aspects of the disarmament process the sides reached agreement on the need to hold the upcoming conference on problems of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in a positive, constructive key and on the need to examine the nonproliferation problem not only in the nuclear dimension but also in all other dimensions and to give paramount

importance to resolving the question of banning nuclear tests on a multilateral basis. Agreement was reached to hold consultations in Tokyo at the level of leaders of the USSR and Japanese Foreign Ministry international organizations administrations before the next UN General Assembly session.

At the Japanese Foreign Ministry today V.F. Petrovskiy passed on specific Soviet proposals developing the idea advanced by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze to arrange for ecological cooperation in Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

The USSR deputy foreign minister had a meeting with Einosuke Akiya, president of the Japanese political-religious organization Soka Gakkai, during which there was a thorough and interested discussion of the development and use of the practice of the ideas of the new political thinking and on the active involvement of public forces in an international dialogue. A meeting was also held with Eytor Gurgulino di Sousa [name as transliterated], rector of the UN University.

Kurils 'Concession' to Japan Rejected

PM2404154790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
22 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Answer to reader's letter by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "Should the 'Northern Territories' Be Conceded?"]

[Text] Reader's Question

The historical documents proving the right to part of the Kuril Islands could be studied long and meticulously. I propose looking at this question as though from a future vantage point.

We are all sure that a time will come "when the peoples will forget their quarrels and unite in one great family." But who is unprepared for such a time, at least intellectually? The two sides in question. "We will not yield an inch of our native soil"—that is fair, in my view, in the extraordinary event of armed aggression. But in this case, the Kuril Islands, why not give way? Not because Japan has demonstrated its rights but because it is historically unjust (although in this instance there is no specific culprit) for a great and talented people (123 million—nearly one-half that of the USSR) to be crowded onto a small archipelago while we actually have millions of square kilometers empty.

When states and the territorial disputes that accompany them disappear, as we believe they will, people in that far-off time will look in the archives and read with a sense of superiority about a great territorial power which "ferreted around" seeking rights to some minute islands. [Signed] L. Piskunov, Temyan village, Tula Oblast.

Commentator's Reply

Esteemed Leonid Leonidovich!

It is hard to dispute your idea that if we look from the future, "when the peoples will forget their squabbles and unite in one great family," then the present disputes about four islands in the Kuril chain will appear trivial. Then, probably, the Americans, too, will agree with us that the sale of Alaska, which was opened up by Russian pioneers, for peanuts was an act of Tsarist stupidity and they will restore historical justice.

But PRAVDA readers in their letters now far more often express alarm: Having become used to selling off irreplaceable natural resources, are we not bartering our national territory for the sake of economic sops from wealthy neighbors? Will our descendants forgive us this act? Let us recall how difficult it is for us now to justify the sale of Russia's historic relics in the years of hunger after the revolution.

Your tendency to interpret the new thinking as meaning unilateral concessions by the USSR is particularly typical of our foreign opponents. In Australia I was asked: Why is the restructuring of Soviet foreign policy in the East less noticeable than in the West? Why not give the Japanese those tiny islands, since you have so much empty land in Siberia?

I recall that I answered that question with a question: Why should Australia, which is even less densely populated than the USSR, not open its doors to at least one-third of the inhabitants of the neighboring Indonesian island of Java, where a population almost equal to that of Japan crowds into an area equal in size to Czechoslovakia? This version of "historical justice" did not generate enthusiasm among the Australians. It is easier to be generous and magnanimous at someone else's expense.

I should like to add that the overpopulation of Japan is striking because one-half of its inhabitants are crowded into 1.5 percent of its territory. Almost 60 million people are concentrated in a chain of large cities along the Pacific seaboard (Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe, and Osaka). Whereas the so-called "Japanese hinterland," which faces our Maritime Kray, and the island of Hokkaido suffer from underpopulation.

Unlike Okinawa, with its 1 million inhabitants, the "northern territories" are virtually incapable of influencing either the economic or the demographic situation in Japan. The only national economic effect of their transfer would be felt by Japan's fishermen (who are currently hindered by the presence of Soviet territorial waters around the islands). In an atmosphere of trust and good-neighborliness, however, this question could have been settled long ago. But if they don't even want to discuss confidence-building measures in the Far East with us, who will guarantee that these "minute islands" will not be used to trap our Pacific Ocean Fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk?

You suggest not ferreting around in documents relating to the ownership of the southern Kurils. Fine. Let us turn instead to the facts of postwar history. It is wrong to

claim that we behaved like an "expansionist power" all those years. Didn't the USSR transfer the naval base of Porkkala Point to Finland or Port Arthur and Dalniy to China? But such goodwill gestures are possible only in an atmosphere of genuine trust and good-neighborliness. If, instead of that, people fuel revanchist passions and pull the ends of the rope in opposite directions, the knot becomes tighter and tighter. It only took Ozawa, general secretary of the Liberal Democratic Party, to state in a recent PRAVDA interview that the development of Japanese-Soviet relations needs mutual concessions for virtually a political scandal to erupt in Tokyo. Until Moscow changes its stand on the "northern territories," they said, it is too soon to talk about fruitful cooperation.

Such a short-sighted policy can only be regretted. We have already acknowledged that we adhere to opposing opinions. It needs a third path—the path of dialogue. A mutually acceptable compromise may be hard to find but it can be done. But to expect our country to succumb to pressure and to capitulate to territorial claims because of current squabbles is senseless, in my opinion.

Yazov Greets DPRK Armed Forces Minister

PM2504091190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Army General D. Yazov greetings message: "To Comrade O Chin-u, vice marshal of the Korean People's Army and DPRK minister of the People's Armed Forces"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Minister!

On behalf of USSR Armed Forces servicemen I sincerely congratulate you and all Korean People's Army personnel on the 58th anniversary of the Army's formation.

I express confidence that the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between our countries and armies will continue to develop for the benefit of the Soviet and Korean peoples and in the interests of maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

I wish Korean People's Army servicemen new successes in strengthening the DPRK's defense capability and in struggling for the peaceful and democratic unification of the motherland.

Respectfully,
Army General D. Yazov, USSR defense minister

Korean People's Army Celebrates 58th Anniversary

PM2404101990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Embassy Press Conference"]

[Text] A press conference devoted to the 58th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army was held in the DPRK's Moscow Embassy on 20 April.

Major General Kim Zeon-chan [name as transliterated], military, naval, and air attache at the embassy, spoke about the Korean People's Army's history and combat record. He stressed the indissolubility of Soviet-Korean brotherhood in arms. Expressing sincere gratitude to the USSR and its peoples for their selfless aid and support, the speaker wished Soviet people success in carrying out the aims and tasks of perestroika.

Korean-Language Newspaper in Kazakhstan Reviewed

SK2404014490 Moscow International Service
in Korean 0900 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Unattributed talk]

[Excerpt] We will briefly introduce LENINIST BANNER. This newspaper is published in Korean five times a week in Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan. The paper mainly deals with the lives of the Korean people in the Soviet Union. We will introduce this newspaper during this hour. The paper carried a letter entitled "Along With the Spirit of the Era" by (Chu Pyong-il), who is an avid reader of (?this newspaper) and a member of the Soviet Journalist Union. (Chu Pyong-il) writes as follows:

The appearance and contents of LENINIST BANNER have significantly improved recently. More writers contribute (?influential) articles, and the number of articles dealing with very urgent issues has increased. For more than half a century, publications have kept silent about many gloomy pages of the history of our revolution. Therefore, I cannot help but mention that (Roboshnikov Pak Chong-hun), (Pang Sang-ho), and other people published recollections on an incident that took place in 1937. Hundreds of excellent Koreans in the Soviet Union were suppressed that year, and other people were forcibly moved to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Data on the history of Korean people in the Soviet Union and the Korean people's (?lesson) are very important in (?teaching) young people. Not many of us have [words indistinct]. I think it very important to establish Korean national cultural centers to preserve the Korean language, customs, and tradition. Such centers are being established in many cities, and the newspaper reports on this without delay. Readers look forward to the delivery of LENINIST BANNER. LENINIST BANNER has become a truly influential newspaper. I pray that the newspaper will bring about further successes. So said (Chu Pyong-il).

(Yi Ha-in) was an editor-in-chief of SONGJONG SINMUN [name of the newspaper as heard], which was published in the 1930's in the Far East; (Pak Il-li) was a political reporter; (Pak Min-yong) was a comrade-in-arms of Yi Tong-hui, an outstanding revolutionary, and was a military political official. In the newspaper, (Pak Valentin), a senior scientist at the Far East Institute under the Soviet Academy of Sciences, is talking about them and 99 other people. For many years at the institute, he has studied the history of Korean people in the Soviet Union in the early days after the October

revolution. In studying this subject, he found names of unknown people—who played outstanding roles in the struggle to build a Soviet regime in the Far East—in old documents. A majority of them were illegally suppressed during Stalin's tyrannical rule and have been unjustly forgotten. (Pak Valentin) asks readers of this newspaper in the Soviet Union, China, and Korea to write to the following address if they know anything about the fate of the aforementioned people and other Korean revolutionaries. The address is (Pak Valentin), 294, Apartment No. 68, (Mozamskiy) Avenue, Moscow. [passage omitted]

Near East & South Asia

Syria's Al-Asad To Visit 'End of April'

PM2404203790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
25 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Visit to USSR by President of Syria"]

[Text] By mutual accord President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria will pay a working visit to the Soviet Union at the end of April.

Najibullah Interviewed on Revolution Anniversary

LD2404113590 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1024 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Kabul, 24 apr (TASS)—In connection with the anniversary of the April Revolution, the president of the Republic of Afghanistan gave an interview to TASS correspondent Yuriy Tyssovskiy:

[Question] Mr. President, the 12th anniversary of the events which changed the life of Afghan society and the whole course of the history of Afghanistan in a major way is approaching. Could you give an appraisal of the positive and negative aspects of the experience of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which has governed the country throughout this period?

[Answer] Despite 12 years having passed since that time, from a historical point of view this is a short time. For the PDPA this time has been filled with important achievements and difficult tests. The party which came to power on 27 April 1978 faced a serious historical test of its endurance. Over this time, for various reasons, the party's activities have had their negative and positive sides. After proclaiming its program of action the PDPA began to implement a whole series of measures aimed at eliminating the country's age-old backwardness, ensuring progress and the flourishing of Afghan society. But soon after it took power the implementation of these measures were hampered by foreign armed interference and internal opposition, which with the passing of some time turned into a very real war against the PDPA, against the state and its very basis.

At the same time the party, being a product of a backward society, in whose heart it arose, and lacking

sufficient experience in governing affairs of state, made a whole series of tactical errors. They manifested themselves as a monopoly of power, haste, and precipitance in implementing political and socio-economic reforms, lack of attention to the traditions of society and its ethnic composition, and the absence of a balanced approach when implementing foreign policy. For these reasons the war whipped up from outside and the party's mistakes prevented the course for implementing the profound transformations in the interests of the Afghan people from being carried out completely.

The experience of the past years has brought our party to the notion of the necessity of changes in policy, forms of activity and its own structure, in order to bring it into line with internal conditions in the country and the development of the international situation. The implementation of the policy of national reconciliation is the fruit of such a rethinking.

[Question] At the moment a lot is being said in Kabul about important coming changes in the political life of the country, and you yourself in your speeches have pointed out the need for the party to give up its monopoly on power, for a further democratization of society, and for those opposition forces who see their task as being the establishment of peace in Afghanistan to be drawn more broadly into the policy of national reconciliation, and be given real levers for influencing state policy. In this context, I should like to know how you see the role and tasks facing the peace congress, and the Peace Front currently being set up, and its political weight in society?

[Answer] The policy of national reconciliation is essential so that all forces, parties, groupings and individuals striving for peace might be united in a single center. We are convinced that the Peace Front could become such a center. Its draft platform has recently published in the country's mass media.

The basic aim of the measures setting up the Peace Front is to speed up the process of implementing the dearest longings of the Afghan people: a guarantee of peace, the elimination of the consequences of the war, the restoration of the country, the rebirth of national unity and selfless activity aimed at achieving prosperity and well-being for the people. The Peace Front could be the most effective instrument to remove discord among the Afghans and to restore national unity.

In the preparations for the constituent congress of the Peace Front, equal parts are being played not only by the PDPA, but also by nine other political and four public organizations. The field commanders of the opposition, the groups of the "Alliance of Seven" in Peshawar (Pakistan), the "Nine-Party Coalition" in Iran, refugees, and public and political Afghan figures currently living in Europe, the United States and other countries will be invited to take part in this process. The draft program for the Peace Front's activities explains, along with other clauses, that "no Afghan, no political, public, national or

local grouping can be considered to be enemies of the Peace Front simply because of the fact that they took this or that position during the war years."

The draft program of the Peace Front's actions has been put forward for general discussion, and we are ready to accept any constructive proposals, opinions or drafts from interested forces and individuals.

[Question] May I ask you to analyze the negative and positive consequences of the plot by the putschists at the beginning of March this year for the policy of national reconciliation, for the unity of the party's ranks, and for the further development of the military-political in Afghanistan for the coming period.

[Answer] The attempted coup of 6 March, which was undertaken by former defense minister Shahnawaz Tanay and his circle, with the complicity of Golbuddin Hekmatyar and comprehensive support from Pakistan's military intelligence, was such a broad and dangerous plot that, had it succeeded, would have led to ruinous and irreparable consequences for Afghanistan and its future.

The attempted coup of which I speak, which was crushed in less than 24 hours, caused large human casualties and material and financial losses, and created short-term difficulties for the state. However, we coped with them swiftly and were able to bring the situation back to normal in a short period of time. Because the plotters' basic aim was to undermine the policy of national reconciliation and of a political solution to the Afghan issue, the liquidation of the attempted putsch undoubtedly removed certain obstacles in the path of complete implementation of this policy. The reality of developments after the failure of the plot shows that there has been an intensification of the front of forces of peace and of supporters of national accord within the country and abroad. The attempted coup also caused a deepening of the polarization in the positions of opposition groupings. The numerous messages which I have received from field commanders and groupings of the armed opposition since the coup, and the stance of certain leaders of the Peshawar alliance, confirm this.

As far as the unity of the party ranks is concerned, it should be said that they have been purged of certain elements which have acted counter to the PDPA's current policy, in other words the policy of national reconciliation. The party has become more united than before, and it intends to put this policy into practice even more resolutely. As far as the last part of this question is concerned, one might note the following: since no military unit, large or small, joined the plotters or the opposition ranks, and since there was no desertion apart from that of an insignificant little group of direct participants in the putsch, this plot did not bring any significant changes to the existing balance of forces in the country or to the military-political situation.

[Question] In the West, and especially in the United States, in spite of the emergence of certain positive

trends on the issue of Afghanistan, some people are once more starting to talk about the need to "give a fresh chance" to the armed opposition detachments in their struggle for power and of a latest "season of military actions" throughout the country. What will this mean for Afghanistan and how, in your opinion, will events develop this year if the Peshawar leaders and their U.S. and Pakistani patrons attempt to put these plans into effect?

[Answer] The talks which are being held in certain official U.S. circles on furnishing the opposition with yet another chance to attempt to achieve their objectives with the aid of military force in the coming season are a reflection of the old U.S. policy based on a military solution to the Afghan problem.

This policy does not only go against the spirit and letter of the Geneva accords and the generally accepted norms of international law, its point and essence is to continue armed interference in Afghanistan's affairs and to drag out the sufferings of our people, which is a fundamental contradiction of the atmosphere of new detente in international relations and the assurances of the U.S. Government of its desire for a political solution to regional conflicts, including that of Afghanistan. Giving the militant opposition forces another chance in the hope of a military success can only be called a new opportunity to continue murdering innocent people and further destroying Afghanistan.

In the course of the last 10-11 years, the armed opposition forces have been given a multitude of such "chances." Even so, they have had no success. Bearing in mind the fact that in the year and two months since the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops, with the comprehensive and generous assistance of the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and certain other countries the forces of the armed opposition have still not managed to achieve a military victory of any significance, it is quite incomprehensible that there is any logic in giving such a "chance" to people who have already tried to take advantage of it and learnt the appropriate lessons.

In the event of attempts by the leaders of the Afghan groupings in Peshawar and their U.S. and Pakistani patrons to put such schemes into effect, we say, and accept full responsibility for so doing, that just as before, we shall be able to defend ourselves, using all our strength and capabilities. Responsibility for continuing the war, for the heartless murder of the sons of the Afghan people and for the consequences of such actions will then lie with those who concoct such sinister and dangerous plans.

Azerbaijan's Sadykhov Discusses Iranian Border

WA2404185990 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY
in Russian 2 Mar 90 p 4

[Report on interview with G.M. Sadykhov, minister of foreign affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR, by AZERIN-FORM correspondent A. Guseynov; date and place not specified: "There Should Be Quiet on the Border"]

[Text] [Guseynov] At the beginning of last month, you informed our readers that the drafts of two international documents were prepared which regulate relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran on questions of the mutual visits of the citizens of both countries to relatives and on invitation from other persons, and also about the simplified crossing of the border by residents of the areas of the USSR and Iran that are contiguous with the border. Please tell us, how do matters stand with these documents?

[Sadykhov] The documents you indicate, in whose preparation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the republic took an active part, were sent by the USSR MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] to Iran in January of this year. It should be noted that the Iranian side treated the situation that developed at that time on the Soviet-Iranian border with great understanding; it studied them carefully and in a timely way, it introduced amendments that were acceptable to us, and, by the beginning of February, it reported its readiness to sign them. The following fact, for example, can serve as an affirmation of the aforementioned: As I already reported in our last interview, the document presented by us about simplifying border crossing was called an "agreement," and the second, a "memorandum." The Iranian side proposed calling both documents "memorandum" inasmuch as, according to the existing situation, an agreement requires ratification on the part of parliament, and, consequently, this would delay putting it into effect. But a memorandum does not require ratification and goes into effect either on the day it is signed or on a day to which both sides agree, and it has almost the same legal force as an agreement. Therefore, the Soviet side accepted the Iranian proposal. A number of other proposals were also made, but on the whole the documents did not undergo any major changes. They were both signed on 15 February 1990 in Tehran. They were signed on the Soviet side by B.N. Chaplin, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and on the Iranian side by M. Mir Mekhdi, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

[Guseynov] Please comment on the documents that were signed.

[Sadykhov] The first document is the "Memorandum of Mutual Understanding Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning Mutual Trips of Citizens of Both Countries to Relatives and on Invitation of Other Persons." It will significantly facilitate

conditions for the contacts of Soviet citizens and Iranians, and it will thereby establish normal civilized relations between the states and also between parts of one nation separated by the will of history. According to this document, the citizens of both countries who have invitations that are verified by competent authorities of their country, on showing actual border passports to consular establishments of the adjoining country, receive visas for a stay in the country for a period of two months, and the names of spouses and minor children of citizens of both countries can be carried on their passports.

No less important is the following: Previously, in applying to consular offices, the periods for a visa to be issued was not definite, and frequently it took months, and even more. Now this period is specified as 10 days, and in extreme cases (visiting the sick, death of relatives), it is reduced to three working days. This memorandum went into effect from the moment of its signing, and appropriate documents are already being accepted in the OVIR [Visas and Registration Department] of the MVD in Azerbaijan.

The second document is the "Memorandum of Mutual Understanding Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning the Simplification of Procedures for Crossing the Border by Residents of Regions Adjoining the Border." There were also difficulties in the preparation of this document: It was necessary to define the zone near the border. We proposed considering it to be 14 rayons of Azerbaijan that border on Iran. However, the Iranians noted reasonably that the Iranian side does not have an administrative division like ours, and they proposed considering the residents of border regions to be those persons located in a zone 90 km by 45 km on both sides of the line of the border between the two states, which, as is known, follows the channel of the Araks River.

According to the memorandum, residents of the border regions have the right to cross the border on national passports with inserts of an established form. These inserts, which are valid for one occasion of 30 days, and whose validity on the territory of the receiving side is 15 days from the moment of crossing the border, will be issued to the local competent organs of both sides. For our country this will be the ispolkoms [executive committee] of rayons, settlements, and rural soviets of people's deputies of the border rayons. The names of children up to 16 years of age will be entered on the insert of their parents or accompanying persons.

Residents of the border regions can cross the border only at established places four times a year, but exceptions (sickness, accidents, death of relatives, traditional holidays, and ceremonies) can be allowed by border authorities for more than four crossings.

[Guseynov] Tell me, please, what sectors on the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] are specified by the memorandum for crossing the border,

and when will citizens, as a practical matter, be able to take advantage of the new rules?

[Sadykhov] Residents of the border rayons of the Azerbaijan SSR will be able to cross the border at admission points which will be built in the following sectors: Negram, Dzhulfa, Khudaferin, Goradiz, Belyasuv, and Astara. The border can be crossed on foot or in a private vehicle indicated on the insert to the passport. Crossing the border is permitted only during daylight hours and during hours that will be specified by border authorities of both countries. When crossing the border, citizens are subject to border and customs inspection in accordance with the internal laws and rules of each of the countries.

When crossing the border, and during the stay on the territory of the receiving country, citizens are obligated to abide by the laws in force in that country and to respect its traditions and customs. Visits to the other country can be made only to that point or designated points indicated on the insert, and travel can be performed only within their bounds.

This memorandum is concluded for three years, but it will be extended automatically every three years, if neither party advises the other party through diplomatic channels six months prior to the expiration of the regular three-year term of its desire to discontinue it.

It should be known that the memorandum will go into effect in accordance with the established procedure in each country after the signing and exchange of notes concerning the readiness of the sides to put the memorandum into effect. This means that each party beforehand must build approach routes to the border crossing points, accommodations for border and customs services, and other attributes that are necessary for their normal functioning.

Thus, the political part of the work to erect bridges of contacts between the populations of the border regions has been completed. Now it is up to the local authorities.

Muslim Clergy Clear Up Pakistani Allegations

LD2404224890 Moscow TASS in English 2107 GMT 24 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Yuriy Tyssovskiy]

[Text] Kabul April 25 TASS—The allegations of the Pakistani mass media that a million copies of the Holy Koran which had arrived in the Soviet Union from Saudi Arabia were burnt and thrown away by the Soviet Customs officials are not true and are designed to stage a provocation, Abdurashid Hadzhi Dudayev, member of a delegation of Soviet clergymen which is staying in Afghanistan, told a news conference on Tuesday.

Dudayev told TASS that during the stay of the delegation of Soviet Moslems in Mecca, the Saudi Arabian King Fahd promised to hand over a million copies of the Holy Koran for believers in Soviet Central Asia and

other parts of the Soviet Union. An agreement to deliver the copies to Moscow was reached with Soviet Aeroflot.

The delegation, Dudayev went on to say, arrived in Afghanistan on April 12 and the copies of the Koran had not arrived in the Soviet Union by that time (the first shipments of the holy book has been delivered to Moscow by now). However, the Pakistan PRESS INTERNATIONAL hurried to spread the rumours that Soviet Customs officers were throwing away 90 percent of the holy books which had not even arrived in the Soviet Union by that time.

Dudayev also blasted allegations spread by the Pakistani news agency that 50,000 copies of the Koran printed in the Soviet Union were not distributed among Soviet Moslems. But, they were distributed among Moslem believers during the celebrations of an anniversary of the adoption of Islam in the Volga Region, the Urals and other parts of the Soviet Union, which was marked in the beginning of 1990.

Head of the delegation of Soviet Moslems and Deputy Chairman of the Moslem Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan Abdulgani Abdullayev told journalists that the policy of glasnost and pluralism had improved the position of Soviet Moslems. He emphasised that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had personally issued an instruction to increase the number of pilgrims going to Mecca for the Hajj this year as against 1989 to visit the holy places in the homeland of the Prophet Muhammad.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Gorbachev Congratulates Namibian President

LD2304174890 Moscow TASS in English 1730 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sent a message to Namibian President Sam Nujoma, in which he expressed sincere congratulations on Namibia's admittance to the United Nations. The message stressed that "this historic event is the logical completion of the Namibian people's struggle for independence with the direct participation of the U.N.

"It is convincing evidence of the efficiency of dialogue in international affairs."

Mikhail Gorbachev wished success to free Namibia and reiterated the Soviet Union's readiness to develop cooperation with your country, including in the search for solutions to global tasks facing the U.N.

Coup Against Nigerian Government Reported

EA2404155590 Moscow International Service in Swahili 1730 GMT 23 Apr 90

[From "Day's Important Events" program]

[Text] Our correspondent, Vladimir Vlaviyev based in Lagos brings us a report following the failed attempt to overthrow the government of Nigeria:

[Begin Vlaviyev recording in Russian, fading to Swahili translation] The decision to try to overthrow the government was taken by those calling themselves residents of the central and southern regions of the country. To a certain extent, this means that there are (?religious) differences in Nigeria between southern regions, where the majority of the inhabitants are Christians, and Muslims living in northern Nigeria.

Time and time again here in Nigeria, there have been complaints about the people from the north holding high posts in the ministries and various offices of the Federal Government. The complaint of the people in central and southern Nigeria about the inhabitants from the north holding power is strengthened by the fact that the Nigerian president, Ibrahim Babangida, is a Muslim himself. Those who plotted to overthrow the government accused the government of President Babangida of human rights violations, corruption, economic decline, and participation in drugs trafficking, among other things. President Babangida himself was blamed for the constant reshuffles of his government which took place toward the end of last year. He is also accused of monopolizing power to rule the whole country.

According to a statement issued yesterday, 22 April, by General Ibrahim Babangida, the rebels who attempted to overthrow the government at dawn on Sunday were very few. The group came particularly from the ranks of lieutenant and major. The dissidents attacked the military barracks where the president was living. There was fierce fighting, and the dissidents managed to enter the premises of the barracks, which forced President Babangida to run for his life to another military barracks.

The dissidents managed to capture the nearby radio station of the Federal Government and issued a statement calling on the people to support the revolt. On Sunday morning, the attempted coup was foiled and the president of Nigeria met with the press and told them that the majority of the dissidents has already been arrested and that they would be taken to court very soon.

Yesterday's attempt to overthrow the government is the second against Gen. Ibrahim Babangida since he came to power in 1985.

The chairman of the Federal Central Committee headquarters, Sani Abachi, issued a statement on the radio and said that the military government was still firm in its intention of implementing the program of bringing Nigeria to civilian rule. [end recording]

Kenya Human Rights Situation Viewed

*EA2004181090 Moscow International Service
in Amharic 1530 GMT 16 Apr 90*

[From the "Africa As We See It" program]

[Text] It will be recalled that the late Kenyan foreign minister, Robert Ouko, was murdered in a village called Koru. The cause of the death and the identities of the killers are not yet known. This has exacerbated the state of Kenya's internal politics. Georgiy Tashin comments:

Reacting to antigovernment demonstrations in Nairobi, Kisumu, and other Kenyan towns, President Moi banned all political activities. Moreover, the Kenyan police were instructed to make arrests in hotels and clubs. Previously such action had been illegal. The reason for the arrest orders is the assumption that leaders of opposition forces meet in hotels and clubs to conspire against the government.

In a statement in March, President Moi said that rich people and disgruntled elements were using Robert Ouko's death as a pretext for conspiring, spreading rumors, and inciting others. According to the Western press, more than 50 prominent Kenyans were arrested or interrogated within a month. British detectives have been invited to trace the murderers, but the circumstances surrounding Robert Ouko's death are not yet known. Anyone who refers to or gives his views on Ouko's death is deemed a conspirator and is prosecuted.

Among those interrogated was the former Kenyan transport and communications minister, Kenneth Matiba. During the 1989 Kenya African National Union [KANU, ruling party] elections, Mr. Matiba accused party officials of vote-rigging. Kenneth Matiba said he had been summoned without a court arrest warrant and that the police had accused him of intending to form a new party.

The Kenyan minister of information and broadcasting, Waruru Kanja, is one of the accused Kenyan political leaders. Mr. Kanja was a freedom-fighter who took part in the activities of the Mau Mau in the fifties. Because he revealed repeated acts of mischief perpetrated by the government, Kanja was sacked from his ministerial post and lost his membership of KANU. Mr. Kanja had also revealed that Kenyan Government officials were corrupt, and said the cause of Ouko's death had been concealed by the Kenyan Government.

The conflict between the church and the government in Kenya has worsened. Bishop Ndege Imunde, a representative of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa, was arrested recently and accused of hiding seditious documents which exposed the president's government.

In a recent All-African Conference of Churches meeting in Nairobi, Archbishop Desmond Tutu made the accusation that human rights and freedoms were violated in most African countries more than they used to be during the days of colonialism. Kenya is one of the countries implicated.

The murder of Robert Ouko at Koru Village has thus occasioned the eruption of political volcanoes which had thus far lain dormant in Kenya. Although it is too early to say that the political crisis in Kenya has worsened, it

is, however, wrong to deny its existence. The one-party system has [word indistinct] Kenya into a state bureaucracy. The party has put all state structures under its own control. The Kenyan people have expressed their displeasure through demonstrations.

East Europe

KGB Increases Romanian-Moldavian Border Forces

LD2404162990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1515 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 24 April—TASS correspondent Aleksandr Borisov reports:

On the Soviet-Romanian sector of the USSR state border, which passes through the territory of Moldavia, a tendency towards complicating the situation has been noticed. This was stated at a briefing today in Moscow by Anatoliy Parakhin, a representative of the headquarters of the KGB USSR border troops. The cause of the complication, he noted, is the desire of Romanian and Moldavian nationalists to eliminate the border demarcation between Romania and adjacent rayons of Moldavia, where a population that is ethnically close to Romanians lives.

Anatoliy Parakhin said calls are currently being voiced on both sides of the border for the organization of free border crossing by the inhabitants of Moldavia and Romania, as are demands for the removal of engineering-technical border installations.

Over the last three and a half months more than 300 border violations have been noted here, reported Anatoliy Parakhin. According to him, leaders of the Romanian "Bessarabia" committee and the People's Front of Moldavia plan, in the first ten days of May, to organize mass marches by the population of both sides to the border for the purpose, so they state, of "fraternization between the Romanian and Moldavian peoples".

Under these circumstances, the command of the border troops of the USSR KGB is taking measures to strengthen the defense of the border and to ensure strict compliance with the treaty between the USSR and Romania on the state border regime, stated Anatoliy Parakhin. He reported that the necessary contacts are being maintained with Romanian borderguards in order to secure the established order on the state border and to prevent unlawful actions at it.

Romanian Trade Union Delegation Pays Visit

90UF0081A Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 Apr 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "On Invitation from the AUCCTU"]

[Text] From 8 through 13 April a delegation of representatives of the Temporary National Committee for organizing the Confederation of Free Romanian Trade unions was in the Soviet Union on invitation from the

AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions]. The delegation was received by AUCCTU Deputy Chairman G.I. Yanayev.

During the course of the discussions, in which AUCCTU Secretaries L.D. Kazakov and V.N. Makeyev participated, they exchanged information on crucial problems of the activity of Soviet and Romanian trade unions in the modern stage and discussed problems of the international trade union movement, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and preparations for the 12th World Trade Union Congress. The conversations took place in a spirit of candor and mutual understanding.

Romania Viewed 100 Days After Revolution

WA2304185090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[Article by V. Vedrashko: "Delicate Balance"]

[Text] Romania recently celebrated the 100th day of its revolution. What is the situation in the country now?

The director of a children's home leafed through a sheaf of papers on his desk:

"These are all kinds of reports on the condition of the health of the children and their parents, if they have them," said Dobrita Moraru. "And here are applications from citizens who wish to adopt one of our children. These are asset documents... We have to do everything here. But they are pleasant concerns; just look at how much powdered milk they have sent us from abroad. And there is a lot of clothing and various kinds of toys. Let's go and I'll show you the children. They are ready. And you ask: What did the revolution bring? I shall show you what it brought.

Children with eyes filled with innate sadness but with cheerful smiles on their faces hung on to surprising toy animals from abroad.

Of the acquisitions of the Romanian revolution I would mention first of all the rising wave of humanity, especially with respect to children. Tens of thousands of orphans—abandoned, forgotten, unwanted children who are called "decree" children because of the cruel Ceausescu decree prohibiting adoption—today are beginning to feel concern for themselves for the first time. It is even said that it was the first generation of decree children—adolescents, boys and girls—who accomplished the revolution, taking vengeance against the dictator for their joyless years.

The youth of Romania, like the elderly, now rarely say words ending in "ism." It was only in the very first hours of the revolution that some people still spoke of a "true socialist society" which could at last be created in the Romanian land. Very soon after that the word "socialism" went out of currency. They began to speak about a "new," "normal," "democratic system." At the same time anticommunist sentiments grew.

Do peace and harmony reign today? No. That lasted for only a moment, at about noon on 22 December, when Ceausescu's white helicopter rose up from the roof over the building of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee and disappeared in a direction that was for a while unknown. At that time everyone was united in their joyous feelings. What followed after that, including the proclamation of the National Salvation Front and then the appearance of dozens of political parties, was and continues to be surrounded by contradictions.

There is little more than a month left before the parliamentary elections. The election campaign is gathering speed. Politics are being discussed everywhere. And even late in the evening among the few people on the streets someone selling newspapers might stop you and blurt out the important news from the latest issue: "Peasant party unmask front!" "Liberals propose coalition!" "Gypsy party does not have a chance!"

The first preelection public opinion poll in Romania was taken at the end of March. To whom did the voters give their sympathies on the day after the poll? The National Salvation Front—57 percent, the National Liberal Party [NLP]—17 percent, the Ecological Movement—five percent, the National Peasant Party (Christian Democratic)—four percent. Regardless of their party affiliation, 67 percent of the citizens think that on 20 May most of the votes will go to the National Salvation Front [FNS]. The same opinion but in favor of the National Liberals was expressed by 12 percent of those questioned, and in favor of the National Peasant Party [NKP]—only three percent.

The popularity of the current political leaders was rated by the organizers of the poll on a 10-point scale. And here is the picture that was obtained: P. Roman and I. Iliescu—7.8 and 7.7, respectively; Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Celac—6.2; National Liberals leader R. Cimpeanu—5.3; Minister of the Interior M. Chitac—4.6; and NKP leader K. Koposu—2.0 points.

A number of political observers continue to regard the National Salvation Front as the most probable winner in the forthcoming elections. It is difficult to say whether this is more a sober evaluation, an intuitive hunch, or sincere sympathy. The legacy of the FNS is depressing. Probably any other force that ended up in power would also make many mistakes...

When observing the development of political life and the debates at meetings of the Temporary Council for National Accord, which unites representatives of all parties and movements, naturally one wishes to understand: Who here is on the left, in the center, and on the right. The most widespread viewpoint is that the FNS and a number of parties supporting it and also the Social Democrats are on the left side of the political spectrum. The National Peasant Party is somewhere in the center, and the National Liberals on the right. Naturally, they have their supporters.

However another, extremely original assessment of the situation has emerged. Its author, political observer A. Stan, considers it wrong to divide the spectrum into three parts—left, center, and right. He mentions two dominant tendencies toward which the existing parties are more or less drawn. The FNS and its followers form a group that is in favor of moderate rates of reform in politics and economics and therefore exhibits a conservative tendency. The other parties—NKP, NLP, and SdPR [Social Democratic Party of Romania] and their proponents—are in the liberal groove and are in favor of gradual, consistent, and in-depth introduction of private initiative and all-around development of the market economy. This approach was also approved by the conference of the National Liberal Party where, among other things, they considered the possibility of uniting the forces of the three "historical parties" in order to win in the elections.

These three parties—the National Peasant, National Liberal, and Social Democratic—made a joint declaration a couple of days ago. They agreed to refrain from any negative propaganda against one another in the election campaign. As for the candidates for president, the "historical parties" jointly support the leader who has the most votes after the first round. The document also notes that each of the three parties is participating in the elections with its own program and a separate list...

More than 10 Romanian political parties have signed a convention for joint actions during the period of the election campaign. The election cartel that was created is called the "Democratic Group of the Center" (DGC). I shall mention only a few of those who joined the DGC: the Socialist Liberal Party, the Democratic Party of Romania, the National Democratic Party, and the Liberal Brateanu Union.

The very name of the grouping shows the desire of its participants to balance out in their platform the extreme positions of the forces now operating in the left and right sides of the political spectrum.

It cannot be ruled out that during the course of the election campaign two of the most powerful national unions might make an appearance—"Vatra Romanneasca" and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. After the conflict in Tirgu-Mures they took up problems of interethnic relations. Not enough study has been devoted to the political potential of the free trade unions which unanimously speak of their "apolitical nature." But still trade union members will inevitably have to participate in the elections just like the rest of the citizens. To whom will they give their votes? On whose side of the scales will they place the weight of their sympathies and antipathies?

And what will happen in the economy?

The national commission for statistics draws a conclusion about observed "tendencies toward improvement." This assertion is based largely on the results of the activity of state and cooperative trade. Thus in February

as compared to January there was an increase in the sale of meat and meat products, milk, vegetable oil, and eggs. The volume of cotton fabric items coming to the shelves of the store increased by 1.5 million square meters. At the same time specialists note that the standard of living is still far from the level reached in 1962." Why is this particular year mentioned? The fact is that in Romania it is called the year of the "completion of socialist collectivization of agriculture."

Another typical feature is the fact that, along with a certain improvement in the food supply in the national economy as a whole, less labor was expended than in any month of 1989. The level of labor productivity per one worker barely reaches 75 percent as compared to January-February of 1989. They produced less coal, lead, zinc, and copper concentrates, chemical fertilizers, and also tractors and trucks.

The commission gives figures according to which there has been an increase in the volumes of imports for convertible currency. As concerns export capabilities, the reality is this. For a number of items that are traditionally sold abroad, the amount produced in February were: locomotives—three, trucks—838, buses—137, small automobiles—200, and tractors—1,804.

These figures show that it will still be necessary to confirm the tendencies toward improvement mentioned initially.

Romanians recently celebrated 100 days of their revolution. During this time the people have learned the power of their break to freedom and have permanently acquired a sense of their own worth.

"The farewell to totalitarian communism turned out to be a dramatic process. It was marked by convulsions and sociopolitical resistance which sometimes developed into conflicts that are to be regretted"—this is the way Ion Iliescu, chairman of the Temporary Council of National Accord, defined the events of the past three months. The Romanian society, in the words of the head of state, is in a fragile political and socioeconomic balance.

This assessment would probably characterize more precisely the months that have passed since the revolution.

Defense Minister Yazov Continues Polish Visit

Meets With Jaruzelski

LD2404205690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1640 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Warsaw, 24 Apr (TASS)—Today Army General Wojciech Jaruzelski, president of the Republic of Poland and commander in chief of the Polish Armed Forces, received Army General D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, who is in Poland.

Aspects of the political and military situation in Europe, primarily in connection with the problem of German

unification, were discussed during the meeting. Questions connected with the temporary stationing and gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, within the framework of the collective security system in Europe, were also a subject of the talks.

They also discussed military cooperation between the two states.

Army General F. Siwicki, minister of national defense of the Republic of Poland, took part in the conversation.

The meeting passed in a friendly and business-like atmosphere.

Holds Talks With Mazowiecki

LD2504084490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0735 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Text] Warsaw, 25 Apr (TASS)—T. Mazowiecki, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, has received Army General D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, who is visiting the northern group of troops. During a conversation they discussed issues relating to the temporary presence of Soviet troops in Poland and the procedure for their withdrawal. Prospects for a future European security system were also discussed.

Talks were held between Army General D.T. Yazov and Army General F. Siwicki, Polish minister of national defense.

Visits Northern Group of Forces

PM2404141590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent Major A. Bugay: "Success Depends on Everyone"]

[Text] Northern Group of Forces—On the evening of 21 April Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, arrived in the Northern Group of Forces. At the Northern Group of Forces headquarters a meeting was held with the group's leadership during which there was a discussion of questions of combat and political training, the state of military discipline, and the problem of providing the backup for the troops' activity.

On 22 April Army General D.T. Yazov visited an armored unit. The confidential talk with the servicemen and members of their families began in front of the garrison officers' house and continued in the assembly hall. The USSR defense minister described the activity of the Soviet Government and party aimed at reducing military antagonism in the world and strengthening the all-European home.

Army General D.T. Yazov also visited the motorized rifle regiment under the command of Colonel P. Kolomoitsev. For a long time there have been no gross violations of military discipline in this military unit. In

this connection the USSR defense minister noted that success in creating statutory order in the subunits depends on each member of the collective and his conscious desire to follow order in everything. On the same day Army General D.T. Yazov visited the garrisons where the aviation units are garrisoned. There were meetings and talks with the personnel, officers, and ensigns and members of their families. The USSR defense minister inquired about people's lives and daily existence and mood. Problems of planning and the organization of combat training were not overlooked.

On 23 April Army General D.T. Yazov continued his acquaintance with the Northern Group of Forces unit and subunit personnel. His attention focused on the progress of combat and political training, the organization of the troops' service, and the state of the material and technical base. In the training classes, soldiers' clubs, and officers' centers there was a committed talk about the progress of perestroika in our country, the solution of the problems arising in the political, social, and economic fields, transformations in the sphere of defense building, preparation for the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War and for the 28th CPSU Congress.

In his talks with people the USSR defense minister noted the importance of the conscientious work of each man on the sector entrusted to him and stressed the need to improve the quality of training of the group's forces, to strengthen military discipline and continue and develop the traditions of friendship and cooperation with the Polish Peoples Army.

PRAVDA on Soviet-Polish Treaty Anniversary

*PM2304101590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5*

[Article by A. Starukhin and M. Tretyakov: "To Be Good Neighbors"]

[Text] On 21 April the Soviet and Polish peoples will celebrate a significant date—the 45th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.

A lot of water has flowed down the Volga and the Wisla since that memorable spring day in 1945 when the signing of this historic document opened a new page in the centuries-old history of our two neighboring peoples: We embarked on the path of good-neighborly relations and mutually advantageous cooperation. Our countries have not only a common border but also a common history in which there have always been and are now far more bright pages. Our peoples are linked by numerous ties in very diverse spheres of human activity—from politics and culture to trade.

From ancient times trade has been considered a mission of peace. It is appropriate to recall that we hold first place on Poland's list of trading partners, while the Republic of Poland is in third place on ours. For several

years now the total annual commodity turnover between our two countries has been estimated at approximately 13 billion rubles. If you imagine just for a moment that some ill-intentioned person were to annul all this, both sides would undoubtedly experience tremendous economic disorder.

Purchases of raw materials, machinery, and equipment from the USSR meet Poland's import needs to a considerable degree. Suffice it to say that over the past decades our deliveries have formed a pool of 165,000 tractors, 16,000 highway construction machines, and 135,000 trucks and passenger cars in the country beyond the Bug.

Would we find it easy to renounce Polish deliveries? Among the CEMA countries Poland is our biggest supplier of raw material commodities. These include coking coal, rolled ferrous metals, copper, and also consumer goods: sewn goods, knitwear, textiles, and footwear.

The appearance of our two countries is changing today. This is having a fundamental effect on the whole package of Soviet-Polish relations, and the chief thing in this process is to preserve the positive potential that has been created and the experience that has been accumulated, mindful of the new demands being made by life, in order to raise our cooperation to a qualitatively new level.

The recent official visit to the Soviet Union by Polish President W. Jaruzelski, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's talks with the distinguished Polish guest, and the joint declaration signed by the two heads of state served precisely to give a new boost to the development of Soviet-Polish relations and to mutual understanding and cooperation.

The joint declaration—a document small in size but big in content—defines the main path of our further cooperation, whose reliable foundation is consistent mutual respect for equality of rights, sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, freedom of sociopolitical choice, and other universally recognized international principles and norms.

Making a positive assessment of the significance of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and Poland and mindful of the fundamental changes in their life and also of the processes taking place in Europe and the world, the sides intend to develop their relations on a new basis in accordance with this declaration. The document emphasizes that the existing treaties and agreements between the states remain in force.

In the world arena the Soviet Union and Poland have repeatedly advanced major foreign policy initiatives aimed at removing the threat of nuclear war, preserving peace on the planet, eliminating the nuclear arms race, and preventing the use of force in interstate relations.

We take close stands on key international problems. And this has repeatedly served as a basis for mutual support

at international forums, strengthened our common position, and helped to uphold mutual interests more fully. This also concerns the question of the unification of the two Germanys, which is of profound concern to Poland. Particularly as voices are occasionally being heard to speak of redrawing the border along the Odra and the Nysa Luzicka. Therefore the interpretation of this question contained in the declaration was welcomed not only by our neighbor beyond the Bug but also by many other countries.

The Soviet Union and Poland are unanimous, the document emphasizes, that the process of German unification must be synchronized with the all-European process, must reliably take account of the security interests of the USSR, Poland, and other countries, and must ensure firm guarantees of the inviolability of Poland's present western border and of all the postwar borders that ~~will~~ shape in Europe and their enshrinement in international law.

The Soviet-Polish declaration convincingly confirmed the fidelity of both heads of state to the consistent development of friendly relations between our countries and reflected the priorities of democratization and humanization in international relations.

In the opinion of TRYBUNA, the newspaper of Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, W. Jaruzelski's Moscow visit made it possible to strengthen Polish-Soviet cooperation, and this will have a positive effect on Poland's position in Europe.

It is hard to object to such a policy, which meets the interests of both our peoples. And, on reading the Polish press today, you probably will not encounter any ill-disposed rejoinders among the numerous comments on the Kremlin talks.

Everyone needs harmony and peace. They help the peoples to build their future more effectively. And this is proved by the 45-year history of the Soviet-Polish treaty.

Perfilyev Hails Albania Statement on Ties

*PM2404151790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Apr 90 Morning Edition p5*

[Interview with V. Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, by own correspondent G. Charodeyev under the headline: "USSR and Albania: Will Relations Be Restored?"; date and place of interview not specified; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Reports on the possible restoration of Soviet-Albanian relations have recently begun appearing in the mass media of a number of countries. How does the situation stand in reality? Your IZVESTIYA correspondent asked V. Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, to answer this question.

"The Soviet Union," he said, "has noted the recent statement by the Albanian leader—R. Alia, first secretary of the APL [Albanian Party of Labor] Central Committee and chairman of the Albanian People's Assembly Presidium—made at an APL plenum on Albanian interest in restoring diplomatic relations with the USSR.

"The Soviet side regards this statement as an important, positive step in the direction of normalizing bilateral Soviet-Albanian relations and confirms its willingness to restore and develop friendly relations with Albania on the basis of full equality, respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, noninterference in one another's internal affairs, and mutual benefit.

"Guided by the principles of the new thinking," the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman continued, "Moscow believes that the restoration of good relations between the Soviet Union and Albania would be in the interests of the two countries' peoples and would strengthen peace and international cooperation."

IZVESTIYA Reports GDR Government Program

*PM2404131790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5*

[V. Lapskiy dispatch under the "IZVESTIYA Correspondents Comment" rubric: "GDR: Government Program Statement"]

[Text] Berlin—The new GDR prime minister, Lothar de Maiziere, has delivered a government statement at a session of the People's Chamber.

All political forces in Europe, he said, are today taking part in the process of German unification. We represent the GDR citizens' interests in this. According to L. de Maiziere, the Soviet Union, whose citizens must not regard the GDR's policy and its desire for German unity as a threat to themselves, must be thanked for the freedom attained. Dictatorial centralism, which ousted democracy, is, according to L. de Maiziere, the hereditary disease of a socialist society. It is a question of preserving the main values in society—freedom of dissent, justice for all, peace "without and within," and responsibility for life.

In the economy the GDR Government's aim is to create an environmentally oriented social market economy which will gradually develop step by step in cooperation with the Federal Republic and the EEC. We do not regard this form of market economy, L. de Maiziere said, as an end in itself, but see it as a compact, effective model for economic activity that has been tested on a worldwide scale.

In the opinion of the GDR Government, the optimum pace and quality of German unification will be ensured if the two German states secure unity through an agreement based on Article 23 of the FRG's fundamental law. We do not expect the Federal Republic's citizens to

make sacrifices, the prime minister said. We are counting on common efforts and solidarity.

The government will propose adopting a law to strengthen stability and develop the economy, a law on cartels, and a new law on banks, along with a law on the amalgamation of combines and large enterprises. The planning system will be abandoned as the currency union is set up. The currency, economic, and social unions must constitute indissoluble unity and enter into force at the same time. When the GDR switches to the West German mark the government confirms its intention to calculate wages and salaries at the rate of 1:1 and pensions at the rate of 1:1 (they will be raised).

In the next few years the government intends to sharply reduce production of energy using lignite and switch to less environmentally noxious energy sources such as oil, hard coal, and natural gas. It will strive to rapidly create an energy union with the Federal Republic. The GDR will not abandon nuclear power generation in the foreseeable future. A program will be elaborated to improve or shut down old, environmentally harmful enterprises. The government ranks urban development and housing construction among the top-priority areas of its activity. Local authorities must have the right to decide for themselves what should be built on their territory and where. The government will take trouble to create normal housing conditions for all citizens.

The government says that the results of the land reform on GDR territory will not be revised. All forms of ownership will be equal in the future. Agriculture will be prepared over several years for conditions in the EEC agrarian market.

The government intends to take emergency measures against unemployment. They include retraining for new professions, insurance against job loss, the adoption of a law on dismissals, and other labor legislation. The position of single mothers will be improved, the network of children's establishments expanded, and working hours at enterprises and establishments made more flexible in the interests of families. The crisis in medical services for the population will be overcome and concern displayed for sexual equality. The creation of a rule-of-law state envisages the decentralization of authority. Administrative division into *Laender* will be introduced on GDR territory as of 1991.

The government acknowledges the need to subsidize culture and art. The press, radio, and television will be free and independent. Justice will be transformed in line with the demands of a rule-of-law state. There will be no secret police in the GDR in the future.

European borders, the prime minister said, must be guaranteed. A united Germany will not make any territorial claims. It must be a factor for peace. Our talks aim to create a European security system with fewer and fewer military functions, the prime minister said. There will be a drastically reduced National People's Army with strictly defensive functions on the territory of what

is now the GDR alongside the Soviet Armed Forces during the transitional period.

The GDR's loyalty to the Warsaw Pact resides in the fact that it will constantly consider the interests of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states. The political structure within the Warsaw Pact framework should be intensified. To this end the GDR Government will in the near future establish contacts with the governments of this alliance's member countries, and the GDR intends to develop and deepen its special relations with the peoples of East Europe. Solutions must be found guaranteeing the GDR's loyalty to current foreign trade commitments, primarily to the Soviet Union.

The GDR Government intends to play an active role in the disarmament process. With the emergence of a system of peace and security in Europe preconditions will be created for the World War II allies to waive their rights in respect of Berlin and Germany as a whole. The GDR Government will make efforts to ensure that this happens within the framework of the "two plus four" talks, De Maiziere said.

Debates on the new government's program begin today, Friday, in the People's Chamber.

Program for Unification, Market Economy Viewed

PM2404110790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
22 Apr 90 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov "On the Spot Report": "Goals Set; GDR Government's First Steps"]

[Text] Berlin—The new GDR Government's main aims have been established. These are the unification of the two German states and, as preparation for it, the country's switch to a market economy. The new policy is set out in the government statement made by Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere in the Volkskammer.

The major document, drawn up by the grand coalition government, was presented to the GDR people. The views of its participants—both the right-wing parties which are members of the "Alliance for Germany" and the social democrats and liberals—have been brought together under a "common roof."

Studying the prime minister's statement, it is striking that it lacks a number of provisions put forward by the grand coalition participants during the election campaign, when they were counting on attracting elector's votes. The time for slogans has passed, the time has come for specific actions. And they require caution and careful consideration.

How does the present GDR government imagine the path leading to the creation of a united Germany? The Volkskammer statement reaffirms the viewpoint expressed earlier by the grand coalition parties: This path lies via Article 23 of the FRG's basic law. Its application would mean the GDR's losing its own characteristics and merging with the Federal Republic.

Here the prime minister made an important remark: After the unification of the GDR and the FRG, Article 23 must be removed from the Federal Republic's Constitution. An important note. Otherwise the world public might ask for whom it continued to be maintained—for Poland's western lands, the Sudety region of Czechoslovakia, Austria? The FRG, though, has yet make any statement on its willingness to remove Article 23 from the Constitution.

The desire expressed in the government statement for the GDR to enter the unification process as an equal partner with the FRG deserves attention. It is not quite clear, however, how the government plans to secure its equality if the device to be employed is the same Article 23 that allows only for the absorption of the GDR?

The problem of the unification of the two German states affects the basic interests not only of Germans in the East and in the West but of all the peoples of our continent. The statement shows that the GDR Government is taking this into account. The prime minister repeatedly stressed that unification must help to strengthen peace on our continent and proceed in step with the all-European process. All Germany's neighbors have to know that their borders are secure. This is particularly important as regards Poland's western border.

Political observers have noted with satisfaction that the government statement does not contain the thesis about the united Germany's membership of NATO which was present in the agreement on setting up the grand coalition. The prime minister confirmed the GDR's loyalty to the Warsaw Pact. The Volksarmee, which has been severely cut and rigorously oriented toward defense, will stand next to the Soviet Armed Forces on what is now GDR territory during the transition period. The GDR Government advocates the reduction of all German armed forces and the rejection by the united Germany of nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons.

A significant part of the prime minister's statement is dedicated to how GDR citizens' property and social interests should be defended in the unification process. "Unity must be attained as quickly as possible," the government statement says, "but its terms must be as good, sensible, and appropriate for the future as is necessary." In this connection the document lays down basic provisions covering the switch from an administrative-edict economy to a market economy—a process which must create the conditions for the conclusion of currency, economic, and social union with the FRG.

At the chamber session disputes flared up around the draft. Deputies from the right-wing parties categorically opposed the idea of creating a new constitution, questioning the point of having one if the GDR is soon to become part of the FRG. Representatives of the Party of Democratic Socialism, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and some other parties objected that only a

new basic law would make it possible to consolidate the social rights of the country's citizens in the unification process.

The GDR is beginning to move along the path laid down by the grand coalition government.

Czechoslovakia's Change of Name, Symbols Noted

*PM2404131390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3*

[Report by own correspondent L. Kornilov: "Republic Changes Its Name Again"]

[Text] Prague—After three days of sittings lasting until midnight the Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia postponed the completion of its work until Monday. One burning question was resolved, however.

Henceforth the abbreviation CSFR will stand for the state's new official name: the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic.

In the view of the deputies and all the parliamentary party groups with the exception of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, it clearly emphasizes Slovakia's sovereignty and distinctiveness. What do the "socialists" think? They are opposed to the new name, regarding it as a step toward the division of the republic, a manifestation of separatist trends.

At the same time, interethnic passions can still be felt outside the parliamentary building. They are kindled mainly by extremist circles. On Friday, in Bratislava, despite a local authority ban, there was a rally of the "National Council for the Liberation of Slovakia Movement." It was attended by around 2,000 people. They included representatives of Slovaks living abroad. The meeting demanded the "liberation of the Slovak people from Czech oppression and the formation of an independent Slovak state." There must be a UN-sponsored people's referendum on this question this year, they said.

The Federal Assembly also approved constitutional laws on state symbols, to wit the coat of arms, flag, and anthem, and also the president's standard and the seal. Basically, the only change is in the coat of arms—now it is a heraldic shield divided into four parts, bearing two Czech lions with a crown and two Slovak crosses atop three hills. There have also been consequent changes to the presidential standard (banner), the main elements of which are the coat of arms and the inscription: "Truth Prevails." The flag and anthem of the CSFR remain unchanged.

CSFR Talk of Democracy Belied by CPCZ Ban

*PM2404091790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 21 Apr 90 Single Edition p 5*

[TASS report: "In Conflict With the Law. Seamy Side of 'Democracy' in Czechoslovakia"]

[Text] Prague, 20 Apr—At the monument to St. Wenceslas in the center of Prague signatures are being collected for a petition calling for the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party] to be outlawed. The action has been organized by the so-called "free bloc," which unites right-wing forces.

By a bitter irony, the call for a ban on the country's largest political party is being made on the very spot where a few months ago hundreds of thousands of Prague inhabitants demanded freedom and democracy and demonstrated against the suppression of dissent and of the free expression of views.

The situation has been exacerbated by the official demand by Prague Prosecutor T. Sokol that the activity of the CPCZ be prohibited in the capital. The prosecutor general of the Czech Republic has stated his decision to bring administrative proceedings against T. Sokol. In response, the "Civic Forum" coordination center has spoken out in defense of the Prague prosecutor. The consistency and purposefulness of pressure on the Communist Party are striking: As though by chance there has been a switch from demands to nationalize the CPCZ's property to demands for a total ban on the CPCZ.

The ease with which the responsible legal official outlawed the CPCZ city organization makes you doubt the authenticity of the revolution's democratic gains. And if things are to be called by their proper names, it must be admitted that society is still only on its way to democracy, which people in Czechoslovakia today eagerly talk about a great deal as if it were a fait accompli.

But other voices can be heard as well. MLADA FRONTA has complained that tolerance and mutual understanding are inexorably disappearing from social life while violence and fear are returning. The chairman of the Czechoslovak Government, M. Calfa, spoke in the same vein. Even the radical STUDENTSKE LISTY—the press organ of the students' union—noted that the struggle against ideas must not be replaced by a struggle against people, meaning Communists.

The danger of a switch from the threat of violence to actual violence is today greater than ever. All this is happening against the background of a decrease in the popularity of "Civic Forum," as figures from recent sociological polls testify. On the admission of the weekly FORUM, this trend is no accident but is the direct consequence of the crisis in this social movement.

CSFR Communists Rebut Prague Prosecutor Letter

PM2004124990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Apr 90 Second Edition pp 1, 6

[Dispatch by correspondent Stanislav Vtorushin:
"Relapse into Anticommunism: Attack on CPCZ"]

[Text] Prague—A further attempt has been made in Czechoslovakia to discredit Communists in the eyes of the public. Prague City Prosecutor Tomas Sokol has sent

a letter to the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee, an account of which has been published in all newspapers.

It contains a warning that, effective 1 May this year, the activity of CPCZ organizations in the territory of Prague will be viewed through the prism of... paragraph 260 of the Criminal Code, which provides for punishment for those who support or propagandize fascism or any other similar movement aimed at suppressing working people's rights and freedoms and propagating national, racial, or religious hatred.

A typical manifestation of these movements, the prosecutor's letter states, is the liquidation of all democratic rights, and their chief political method is terror and social demagoguery. In the opinion of this legal expert, this is precisely how the Communist Party acted while in power for more than 40 years.

To judge from this text, the Prague prosecutor does not confine the sphere of his tutelage to the territory of Prague or even the whole of Czechoslovakia: He also aims arrows at the CPCZ's friends and confederates throughout the world. The communist movement, he asserts, is essentially geared to the violent seizure of power, and the revolution accomplished under Lenin's leadership in Russia and the state created by him are, he says, none other than the "apotheosis of violence." In his opinion even the successes which Czechoslovakia achieved while the CPCZ was in power were secured at the price of incommensurate sacrifices. In this way, he declares, the party puts itself not just outside democracy but also outside the law.

Naturally, Communists could not leave this malicious relapse into anticommunism unanswered. An extraordinary joint session of the CPCZ Central Committee Executive Committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia was held yesterday afternoon. The adopted statement reads, in particular: On 23 January 1990 the Federal Assembly adopted the Law on Political Parties, in which the CPCZ, as well as other parties and movements, is acknowledged to exist. Neither that law nor any other legal documents contain the right to ban the activity of a territorial organization of a political party or political movement. In this context, the CPCZ leadership considers the city prosecutor's letter a serious instance of exceeding his powers and a deliberate attempt to discredit a legal political party. The CPCZ leadership expressed the conviction that the prosecutor's letter and its publication are nothing but an attempt to increase social tension. And this could pose a threat to the program of democratic changes in society. The CPCZ Central Committee appeals to all its members to be calm and restrained and not to succumb to the artificially created atmosphere of fear and to the attempts to fan political passions.

However, the impression is being created that, instead of alienating people from the Communist Party and

harming it in the eyes of the public, the Prague prosecutor's report seems to have produced the opposite results.

The CPCZ Central Committee and organs and the RUDE PRAVO editorial office are receiving a tremendous number of telegrams and letters from all over the republic and from abroad voicing extreme indignation at this anticommunist outburst. The majority of Federal Assembly deputies hastened to dissociate themselves from it. The Prague prosecutor's higher colleague—the prosecutor of the Czech Republic—declared this letter incompetent and described its conclusions as the personal opinion of T. Sokol, at the same time speaking of the need to conduct an official investigation into his activity.

In any democratic country the Prague prosecutor's "memorandum" could be perceived as something extraordinary, verging on an April Fools' Day joke. However, in present-day Czechoslovakia it is, alas, on par with the long chain of persecutions of Communists, their groundless dismissal from work, instances of "settling scores," and attempts to hamper the election campaign (let me remind you that less than two months now remain before the parliamentary elections). Anticommunism is manifesting itself here in a malicious and extremely undemocratic aspect.

Lenin Statue Abused at Sofia Pro-Lithuania Rally

PM2404112190 Moscow TRUD in Russian
24 Apr 90 p 3

[Own correspondent V. Khrustalev dispatch: "Frenzied"]

[Text] Sofia, 23 Apr—Last Tuesday a rally in support of Lithuania took place outside the Soviet Embassy in Sofia at which portraits of Lenin with a swastika painted on his chest were on general view. This person's name has probably never known more frenzied abuse. Speakers at the rally, which was organized by the federation of independent students, arbitrarily quoted Lenin, accusing him of every heinous sin. Even as far as naming him "the true spiritual father of communist totalitarianism." The rally adopted a declaration demanding the removal of the Lenin memorial in downtown Sofia, along with the plaques and the titles of streets, squares, and plants associated with V.I. Lenin's name.

DUMA, the newspaper of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, reacted to the action by the federation of independent students—timed to coincide with the 120th anniversary of Lenin's birth—by saying: "Today, tomorrow, and throughout the years Lenin will be a name in world history, one of the colossi of our troubled age..."

Hungarian Communists' Left-Wing Bloc Idea Noted

PM2404141790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 22 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Hungary. Bloc of Left-Wing Forces Necessary"]

[Text] The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] advocates the formation of a new bloc of left-wing forces in Hungary, MSZMP Chairman G. Thurmer has stated in an interview with SZABADSAG. Proceeding on the basis of lessons learned in the recent parliamentary election, the MSZMP is counting primarily on cooperation with the socialists, the social democrats, the Hungarian People's Party, the Agrarian Union, and the Patriotic Electoral Coalition.

According to G. Thurmer, in the election the majority of Hungarian citizens rejected not socialism but the erroneous political practice of the past 10-15 years. The MSZMP leader noted that over several months he had visited many settlements in the country where the old MSZMP republic or county leaders had not been seen in 40 years. The link between the party leadership and the working class which forms its mass base had been broken. At present the MSZMP is the country's seventh-largest party. It has 80,000 members, and 190,000 voters voted for the MSZMP in the election. The MSZMP leadership is not disappointed with the election results. It must now carry on its organizational work and prepare for the local council elections.

In the next few months the new government can count on temporary successes, but sooner or later it will have to confront phenomena such as inflation and unemployment.

G. Thurmer said that Hungary needs to participate in all-European processes, but it is hard to see how it can be an equal member of the EEC. Belonging to it as a poor relative is not in the country's interests.

Dwelling on questions of international policy, the MSZMP chairman pointed out the importance of a united and strong Soviet Union. The policy of perestroika being implemented in the USSR, he stressed, serves the interests of world peace.

State of Emergency Lifted in SFRY's Kosovo

PM2404140790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Correspondent Ye. Vostrukhov dispatch: "On the Situation in Kosovo: No Alternative to Dialogue"]

[Text] Belgrade—TANJUG has reported that the SFRY Presidency has adopted a decision to suspend the emergency measures and lift the state of emergency on the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo.

The agency report emphasizes that the federation's presidency was guided in its decision by the present situation in the province and also by the proposal of the Presidency of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Executive Council (the country's government) to lift the emergency measures there. Members of the Presidency voiced confidence that their decision will help to further reduce tension not only in Kosovo but also in the country as a whole.

The lifting of the special measures in the long-suffering province, where very acute interethnic clashes have been continuing for many years, frequently fanned by separatists and extremists of various hues, was made possible thanks to the democratic process of the reforms which have begun in Yugoslavia. The TANJUG report points out that precisely these processes of renewal are opening up prospects for resolving Kosovo's problems by political means.

Twice during the past 14 months the SFRY Presidency was forced to adopt special measures in Kosovo in order to stop the bloodshed there and protect public order and the population from extremists' sallies. This had to be done in February last year. And similar measures had to be introduced at the end of January this year. The "special" and "emergency" measures taken are well known to everyone. They include a ban on rallies and demonstrations, a ban on holding strikes, and the introduction of special labor service. Rigid control over the observance of the emergency measures was exercised by a thousands-strong militia detachment representing almost all the federal republics, as well as by the usual administrative organs.

...You quite quickly get accustomed to the excessive presence of people in the dark-blue militia uniform in the city streets. Earnest, armed guys in bulletproof vests stand about in groups, not interfering in the ordinary rhythm of local life. Everyone understands that they are not here of their own volition. And the attitude of the population toward the representatives of this combined "SFRY team" is, as a rule, quite fair. Guys with assault rifles calmly drink aromatic coffee with everyone in the local "kafanas."

But peaceful days in the detachment have frequently given way to deadly dangerous hours when extremists armed with assault rifles have made a frontal attack on militiamen. IZVESTIYA described this confrontation in detail in January and February this year. And when the waves of violence and mutual clashes began to swamp more and more settlements, a curfew had to be imposed in Kosovo.

The actions of Albanian extremists are condemned by the majority of the province's Albanian population. The voices of the "Kosovo alternative" have recently been heard speaking increasingly loudly in its name. Adherents of the "alternative" advocate resolving the accumulated problems by political methods and democratic means. The leaders of the Democratic Union—a movement which emerged a few months ago but which is already quite influential in the province—also condemn the separatists and their calls for Kosovo to secede from the SFRY.

All Yugoslavia has an interest in the peaceful and efficient resolution of Kosovo's problems. The efforts of the SFRY Government and Presidency are directed toward this. A special committee on questions of Kosovo has been set up under the government, headed by Ante

Markovic, chairman of the Federal Executive Council. A recent plenum of the League of Communists of Serbia adopted a program of measures to normalize the situation in the province. Its further democratization is envisaged on the political plane, but on the basis of the principles of autonomy within the framework of Serbia and a unified Yugoslavia. Specific steps have been outlined to stimulate the economy there, which at present is the most backward in the federation (the volume of production in the province fell 15 percent during the first three months of this year compared with last year).

The package of political and economic transformations which have begun includes a proposal by the Presidency of the Republic of Serbia to lift the state of emergency in Kosovo, which the SFRY Presidency has accepted. The Presidency has demanded that all state organs in the republic and the province now fulfill their duties particularly carefully, strictly within the framework of the constitution. And the country's Presidency expects all citizens of Kosovo to show responsibility and restraint and to seek the democratic resolution of the present problems. Confidence has been expressed that the stabilization of the situation in the province will finally restore mutual trust among people of different nationalities.

West Europe

Adamishin Views 'Building of German Unity'

LD2504105990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0817 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 25 April (TASS)—The building of German unity should take place in stages, in an orderly and democratic way, Anatoliy Adamishin, deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs, considers. In an interview on the German unification issue published in 'LITERATURNAYA GAZETA' today, he commented that this assumes first and foremost talks between two equal, sovereign states. "This is the position taken by the USSR and the GDR and, as far as I can judge, the most responsible politicians in Bonn are of the same view," the Soviet diplomat said.

Emphasis is laid in the interview upon the need to draw a final line beneath the results of World War II. From the Soviet Union's point of view, the most correct form for this is a peace treaty. Only after this will it be possible to speak of discontinuance of the rights and responsibilities of the four powers. According to Anatoliy Adamishin, the building of German unity and the foreign policy aspects closely linked with this should proceed in parallel. Furthermore, the post-war borders should be consolidated under international law, which assumes ratification of the treaty by parliaments.

"The idea of a united German state becoming a member of NATO is for very understandable reasons unacceptable to us," the deputy minister underlined. The rapid

political changes, he pointed out, have found Europe still in a state of bloc confrontation, when we are still operating in terms of equilibrium and balance of forces, and when disarmament processes are only just being outlined, and only one treaty has actually been signed—on medium and shorter-range missiles. In these conditions the transfer of the GDR into the opposing military bloc would justifiably be assessed as a violation of the existing equilibrium. Other solutions need to be sought, which would take account of the interests not only of the West, but of the East as well. One of the possible solutions is that a united Germany might for a certain time be a member of both the Atlantic Treaty, and the Warsaw Treaty.

The issue of persecution of communists in the countries of Eastern Europe was also touched upon in the interview. In the opinion of the Soviet diplomat: "This is not now the correction of political mistakes, it is a violation of human rights." In this difficult solution, he comments, we are trying to conduct a well-considered and humane policy. "At the inter-state level relations are being maintained with new forces, with new people who have come to power, and for the most part the contacts are shaping up pretty well. But one should not turn away from those who continue as before to regard themselves as our friend and ally."

Dzasokhov-Led Delegation Meets With Mitterand

LD2404102190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0900 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] The delegation of the committee for foreign affairs of the USSR Supreme Soviet, headed by committee chairman Dzasokhov, which is now visiting Paris has been received at the Elysee Palace by French President Mitterand. A cordial conversation on the contemporary development of cooperation and contacts between the two countries was held in the spirit of the traditional good relations between the Soviet Union and France.

General Moiseyev Sees Off French Counterpart

PM2404102590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Trip Around Country"]

[Excerpt] Army General M. Schmitt, chief of staff of the French Armed Forces, who is on an official visit to the USSR, left for Sevastopol on 19 April.

He was accompanied to the airport by Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister, and other generals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The visitor is being accompanied on his trip around the country by Admiral of the Fleet K.V. Makarov, chief of the Navy Main Staff. [passage omitted]

Prunskiene's Oslo Press Conference Reported

PM2404154190 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET
in Norwegian 20 Apr 90 p 4

[Torbjorn Faerovik report: "'The Blockade Will Hit Hard'"]

[Text] "The Soviet authorities' decision to reduce gas supplies to Lithuania will have very serious consequences and will hit us harder than a corresponding oil blockade," Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene said at her press conference in Oslo yesterday.

Just before Prunskiene's meeting with the press it became known that Soviet gas supplier Transgas had shut off three of its four gas pipelines to Lithuania. According to Soviet sources, this means a cut in gas supplies of around 85 percent. Oil supplies were halted Wednesday [18 April].

The Lithuanian prime minister said that she had reacted to this latest Soviet escalation of the conflict with indignation.

"It is completely beyond belief that in the 20th century one country should actively seek to strangle another. But when the Soviet leadership acts in this fashion, we are quite simply forced to seek help from outside," she said.

At the same time she repeated the argument which President Vytautas Landsbergis has already used in the Lithuanian national assembly: When the Soviet authorities resort to as drastic a step as a blockade, they have in reality renounced ownership of both the refinery and the republic.

Prunskiene said that Lithuania has sufficient oil reserves for six weeks, but no gas reserves.

"The gas blockade will gradually destroy our economic structure and make people's everyday lives more difficult. Important sections of industry are dependent on the gas supplies and gas is also used for cooking and heating in homes," she said.

However, the prime minister added that the blockade will backfire on the Soviet Union itself. Very many of the Lithuanian enterprises now being affected produce up to 90 percent of their goods for the Soviet market.

Asked what the government will do to reduce the effects of the dramatic reduction in gas supplies, Prunskiene replied that the Lithuanians will for the time being be able to use the gas that is still available.

"Our engineers are now working hard to develop temporary new energy supplies. On the whole the situation in which we now find ourselves makes great demands on our imagination and enterprise," she said.

On the subject of the oil blockade Prunskiene said that her government will work actively to acquire oil from other Soviet sources. The Soviet Union is a major

oil-producing country. With the good contacts the government has in several of the Soviet republics it ought to be possible to circumvent the official blockade.

However, during the press conference it became clear that this project could also run into major problems. Lithuania has little, if any, control over its own borders and possible future transports from friendly Soviet republics run the risk of being stopped.

During her many meetings yesterday with Norwegian politicians Prunskiene received no firm promises of Norwegian assistance.

"We do not expect the world to give us instantaneous assistance. In the present phase we are concerned first and foremost to create understanding of our own cause. Nevertheless, we hope for concrete support in the future and are looking forward to entering into mutually beneficial agreements," she said.

One of the many questions which will have to be cleared up before possible future sales of oil by Norway is the method of payment. Prunskiene admitted that Lithuania lacks the currency needed for the purchase of Norwegian oil. The Lithuanians' money, she said, has up to now found its way to the "big moneybag in Moscow."

Prunskiene admitted that in this situation Lithuania could be forced to take out loans abroad. However, this question was not discussed during yesterday's meetings with Norwegian politicians.

Since Lithuania itself is in a position to refine oil the republic has need first and foremost of supplies of crude oil.

"The Soviet blockade means that the employees at the Mazeikiai oil refinery will soon be without work. For this reason, too, we are committed to doing all we can to get oil from outside, so that the refinery does not have to lay men off," she said.

The sector of the Lithuanian economy that will get off lightest from the Soviet blockade is agriculture. Spring farm work has already been completed and the first effects of the blockade will not make themselves felt for a couple of months.

Asked whether Lithuania could need Norwegian food aid, a smiling Prunskiene said that 40 percent of the republic's food production is exported to the Soviet Union. "We have enough food," she said.

At the press conference Prunskiene repeated yet again that Lithuania's 11 March declaration of independence is not negotiable.

However, as far as the questions of how and how quickly independence is to be achieved are concerned the government in Vilnius is willing to compromise. The government will wait until negotiations are under way before it concretizes the offers it has in this respect. But

she added that the transitional phase from "judicial" to "actual" independence should be as short as possible.

Today Prunskiene will travel to Stavanger where she will meet with representatives of Statoil. Tomorrow her journey takes her on to Denmark where both Prime Minister Poul Schluter and Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen have said that they are ready to listen to the Lithuanian prime minister. Later in the day Ellemann-Jensen flies to the EEC foreign ministers' conference in Dublin where the situation in Lithuania will probably be one of the main items on the agenda.

Prunskiene's visit to Denmark has come about as a result of a Danish initiative and was not originally on her program.

Prunskiene Urges West To Break Soviet Blockade

*PM2404154190 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
SONDAG in Danish 22 Apr 90 p 12*

[Flemming Rose report: "The West Should Break the Soviet Blockade"]

[Text] Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene yesterday called on Western nations to break the Soviet Union's blockade of the Baltic republic. "The Soviet Union's sanctions are directed not only against Lithuania; they also affect the Western nations. The West is prevented from developing contacts with us, and the refusal to grant visas to representatives of the Danish Chamber of Trade is an good example of this," said the prime minister, who is on a two-day visit to Denmark.

A Danish business delegation should have left for Lithuania today, but it was refused permission to enter Lithuania by the Soviet authorities. Instead the delegation must content itself with visits to the two other Baltic republics, Estonia and Latvia.

Prunskiene called on the EC's foreign ministers to disassociate themselves from the Soviet Union's behavior toward Lithuania. The prime minister stressed that the aim of her visit to Denmark was not to buy energy, but that the current energy blockade on Lithuania means that she will investigate the possibility of buying oil and gas in Denmark. According to Prunskiene, the results of her visit to Norway were not too bad. "Neither of the sides had prepared itself to discuss energy, so you could not expect concrete results from the improvised talks. We have begun negotiations on shipbuilding agreements and are also hoping for agreements with Denmark in the fields of fisheries and industry," Prunskiene said.

Asked what message he would be passing on to the other EC foreign ministers at their meeting in Dublin, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen said: "I will inform them of Lithuania's assessment of the current situation and tell them that Lithuania expects the EC's political support for negotiations with the Soviet Union." The Danish foreign

minister did not comment on Prunskiene's call for more direct support from Lithuania to the EC [sentence as published].

The Lithuanian flag was missing at the airport when Lithuania's prime and foreign ministers were met by Folketing President H.P. Clausen. However, it was fluttering above the entrance to the Stock Exchange when the Chamber of Trade hosted a press conference. On her way out from the press conference the Lithuanian prime minister was waylaid by an eager Soviet journalist from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA who asked in an ironical tone about Lithuania's chances of managing outside the Soviet Union. Prunskiene replied sharply: "I do not understand why the Soviet Union is so worried about whether we can manage. That does not really square with its behavior toward Lithuania."

At the press conference Prunskiene pointed out that the cultural and economic cooperation which Denmark and other Western nations want with Lithuania is very difficult to achieve in the current situation.

"The Soviet Union does not seem to want to give up its 50-year occupation of the Baltic countries and all cooperation will run up against this political hurdle. That is why it is important first to overcome these obstacles, and the West must understand that there can be no suggestion of a free Europe until the Baltic countries are able to give their independence real content."

The Krak Fund yesterday presented Danish Chamber of Trade chairman Klavs Olsen a check for half a million kroner. Since 1988 the Chamber of Trade has been working on a project covering the Baltic region.

Further on Prunskiene's Visit to Copenhagen

PM2404152990 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
SONDAG in Danish 22 Apr 90 p 12

[Flemming Rose report: "Gorbachev Not Using His Powers"]

[Text] Gorbachev is not using his increased powers as president to resolve the Lithuanian crisis. He is trying to balance between the reformist forces and the conservatives instead of clearly demonstrating his support for the democratic forces and therefore supporting Lithuania's independence, which is a natural consequence of Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost.

This is the view of Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene. "The West is overdramatizing the threats to Gorbachev's position and in so doing making it less possible for him to take up a position supporting the reformist wing in the Soviet Union," she said yesterday in Copenhagen after holding talks with Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Poul Schluter on the situation in Lithuania.

Prunskiene thinks that it is possible to transport oil from the West to Lithuania via the Baltic Sea. "It is not the easiest or cheapest way of doing it, but at present we only have pipelines from the east. Another possibility is for us

to buy oil from the Soviet Union through a third country and have the oil transported through the existing channels in the Soviet Union."

However, the prime minister sees a major problem in the Soviet Union's continued control of the strategically important ice-free port of Klaipeda.

"Klaipeda is vitally important to Lithuania's existence; the port is of crucial importance for our economic integration with the Western world, but today it is controlled by Moscow. However, I cannot imagine that this situation will last long or that the Western world will look silently on while the Soviet Union blockades us from both East and West.

"The Soviet Union's behavior is paradoxical. On the one hand it views us as foreigners, while on the other it cuts us off from the West."

Asked whether with hindsight she would have done anything differently Prunskiene replied: "On the whole: No. But we should perhaps have given clearer expression to our readiness to compromise and should have sought contacts with the Soviet leadership more actively."

Foreign Minister Saudargas referred to a resolution adopted by the Lithuanian parliament 18 April. It calls for interim parliamentary consultations and if they are begun before 1 May the Lithuanian parliament will not pass any further resolutions aimed at achieving independence. The citizens of Lithuania are also urged to save their scarce resources and to demonstrate spiritual endurance.

The Lithuanian prime minister thinks that it is necessary for Lithuania to obtain credits in the West, but to begin with it wants to concentrate on joint projects which will make it possible to pay off the loans that are taken out. "I expect the West to be interested in the cheap but skilled labor force we have."

Prunskiene also expressed hopes of economic cooperation among the three Baltic republics. "We hope to be able to establish a Baltic common market. And we also think that Europe's single internal market should also include the Baltic region."

The prime minister sees the issue of ownership rights over a number of enterprises in Lithuania which are currently under Moscow's control as a result of the Soviet Union's past occupation of the republic. "If the Soviet Union is laying claim to these enterprises, it is also claiming still to own Lithuania. The things that have been built in the Soviet period have been financed through central funds. We have also made a contribution to these and could therefore also lay claim to a share in the enterprises outside Lithuania. I think that the simplest solution would be to recognize our rights of ownership of the union enterprises in Lithuania."

USSR, Italy To Pool Efforts Against Crime

*LD2304165790 Moscow TASS in English 1630 GMT
23 Apr 90*

[Text] Rome April 23 TASS—A memorandum on cooperation between the Soviet and Italian interior ministries in combatting organized crime was signed here today by Soviet Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin and his Italian counterpart Antonio Gava.

The memorandum envisages the establishment of a bilateral committee to combat organized crime, to exchange information and expertise in specific areas of activity on a permanent basis and to organize working meetings, symposia and seminars.

A news conference was held in Palazzo Viminale, the home of the Italian Interior Ministry, at which Gava expressed great satisfaction with the signing of the memorandum. He said it was significant that the signing occurred during the dynamic development of relations with the Soviet Union which is undergoing historic radical transformations that are followed by Italians with sincere interest. "We expect positive yields from the implementation of this document," Gava said.

Soviet Minister Bakatin said that the basis for the memorandum was laid during the political talks President Gorbachev held during his visit to Italy last year.

He said that the signing of the memorandum creates "great potential" for the Soviet Interior Ministry's efforts to upgrade the quality of its work at all levels. It is a substantial prerequisite for improving practical work of law enforcement agencies.

Bakatin stressed the great importance of direct contacts established between respective bodies of different states as well as the expansion of international relations and the pooling of efforts of different countries in order to curb organized crime.

The two ministers responded to numerous questions from journalists.

Irish Parliamentary Delegation Ends Visit

*LD2404141490 Moscow TASS in English 1311 GMT
24 Apr 90*

[By TASS correspondent Igor Peskov]

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—An Irish parliamentary delegation, led by Senate Speaker Sean Doherty, today ended the official part of their visit to the Soviet Union with a discussion in the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute for Europe. The delegation had meetings with Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and other representatives of the Soviet parliament during their visit. The delegation visited Tashkent where it met deputies of the Uzbekistan Supreme Soviet.

The development of the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, German reunification and economic cooperation between East European countries and European Community members were the focus of attention during discussion in the Institute for Europe.

The two sides agreed that the "multitude of interests" in Europe and their close interweaving requires a well-considered approach, above all on the question of German unification, from all countries of the region.

Soviet scientists expressed their view of the special role of the foreign policy activities of Ireland, which as a neutral country is at the same time a member of the European Communities, i.e. organically integrated into Western Europe. This status of Ireland and real steps by Dublin create opportunities for the country's "mediatory mission" in the solution of many all-European issues.

"Our visit was very useful and productive," Doherty told TASS. Having noted that a wide range of issues concerning European politics, bilateral relations and inter-parliamentary contacts were discussed during the visit, he voiced hope that this will help strengthen mutual understanding and cooperation between the two countries. The information the delegation received during discussion in Moscow about the Soviet side's position on German unification will be used for an analysis of the problem by the Irish parliament, Doherty said.

The Irish members of parliament have been able to assess the Lithuanian problem more deeply, he added. "We are aware of the difficulties involved in this issue," Doherty said. "We believe that what is essential in this respect is dialogue, not confrontation between the two sides."

FRG Ecological Panel Studies USSR Experience

*PM2404152390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] A delegation of the FRG Bundestag commission for the environment, nature protection, and nuclear reactor safety has spent a week learning about the Soviet Union's experience of environmental protection and the care of flora and fauna. During their conversation 23 April with R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet of Nationalities, the West German parliamentarians stressed that there are a considerable number of areas in which the two countries could and should combine their efforts to resolve environmental problems.

K. Salykov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources Committee, and USSR people's deputies Yu.I. Voronchitsev and P.D. Osipov took part in the conversation.

TASS Notes WEU Council Session in Belgium*LD2304145490 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT
23 Apr 90*

[By TASS correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS—The foreign and defence ministers of Britain, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, West Germany and France gathered in the Belgian capital today for a regular session of the council of the West European Union (WEU). It will discuss security problems in the new situation on the continent, caused by changes in Eastern Europe.

This organisation's stand on several problems can be gauged by the April visit to Moscow by a WEU parliamentary assembly delegation. Members of the West European Union favour the perpetuation of blocs which, Western parliamentarians believe, guarantee stability and control the observance of concluded treaties. At the same time, they call for a broader dialogue with the USSR and for changing from parliamentary meetings to contacts at the level of foreign and defence ministers.

While in Moscow, chairman of the assembly Charles Goerens told TASS that the "union understands the Soviet Union's concern about problems of security and military equilibrium." He said the Vienna talks should be continued after an agreement on conventional armaments is signed. He did not rule out the possibility that tactical nuclear weapons will also be discussed.

Mechanisms of European security are also being discussed within the West European Union. Before flying to Brussels, Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordenez said his country would support at the session the idea to create a new peaceful structure for Europe. "It is obvious," he stressed, "that the concept of European security is bound to change in light of the situation in Eastern Europe."

One of the fundamental ideas, discussed in the union, is the rapprochement of the West European Union and the European community, which could evolve into an association competent not only in commercial and economic affairs, but in defence matters too. The union's leadership favours a revision of NATO administrative patterns, which have remained unchanged since the 1950's, in order to raise Europe's role in Western defences.

The Soviet Union believes that the present national and bloc character of defences should be relaxed by collective measures and security mechanisms. Stability, confidence and openness in Europe must be all-embracing.

NATO 'Deterrent Force' Exercises Viewed*LD2304172690 Moscow TASS in English 1653 GMT
23 Apr 90*

[Text] Rome April 23 TASS—The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation began its traditional Deterrent Force-1/90 military exercises in Trieste today. The exercises were

preceded by a short ceremony attended by representatives of the NATO southern flank command.

The manoeuvres involve naval ships, submarines and naval aviation of Britain, Italy, West Germany, the United States, Turkey and even France and Spain which are not members of NATO's military organisation.

The exercises will take part in the central regions of the Mediterranean and are designed to drill joint military operations among the Allies and to improve the systems of communications and supply of cruising ships, reconnaissance and contemporary methods of locating a simulated enemy.

The exercises also involve the special squadron (NAV-OCFORMED) of the NATO Rapid Deployment Force in the Mediterranean. The squadron was formed in 1969 under the pretext of "ensuring the freedom of navigation in neutral waters." The current exercises are the 40th in the history of the squadron which gathers twice a year—in spring and autumn.

The NATO command emphasises in its information communiques that Deterrent Force is a means to strengthen the bloc and increase its military capability.

Commander-in-chief of the naval forces of the NATO southern flank admiral Antonio Geraci said in Trieste today that despite radical changes in the world caused by events in Eastern Europe, the tasks facing the North Atlantic alliance have not changed. He emphasised that NATO should continue being the guarantor of Western countries' collective security.

The Deterrent Force exercises will consist of several stages and will end on June 1 near Naples.

Latin America & Caribbean**New Cuban Ambassador Praises Bilateral Relations***LD2504082390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1715 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Text] Moscow 24 Apr (TASS)—The overwhelming majority of our people feel sincere sympathy and deep gratitude toward the Soviet Union, Jose Ramon Balaguer, the new ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Cuba, told a TASS correspondent after presenting his credentials today to Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the USSR. Over the 30 years of relations between our countries, he stressed, we have been able to assess in full the exceptional role which the Soviet Union has played in Cuba's history and the significance of its cooperation for our struggle to consolidate our sovereignty.

Jose Ramon Balaguer denied the speculations of certain organs of the western press about an alleged deterioration in Soviet-Cuban relations. As the Cuban ambassador to the USSR, he stressed, I can state with all accountability that relations between our country today,

as previously, are excellent. Despite the complications and problems which exist, both sides are striving to develop and improve them further. The ambassador noted: I believe that all the conditions for this exist.

I can say on my own behalf that I genuinely love this country and its people, and I see it as my task to make relations between our countries even more effective and to seek new spheres and forms of cooperation.

Yazov Receives Cuban Army's General Staff Chief

PM2304092790 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 21 April Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro, candidate member of the Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee Politburo, first vice minister of the republic's Revolutionary Armed Forces, and chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces General Staff, who is on an official visit to the Soviet Union, was received by Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister.

Division General U. Rosales del Toro visited an air unit at Kubinka, where he familiarized himself with the combat hardware and attended demonstration flights. The Cuban guest was accompanied by Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister.

Division General U. Rosales del Toro met with Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, adviser to the Soviet president, in the afternoon.

The Cuban guest also visited the Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy Military Academy of Armored Troops.

Cuban Symbolic Gunfire Reported in Havana 22 Apr

PM2304122590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
23 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by own correspondent A. Moiseyev: "Guns on the Malecon"]

[Text] Havana, 22 Apr—The sun was already setting when howitzers and anti-aircraft machineguns were set up on the Malecon, the renowned Havana oceanside boulevard. At 1830 local time the order "Open fire!" was heard on the Reloj radio station. Blank shots resounded in the direction of the United States while helicopters scattered over the city bundles of leaflets with the slogan "Socialism or death..."

That was the unique way in which the capital's inhabitants began the holiday to mark the 29th anniversary of the defeat of the U.S. mercenaries at Playa Giron. The program provided every participant in the political fiesta the chance to hurl his own stone into the Gulf of Mexico.

For that, impressive piles of gravel had been prepared in advance on the oceanside boulevard. The day before the central youth newspaper JUVENTUD REBELDE published a note with a drawing, with an easy-to-understand explanation, of how to make a "David's sling" for hurling stones at Goliath—that is, the northern neighbor.

Problems in Cuban-East Bloc Trade Viewed

90UF0096A Moscow TRUD in Russian 18 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by TRUD staff correspondent L. Platonov dated-lined Havana, April: "Whose Sugar Is Sweeter? Reflections on Our Trade With Cuba"]

[Text] For the third month in a row, the windows and furniture of the office of the TRUD Havana correspondent have been covered with a thin film of black dust day after day. A Cuban acquaintance of mine reassured me: "This is not a problem. It is just that a sugar plant is somewhere in the vicinity. In the furnaces, they burn bagasse, sugar-cane oil cake which is used as fuel for the production of sugar. Don't pay attention to the dust; they say that it is not dangerous."

Indeed, the dark brown smoke which the Cubans are accustomed to never stops billowing from the smokestacks of the centrals, as they call sugar plants here, in most provinces of the country. As the local scientists maintain, it is indeed harmless. Newspaper reports on the progress of the cane-harvesting campaign resemble communiques from the front line. To be sure, recently notes of alarm have been increasingly heard in them. After the record of over 8 million tons of this product turned out last year, the outlook for this year is not bright.

The pace of manual and mechanized harvesting of sugar has dropped. As a result, by the beginning of March the sugar plants had produced 450,000 tons less output than was envisaged by the plan. Recently the newspaper GRANMA reported with alarm that in only two of 14 provinces in the country was the capacity of plants producing sugar used at 90 percent or more. To be sure, emergency measures are being taken now with a view to making up the shortfall in the remaining three months.

It is easy to understand the concern of the Cubans. After all, sugar is the main export product of the country. It pays for the deliveries of various goods and products from abroad, primarily from the Soviet Union. The surplus is sold in the free market, which makes it possible to obtain badly needed hard currency.

It is known that we are the main purchasers of sugar from this Caribbean country. It accounts for about 70 percent of Cuban exports to the USSR. One spoonful of sugar out of three in the tea we drink is from Cuba. For three decades, the mutually advantageous nature of commercial contacts in this field was not questioned, even when housing stock administrations became involved in the distribution of sugar in our country...

However, recently a number of people's deputies asked in the forum of the supreme legislative organ of the USSR: Are these purchases that advantageous for us? Indeed why, for example, is the price for the wholesale purchase of sugar in our country set at 650 rubles per ton whereas in Cuba the same ton costs 850 rubles? Who pays for the difference?

Chairman of the Prodtorg Foreign Economic Association A.K. Krivenko said: "Yes, we may be paying too much for sugar. However, what do we use for counter-deliveries? Our machinery and equipment, which no other country would hardly buy."

This view may be debatable. However, in reference to this a recent speech by F. Castro comes to mind. Evaluating the goods that Cuba purchases from the East European countries, he referred to them with obvious irritation as "refuse, muck, trash, and cheap stuff." The only consolation in this case is that the Cuban leader passed over the quality of our products in silence. Or could it be that the time for this has not come yet?..

Another argument in favor of our purchases of Cuban sugar also merits attention. It was put forth by P.I. Kormilitsin, USSR Trade Representative in Cuba. He noted: "At present, we receive 4.3 million tons of this product annually from Cuba. Meanwhile, they pay about \$300 per ton for it in the world market!"

However, let us recall that machinery and equipment account only for about 20 percent of our exports to Cuba. "Hard-currency" goods such as oil, metal, food-stuffs, cotton, and various chemicals account for the rest of it. Oil is in the lead: It accounts for almost one-half of our exports. This is why it stands to reason that this raw material should be the main indicator in searching for an answer to the following question: "What does Cuban sugar cost us?"

In this case, it turns out that under our mutual agreement we give five tons of oil for every ton of sugar. At the same time, at current world prices an equal amount of this product may correspond only to three tons of this important raw material.

Here are all the numbers which suggest that, given the world-market price of approximately \$100 per ton of oil, excessive payments for the sweet product come to around 66 percent.

Finally, with every passing year Cuba has been experiencing increasing difficulties in meeting its obligations for the delivery of sugar to its trade partners in various countries. The limit of its own resources has been reached. In the past three years, the Cubans... have been buying sugar on credit from a French company, to be sure, with our guarantees, in order to settle with us and meet their obligations scrupulously. This has accounted for about 30 percent of contract deliveries to our country in the past two years. The conditions the selling company sets are on the whole straightforward: An annual interest

rate of 10 percent; after that, either the sugar goes to their warehouses, or cash on the barrel.

There is sufficient cause for concern in this instance: After all, someone will have to pay.

Just recently the two countries, Cuba and the USSR alike, solemnly celebrated the 30th anniversary of their commercial and economic relations. During these days, as was the case in all previous years, buoyant notes were heard in the speeches of ranking comrades both here and there when it came to assessing results and future outlook.

Undoubtedly, this is not unfounded. Very many things have been built, sold, coordinated, prepared, given as gifts, and even just given away, which, according to the common official opinion, contributed and contributes to nothing else but the welfare of the two countries, their development and prosperity. However, present-day reality suggests that a lot will have to be revised and changed, whether we want it or not.

It was and is maintained that mutually beneficial cooperation occurs in the area of commercial and economic ties. If it is so, where does the annual 700-million imbalance in these relations fit, which we offset annually with credits going into millions? Besides, we annually allocate credit for rendering technical assistance in the construction of industrial and other facilities. This costs us another more than R400 million a year. This means that in every five-year period these injections go into billions.

Why should we not do something simpler and, at the same time, clearer: Call commerce commerce, and aid—without embarrassment—aid.

The case of the sugar problem used in this article is but one example of how difficult it is to clean up the mess of the past. Here is this topic from yet another angle.

In the environment of transition to complete economic accountability, Soviet enterprises traditionally manufacturing products to be exported to Cuba naturally strive for their contacts with this country to be genuinely in the mutual interest. However, as soon as articles in which various aspects of bilateral cooperation were critically reviewed appeared in some organs of the Soviet press, the Cuban leader responded to this. F. Castro noted in one of his speeches: "Some Soviet publications have already begun to demand that fair trade relations on an equal footing established between Cuba and the USSR be discontinued." In his opinion, the call for "the USSR to join the Yankee blockade of Cuba" is hidden behind this.

Nothing of the kind; nobody in our country has as much as hinted at that. Nobody wishes on the Cubans the exacerbation of their economic problems, most acute to begin with. To be sure, nobody in our country is going to advocate the flow of our foreign-currency funds to this

country in a unilateral stream either. After all, I am certain that neither state is interested in "a one-way street."

At the same time, is it not absurd for an industrial power such as ours to have a pattern of foreign economic ties which is based mostly on the exchange of its natural resources for, say, sugar? Could it be reasonable to consider and agree on a transition to purchasing this product at world market prices? Of course, each other's positions should be taken into account in the process. In the opinion of our friends prices at the London exchange, which are the benchmark for the world market, are clearly too low and do not cover the level of the cost of manufacturing this product.

Perhaps this transition to mutually advantageous hard-currency trade could help reinvigorate the Cuban economy and liberate it from the dominance of a single crop. At any rate, changes are on the doorstep. I stress that it is up to the specialists to determine specifically how they are going to be implemented.

Shevardnadze, Bolivian Minister Exchange Messages

PM2004161190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Exchange of Telegrams"]

[Text] In connection with the 45th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR

and Bolivia on 18 April the two countries' foreign ministers have exchanged telegrams of congratulations.

E.A. Shevardnadze noted in his message that over the years diverse ties based on the principles of equality, noninterference in internal affairs, mutual respect, and freedom of choice have taken shape between the USSR and Bolivia. The hope was expressed that bilateral relations will continue to strengthen in the interests of both peoples and the cause of peace and progress.

The telegram from Bolivian Minister C. Iturralde Baldivian praises highly the joint efforts of the Soviet Union and Bolivia aimed at strengthening peace and international security and democratizing international relations and expresses confidence in the further deepening of Soviet-Bolivian ties.

Mexican Party Delegation Visits Soviet Union

PM2004095790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] A delegation of the ruling Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI] was in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee 8 through 18 April. The delegation was familiarized with the perestroika processes in the Soviet Union and progress in preparing for the 28th CPSU Congress. The guests had conversations at CPSU Central Committee departments and visited Leningrad and Kiev.

The sides confirmed their mutual desire to develop contacts between the CPSU and the PRI.

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow TV Carries 24 Apr Supreme Soviet Session

Soviet of Union

LD2404200790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 24 April begins to broadcast a recording of the 24 April USSR Supreme Soviet Councils proceedings in the Moscow Kremlin. The Soviet of the Union session is chaired by Laptev, who says that they are to consider the draft law on the free national development of USSR citizens living outside their national-state formations.

At 1802 GMT Tarazevich, chairman of the Commission on Nationalities Policy, reports on the commission's deliberations on the draft law. He reviews the various amendments that deputies had proposed for the commission's consideration, and expounds the commission's conclusions in detail, article by article. The articles cover the rights of citizens living in a republic or area that is not, in nationality terms, their own to enjoy cultural facilities relating to their own nationality, including the right to establish cultural centers; to be given full legal protection.

At 1815 GMT Tarazevich concludes his report. Laptev asks for questions. Deputy Bobyleva asks about the status of the cultural centers. Tarazevich answers briefly. Bobyleva then comments about the provision of arrangements for national customs to be observed.

At 1817 GMT Deputy Ryabchenko asks about arrangements made by organizations who invite specialists from one state formation to another to ensure the well being of the specialists. He refers to such arrangements made in the FRG in the case of Gastarbeiter.

At 1820 GMT Laptev outlines the procedure to be followed during the draft law's second reading. He invites the deputies to register their presence: 203 are present. He then invites deputies to vote on the preamble: for 186; against 5; abstained 3. The preamble is passed.

At 1823 GMT Deputy Yudin raises an editorial point about Article 1 of the first section of the draft law. He goes on to talk about the provision of cultural rights to members of a particular nationality, for example Tatars, who live outside the national area. There are more Tatars living outside the national area than in it. The amendment is defeated: Only 89 deputies voted for it.

At 1827 GMT a deputy proposes the addition of a few words concerning religious rights to the others listed in the article. Result: for 139; against 28; abstained 15. The amendment to the first section is passed.

At 1829 GMT Deputy Kim proposes that the word "political" be removed from the general description of a

national entity. A vote is taken: for 175; against 9; abstained 5. The amendment is passed.

At 1831 GMT Laptev proposes a vote on the acceptability of the first section as a whole. Result: for 187; against 9; abstained 2. The first section is approved.

At 1832 GMT the second section is put to vote without discussion. Result: for 181, against 7, abstained 7. The second section is passed.

At 1833 GMT Laptev proposes discussion of the third section. A member of the Commission for Industry takes the platform. He outlines some apparent contradictions between three articles in this section as regards the right of minorities to set up national rayons—for example a German rayon in Kazakhstan. He asks that these articles be abolished.

At 1838 GMT Tarazevich replies to the points raised. On the German question, he has no objection to the formation of German rayons in areas where Germans constitute the majority.

At 1845 GMT Professor Krylov says that the point is not the right of minorities to set up their own state formations, but their right to enjoy their own cultures in the alien environment. If this is granted, there should be no nationality conflicts.

At 1848 GMT Deputy Reshetnikov asks about the Meshketian Turks and the refugee problem. Krylov says that the refugees problem is a matter for a different discussion.

At 1849 GMT Laptev puts Yudin's amendment on the development of industry to the vote. Only 73 vote for it. It is declined. He then puts the third section as a whole to the vote. Result: only 127 vote for it. The third section is rejected.

At 1851 GMT Deputy Kim turns to the fourth section, making a point about Article 13. His suggested amendment is put to the vote. Result: for 148; against 24; abstained 11. The amendment is approved.

At 1853 GMT Deputy Ryabchenko makes a point about Article 18, suggesting an addition. Laptev puts the amendment to the vote. Result: for 45; against 95; abstained 14. The amendment falls. The fourth section as a whole is put to the vote. Result: for 181; against 1; abstained 7. The fourth section is carried.

At 1857 GMT Deputy Reshetnikov makes a point about the fifth section—on legal guarantees. Tarazevich clarifies the situation.

Draft Law on Languages Considered

LD2404223190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1900 GMT on 24 April continues its recorded relay of the Supreme Soviet Councils proceedings in the Moscow Kremlin.

Stadnik raises a point about Article 20, suggesting that it be omitted. Laptev puts it to a vote: for 172; against 11; abstained 9.

At 1902 GMT Laptev puts the whole section to the vote: for 185, against 5, abstained 1. It is passed.

At 1903 GMT discussion moves on to Article 6. There are no comments. It is put to a vote: for 179; against 4; abstained 3. It is passed.

At 1905 GMT Laptev explains the procedure to be followed now. He invites Tarazevich to the rostrum to explain Article 7. Laptev puts it to a vote: for 114. It is not passed.

At 1906 GMT Tarazevich explains the background to Article Eight. Laptev puts it to a vote. For 121. It is not passed.

At 1907 GMT Laptev puts Article 9 to a vote: for 140; against 26; abstained 19. It is passed.

At 1909 GMT Tarazevich explains the next article, Article 10. It is put to a vote: for 103. It is not passed.

At 1910 GMT Article 11 is put to a vote: for 145; against 27; abstained 11.

At 1911 GMT Article 12 is put to a vote: for 163; against 10; abstained 11. It is passed.

At 1912 GMT Laptev explains that as three articles of section three have not been passed, the law has not been passed and needs further work. It is postponed until later.

At 1913 GMT Laptev moves on to the second law to be considered: the law on languages. The first reading was on 15 November last year. It has been worked on since then.

At 1914 GMT Deputy Aytmatov tells of the work that has been carried out on the draft since the first reading. He says:

"Since the passing of the first reading of the draft law of the languages of the peoples of the USSR almost half a year has passed. In that period, in spite of a certain calm on this theme in the mass media, the tension of the language situation in the country has not lessened, but has grown more acute. Alongside the growth of national self-awareness and the development of the economic autonomy of the Union and Autonomous Republics there has been further progress in such unfortunate phenomena as the exacerbation of inter-ethnic relations, the process of political, economic, and language disintegration of the country.

"In the public opinion of some republics the tendency to secession from the USSR is interpreted exclusively in one way, as the shortest path to resolving all social, economic, historic, and other problems. At the same time, language policy is growing from being a defensive tendency, from being opposition to assimilation, into an

active form of self-assertion of national languages as state languages and in some cases as obligatory for all national groups living an administrative territory.

"This process is undoubtedly progressive but is proceeding not without complications and conflicts in the localities, for the resolution of many problems requires time, consistency, and tolerance."

At 1931 GMT Laptev says the draft will be considered point by point. First, the preamble. No remarks. It is put to a vote: for 169; against 8; abstained 4. It is passed.

At 1933 GMT the first section is considered. A deputy comments on Article Four, suggesting a different wording on Russian as a statewide language. Aytmatov expresses the opinion of the commission on this, opposing the change. Laptev notes that the proposal came from a member of the Soviet of Nationalities. Other deputies propose different wordings.

At 1938 GMT a Ukrainian deputy on behalf of the delegation of the Ukraine reads out a statement pointing out that the proposed draft contradicts a law already passed in the Ukraine.

At 1940 GMT a female deputy expounds on the role of language as such.

At 1943 GMT Deputy Ryabchenko returns to the description in the draft: only the Russian language fits the bill.

At 1946 GMT Aytmatov intervenes again on behalf of the commission and objects to any changes in the commission's wording, apart from one small amendment.

At 1949 GMT Laptev proposes to put to vote Article 4, in the wording of the commission: for 141; against 34; abstained 9. Article Four is adopted in the wording of the Commission.

At 1951 GMT Laptev puts Article 5 to a vote, incorporating Kim's amendment: for 164; against 8; abstained 6. Article 5 passes.

At 1952 GMT Laptev puts the first section to a vote: for 161; against 19; abstained 9. The first section of the law is passed.

At 1953 GMT Laptev puts the second section of the law to a vote.

At 1954 GMT Deputy Pukhova reads out Article 9, stressing the need for anyone appealing to address his request in the official language.

At 1956 GMT Aytmatov says they examined this proposal but rejected it.

At 1956 GMT Laptev puts it to a vote. The results: for 151; against 19; abstained 13. Section 2 is passed.

At 1957 GMT Laptev proposes for discussion Section 3 on language use in enterprises and other establishments.

At 1958 GMT Deputy Miloserdnyy re-introduces a proposal he made earlier.

At 1959 GMT Laptev puts Miloserdnyy's amendment to a vote, which the commissions support. The amendment is rejected.

At 2000 GMT 140 vote for passing Section 3, 23 against, 11 abstain. Section 3 is passed.

Deputy Abdullayeva proposes her wording for Section 4. Aytmatov says the commission accepts her editorial amendment. It is put to a vote: for 166; against 5; abstain 7. Section 4, including amendment 5, is passed.

At 2003 GMT Laptev says the entire law on languages as a whole is put to a vote: for 149; against 25; abstained 9. The law passes. The Soviet of the Union session ends.

Soviet of Nationalities

LD2404231290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2005 GMT on 24 April continues its recorded relay of the Supreme Soviet Councils proceedings in the Moscow Kremlin.

At 2005 GMT Soviet of Nationalities session begins. Nishanov gives the floor to Deputy Mashbashev.

At 2006 GMT Deputy Mashbashev says that minorities' rights are often violated. He says that his commission proposes the passing of this law.

At 2009 GMT Deputy Abbasova proposes a number of minor changes in the wording of Articles 14, 16, 19.

At 2013 GMT Deputy Lyudmila Arutyanyan takes the floor, recalling the Turkish genocide of the Armenians. The USSR Supreme Soviet was unable to consider this matter for over a year. A minute of silence is observed at her request.

At 2016 GMT Nishanov says he fully shares the pain felt by the Armenian delegation over the Armenian genocide. Such crimes should be condemned wherever they occur.

At 2018 GMT Deputy Isayev from Nakhichevan oblast recalls what has been done in Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic in the area of the law. He proposes an amendment to Article Three, an amendment to Article Four, an amendment to Article Seven.

At 2021 GMT Deputy Veyser of Kazakhstan says that without adopting Articles Three, Four and Eight, passing the law does not make sense. He calls on the Soviet of the Union to return to these articles and adopt them, perhaps in a different wording.

At 2023 GMT Deputy Advadze of Tbilisi proposes some amendments which apply to Georgia, saying that passing the law as it stands is unacceptable for Georgians and will not be registered there.

At 2025 GMT Deputy Vyucheykiy, Naryan-mar, complains about the poor conditions of the small peoples of the North. People who settled there from elsewhere live in better conditions than the natives.

At 2027 GMT an unidentified female Ukrainian deputy disagrees with two previous deputies. She says there are 14 million members of other nationalities living in the Ukraine. In recent years, they have been allowed to develop their cultures, societies, and languages freely. She details the various institutions opened to assist the free-development process. There are 7 million Ukrainians living in the USSR outside the Ukraine. She voices gratitude to other republics for helping these Ukrainians to maintain links with their native culture. The free-development process must be extended to the country as a whole. She supports the draft law.

At 2033 GMT Deputy Labunov says that there should be national schools and other cultural facilities wherever there is a local need for them, even in individual villages. (break in reception)

At 2059 GMT an unidentified male deputy from the Ukraine talks about the apparent contradiction between the existence of a republic's individual language and the use of Russian throughout the USSR as the state's official language. Russian speakers have no incentive to learn local languages. Switzerland has no single state language. The use of English in India does no harm to the indigenous languages. Lenin said that Russian should be used as a matter of choice, not of compulsion.

Draft Law on Languages Passed

LD2404231390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2105 GMT on 24 April continues its recorded relay of the Supreme Soviet Councils proceedings in the Moscow Kremlin.

Deputy Gamkrelidze says that Russian should be the language of inter-republican communication within the USSR, but efforts must be made to see that the use of local languages is not dangerously reduced. He calls for a sensitive approach by deputies to language and nationality issues.

At 2108 GMT Deputy Rakhimova says that careful organization of the approach to languages is called for, although she does not disagree with the view that Russian must be the state language. It helps to maintain state unity.

At 2112 GMT Deputy Chernykh supports the draft law.

At 2116 GMT Deputy Sharipov claims to be a polyglot. He supports the draft.

At 2121 GMT Deputy Shamikhin from Riga says this is a longterm problem.

At 2125 GMT Deputy Stepanova of the languages commission suggests adopting a message to the Soviet people

explaining the essence of the draft law. She calls for a careful education program to explain the law.

At 2132 GMT Deputy Akayev praises the law as integrationist.

At 2134 GMT Deputy Yerelina from Gorno-Altay autonomous oblast supports the law.

At 2139 GMT Nishanov calls for registration. There are 182 present, a quorum, so three deputies who have requested permission to leave are permitted to do so.

At 2141 GMT Deputy Oleynik says that pragmatism calls for a working language for the whole country.

At 2145 GMT Deputy Bisher refers to foreign experience on official state languages.

At 2151 GMT Nishanov says that the majority seem to support the draft law; but the fourth point is causing problems.

At 2152 GMT Aymatov expresses the opinion of the commission; he is willing to alter slightly the fourth point, making Russian the "working" language.

At 2153 GMT the voting figures are shown: for 156; against 7; abstained 3. The Soviet of Nationalities has thus passed the draft Law on Languages.

Deputies Recognize Russian as State Language

LD2404115990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1100 GMT on 24 April carries a three-minute report by correspondent Aleksandr Ruvinskiy on the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet morning session in the Kremlin on 24 April.

He says a heated discussion took place on the draft law on the free national development of citizens of the USSR who reside outside the boundaries of their national-state formations or who do not have such formations within the territory of the USSR and the draft law on the languages of the peoples of the USSR. He says "many amendments to the draft laws were put forward by the deputies. All the same, the laws, both laws, have been adopted, admittedly thus far only by the Soviet of the Union at its morning session. Most objections from the deputies were aroused by the article on national administrative and territorial units. These may be formed by an expression of the will of the majority of the population resident in a given location. This article was put to a vote several times, rejected in the vote, and the deputies returned to it again. As a result, however, the draft law was adopted in full."

Ruvinskiy adds that Article 4 of the draft law on languages was the stumbling block for many. He says "it talks about the legal status of languages and specifically about acknowledging Russian as the official language of the USSR." He then reads the final adopted version as follows:

"Taking into account the conditions that have come about in the course of history and with the aim of ensuring all-union tasks, Russian is acknowledged on the territory of the USSR as the official language of the USSR and is to be used as a means of communication between the nationalities."

Soviet of Union on Ethnic Development Law

LD2404102790 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 0900 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Excerpts] At the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Over the All-Union Radio correspondents' post in the Kremlin. Lyudmila Semina is on the line:

[Semina] The Soviet of the Union has been at work in the Kremlin this morning. On its agenda are two draft laws from the package of law-making acts on our federation: the law on the free national development of citizens of the USSR who are resident outside the boundaries of their national-state formations or who have no such formations within the territory of the USSR, and that on the languages of the peoples of the USSR.

The law on the free national development of citizens of the USSR is designed to facilitate the harmonization of interethnic relations, meeting the specific interests of each nationality and ethnic group and affirmation of mutual respect and socialist internationalism in contacts between the nationalities. The Soviet of the Union has not adopted the law. It has rejected three articles from the section on national and administrative territorial units, which are about the formation of national rayons, settlements, and rural soviets, the guarantee of representation of national groups in the executive and administrative bodies of the local soviets, and the use of the national language in all spheres of activity. The deputies found that the way in which these articles were formulated was not sufficiently accurate or comprehensive. They will have to come back to them. We shall see what conclusion the Soviet of Nationalities will reach on this law today.

The other 21 articles of the law were adopted. The law is also essential to ensure the development of national cultural traditions of all the peoples of our country. We have 130 nationalities and ethnic groups. Sixty million of our citizens are resident outside their national-state formations.

The Soviet of the Union is now discussing the draft law on the languages of the peoples of the USSR. Chingiz Aytmatov has delivered the report. [passage omitted] Discussion of this law has only just begun at the Soviet of the Union. We will have more to say about it later on. For the moment I am ending my report from the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

More on Language Law, 'Free Ethnic Development'

*LD2404192590 Moscow TASS in English 1901 GMT
24 Apr 90*

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—The two chambers of the Soviet parliament today separately passed a bill on the languages of Soviet peoples.

The Council of Nationalities also approved another bill—on the free ethnic development of Soviet citizens living outside their national-state entities.

However, some of its provisions failed to win the required majority of deputies to the Council of the Union.

The Law on Languages gives constituent and autonomous republics the right to independently determine the legal status of their languages, including the right to establish them as state languages on their territory.

Taking into account historically-established conditions and realities, the Russian language is recognised as the official language on the territory of the USSR.

The law guarantees Soviet citizens the freedom to choose the language used in upbringing and education and gives them the right to turn to state and public bodies using any language.

The law prohibits any direct or indirect restriction of the right to work depending on the knowledge of a language. It establishes that the creation of any privileges, obstacles or restrictions concerning the use of languages of Soviet peoples entails responsibility under existing legislation.

The bill on the free ethnic development of Soviet citizens living outside their national-state entities or having no such on Soviet territory—there are about 60 million such people in this country—contains various guarantees for full equality and equal opportunities for corresponding ethnic groups.

Specifically, it provides for the possibility of creating ethnic districts and settlements by ethnic minorities, having no autonomous entities of their own, in areas inhabited mostly by these groups.

Such ethnic entities existed in the Soviet Union in the 1920s but were later abolished.

This provision of the bill provoked a heated debate among deputies to the Council of the Union. Many of them expressed fears that its implementation might provoke territorial conflicts.

As a result, some articles of the bill failed to win the required majority and were instructed to be revised.

The two chambers will hold a joint sitting on Wednesday to discuss a programme of urgent measures to eliminate the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

Supreme Soviet Discusses Chernobyl Consequences

*LD2504070790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0630 GMT 25 Apr 90*

[Text] A joint sitting of the chambers is under way at the USSR Supreme Soviet session today. Many people's deputies who are not members of the Supreme Soviet or the government are present. The question under discussion is a very difficult and urgent one: a unified program to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station, and the situation connected with this accident.

The state program of urgent measures for the period 1990-92 to eliminate the consequences of the accident has taken a long time to draw up. The issue was raised at the last session of the Supreme Soviet, when the deputies instructed the government to draw up a program. A great deal of material has been gathered. The USSR Supreme Soviet points out that the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station is by the sum total of its consequences the biggest catastrophe of modern times, a nationwide misfortune that has affected the destiny of millions of people living over huge areas. This has confronted the country with the necessity of resolving new, exceptionally difficult, and large-scale problems touching upon practically every sphere of public life, many aspects of science and production, and problems of culture, morality and ethics.

Vitaliy Khusheynovich Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, is now reporting on the state program of urgent measures in Supreme Soviet hall.

Council of Union Chairman Laptev Profiled

*90UN1524A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 14, 7 Apr 90 p 1*

[Pavel Semenov report: "Ivan Laptev"]

[Text] The choices were difficult: Three candidates were nominated and three times none won the necessary number of votes to exceed the 50-percent mark to make muster in the chamber. They were already talking about a "procedural impasse," which, incidentally had been created, strictly speaking, by the fact that almost one-fourth of the members of the Council of the Union did not think they could attend the meeting....

They are claiming that in his earlier seat Laptev allegedly stated that he would abolish the concept of labor discipline: "As a leader I am not interested in when people go to work and how many leave. What is important to me is that each person does what he is supposed to do...." It is interesting, is it not, to know whether this principle will be altered in connection with the lack of this concept of discipline in the Council of the Union?

Finally, Ivan Dmitriyevich Laptev was elected chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Union. I think that it was not by chance that People's Deputy I. Andreyeva congratulated him "not only on his election but also on his remarkable self-control and real human courage." Qualities, one could say, that are useful in any post, in any sphere of activity, and one does not need to be a prophet to predict how they are needed by the speaker in our parliament, which is unfortunately still not overburdened with good manners.

But the political positions held by a man who has become one of the most visible figures in the country—visible also in the direct "audiovisual" sense of the word—are much more important. It seems to me that we may judge these positions quite clearly from the newspaper IZVESTIYA, which Laptev has headed for the past six years. Decisive support for the policy of change and consistency and staunchness in the struggle for it, democratism, and intelligence—all these things have created for IZVESTIYA a stable prestige among readers and the role of a captain who sets his ship on a course into the stormy latitudes of life today, determined and sure. Mention might also be made of Laptev's innate ability to "take a punch" without passing it on "downward," onto his colleagues, and his readiness to reach a decision and defend it to the end, and when he does this to lay the stress on "centrism," his rejection of extreme positions, and his ability to listen to other arguments, which, however, does not prevent him very often from maintaining his own opinion.

He was born and grew up in Siberia, in Omsk Oblast. He went to a craft school. He engaged in sports—he was twice USSR cycling champion. He studied by correspondence in a faculty of journalism and he has worked on SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and PRAVDA (which, however, did not subsequently prevent IZVESTIYA in a whole series of cases from fully expressing its disagreement with those newspapers). He is a doctor of philosophical sciences and deals with problems relating to the interaction between society and nature. At one time he headed the All-Union Temperance Society which, like his work in the party apparatus, does not, it is true, add to his popularity in these times. He has just been elected chairman of the board of the USSR Union of Journalists.

It is the opinion of those who have worked with Laptev that all these circumstances of life and the qualities of character that have been shaped in him make work with fruitful and interesting.

Deputy Defense Minister on Bigger Army Pensions

PM2404161990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Speech by Army General V.M. Shabanov, USSR Supreme Soviet member and deputy defense minister, at the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet under the rubric "Deputy's Platform": "A Question of Exceptional Importance"—date of speech not specified]

[Text] Dear comrade deputies! Today the whole country is listening to us, people of all ages and walks of life, civilian and military. I am convinced that they are all united in one thing—in their reliance on us, in their reliance on the fact that we possess the necessary wisdom, knowledge, and experience of life to pass some of the most significant laws in their lifetime—laws on pension provisions.

It need not be proved that military service entails considerable hardships and deprivations, the strict carrying out of the military oath's requirements and of regulations and orders, and that it frequently entails a risk to a serviceman's life. We should not fail to note also a very important feature of military service—the need for the majority of servicemen to retire on pension—officers, army and navy warrant officers, and extended-service soldier—aged between 40 and 50. A serviceman's early retirement on pension is a particularly difficult experience for him if, at the time of retiring on an age-related pension, he does not have the full length of service required and consequently cannot receive a full-rate pension. The morale of an officer, army or navy warrant officer, or extended-service soldier after retiring on pension is also eroded by the uncertainty of job placement and earnings, and by the realization that it will often be impossible for him and his family to live on the pension he receives.

In the majority of foreign countries, questions of servicemen's pension provisions are separate from the general system of pension provisions, and the military pension rates are significantly higher than ours. For example, here a company commander can receive a pension of R155, whereas in the United States it is \$1,890.

Everything I have said enables me to ask members of the Supreme Soviet, at the same time as adopting the general Law on Pension Provisions, to adopt the Law on Pension Provisions for Servicemen, which will affect around 3 million people. An improvement in pension provisions for servicemen and their families will be of exceptionally great significance for the social protection of servicemen and for high-quality manpower acquisition in the professional section of the Army.

As a deputy I receive a great quantity of letters from my servicemen-electors, in which they pointedly raise the question of the calculation of servicemen's pensions, which is not only based on a scale according to post and military rank but also takes into account the financial long-service increment. Many, very many servicemen and veterans are moving a resolution to allow full-rate pensions to be paid to pensioner-servicemen without taking into account their earnings after retiring on pension, which will allow highly qualified cadres to be utilized in the national economy according to their speciality, and not as guards.

Many proposals have been received on the question of counting time spent studying at civilian higher educational establishments and time worked prior to entering

military service toward servicemen's length of service. The question of the mechanism for increasing pensions once fixed causes veterans particular anxiety. They suggest recalculating their earlier set pensions, based on the current equivalent financial allowance for servicemen.

I personally also consider the level of pensions for disabled soldiers very low. Thus, a Category II disabled soldier—an enlisted man—currently receives the minimum-rate pension of R97. Under the new pension provisions he could receive an increment of only R8.

I would ask that, along with the proposals set out above, the possibility of substantially increasing the minimum-rate pension for disabled soldiers be examined during finalization of the law.

The law as a whole can be approved and finalized, bearing in mind that it was widely discussed among servicemen and veterans.

Political & Social

CPSU Ideological Conference Discusses Reform

LD2404210390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1710 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 24 Apr (TASS)—A conference of secretaries of the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics, of kray committees, oblast committees, and a number of city and rayon committees of the CPSU took place on 23-24 April at the CPSU Central Committee. Questions of the party's ideological and political work under present-day conditions were discussed at the conference. A report was given by Vadim Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

It was noted at the conference that Soviet society has entered an exceptionally crucial stage in its development. Implementation has been started of a program of reforms of the economic system, of state power, and of the area of interethnic relations, which is unprecedented in many decades. A qualitatively new stage also has arrived in the activity of the party as it prepares for its 28th congress.

The principal specific feature of this stage lies in the fact that from now on the CPSU is faced with acting on the basis of constitutional norms under conditions of rivalry and competition with other political forces and social movements. All of this presupposes conceptual approaches in the ideological activity of the CPSU which also are new in principle. The Politburo and the CPSU Central Committee stand firmly on the position that neither a conservative recoil from the course of progressive changes nor a revision of the socialist choice should be permitted.

Those taking part in the conference stressed that the spearhead of ideological work must be directed toward imparting a new impetus to the processes of perestroika,

toward putting them into a constructive channel, and stabilizing the sociopolitical situation. The fetters of obsolete prejudices in economic thinking also are to be thrown off and an understanding formed in public opinion of the need for radical economic changes with the setting up of a mechanism for the social protection of the main strata of the population.

The importance of a correct understanding of the CPSU Central Committee's open letter to the country's communists and of active work around this was stressed. In no circumstances must it be perceived as a signal for winding up discussion, restricting the struggle of opinions and democracy in the party and tearing out all those who voice criticism of the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee and put forward alternative opinions. Measures of party responsibility can affect only active leaders of splitting groups pursuing a struggle against the party.

The forthcoming adoption of the law on the press and the emergence of the multiparty system are creating a situation in relations between the CPSU and the press which is new in principle.

It was observed at the conference that the party has no grounds for complaining about an explosion of social activity. The Lenin formula, "the living creativity of the masses," today is being filled with specific content. The task of the ideological workers is to direct the activeness of the people into the construction of a democratic and humane socialism.

Komsomol Program Goals Published

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[Text of "Komsomol Program Goals"]

[Text] This document is geared toward the transitional period in the development of our youth league, which conditions the special features of the tasks and functions of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] at the present stage.

The fundamental priorities for the Komsomol are freedom and justice, humanism and human solidarity, the desire for a society in which the free development of each person is the condition for the free development of all and in which man is the supreme point of political and economic transformations.

Essential conditions for the organization's renewal are the resolute renunciation of:

—dogmas and stereotypes which for many years have formed our world outlook;

—the statization of the Komsomol, which turned our league into an obedient tool for controlling young people;

- the blind copying of party structures and methods, which led to the suppression of the youth organization's independent nature;
- education as its main function;
- the model of the Komsomol which suppresses democracy within the league and impedes the development of the personality of each member of the league.

The basis for ideological unity in the Komsomol is the creatively developed theory of Marxism, the recognition of the priority of general human values; and the achievements of modern socialist thought.

The main aims are:

- the creation of conditions for man's free development, the revelation of his creative potential, and the defense and implementation of the rights and interests of members of the organization and of the country's young people;
- the promotion of the creation of a society of democratic, humane socialism and the country's transition to the condition of a truly federative rule-of-law democratic state and the implementation of this transition without violence, by parliamentary means.

Our league can express its program tasks in three words: PARTICIPATION, DEVELOPMENT, PEACE.

I. Participation

The Komsomol seeks the participation of its members in the activity of the organs of the people's power: from the labor collective council to the congress of people's deputies.

Taking part in sociopolitical life and using the right of legislative initiative and representation in organs of state power and public self-management, the league will:

- suggest its options for resolving the problems of society and youth;
- take an active part in the elaboration and implementation of the policy of the CPSU; and of other sociopolitical and state structures engaged in resolving youth problems;
- seek the consolidation of all constructive political forces for the implementation of radical democratic transformations;
- demand state subsidies for the activity of youth and children's organizations.

The Komsomol advocates the development of the V.I. Lenin all-union pioneers organization and the children's movement as a whole on the basis of democracy and humanism.

II. Development

The Komsomol offers its concept of a state youth policy and seeks its implementation at all-union and regional level. **The youth league advocates the adoption of a comprehensive act on state youth policy.** It advocates the creation of a system of organs of state power and management engaged in youth problems and a system for its public self-management. It advocates a regional policy with regard to young people which takes account of territories' national, historical, and sociocultural features. It advocates public control over its implementation in a federative state.

In the education field. Recognition of education as a priority and a condition for society's renewal. An increase in appropriations for education. Free access to any open sources of information. Diversity and freedom of choice of forms of receiving education in the country and abroad. The elaboration of an all-state "21st century intellect" program.

In the cultural field. Free, broad access for young people to the values of world and native culture. State support for this activity. Freedom of creation. Equal development and the elaboration of state and public programs for the resurrection of national cultures.

In the socioeconomic sphere. The defense of young people's socioeconomic interests. Long-term preferential credits for young families and citizens with the partial extinguishing of credit depending on the birth of children or participation in urgent social programs. The development of young people's housing complexes and the individual and collective construction of housing for young people. The introduction of a new and effective system of grants for mother and child protection and aid for young invalids and those who have been invalids since childhood. A preferential taxation policy with regard to youth organizations and their enterprises.

The Komsomol considers youth employment to be a very important avenue of its activity in the economic conditions which have taken shape. To this end the Komsomol will insist on:

- the young person's guaranteed right to a first job;
- the organization of a broad network of courses for improving qualifications, retraining, and requalifying;
- the creation of additional jobs for young people, including through youth organizations' enterprises;
- the organization of a system of partial employment providing for a reduction in the working day and an increase in the number of jobs and the receipt of remuneration guaranteeing a living wage;
- the encouragement of enterprises recruiting young people through the introduction of preferential payment for manpower resources;
- the payment of unemployment grants.

The creation of a single social service for young people including centers for:

- social assistance for the young family;
- information on finding a job;
- legal consultation;
- young people's sociopsychological adaptation.

The Komsomol advocates the development of the qualities of a citizen, patriot, and defender of his Fatherland in every young person. The Komsomol seeks democratization and the creation of normal conditions for young people's military service.

III. Peace

We advocate peace, by which we understand:

- the peaceful transition to a new state for society, civil peace, civilized collaboration between all political forces, and guaranteed participation in this process for all our country's progressive, democratic forces, including young people;
- the formation in young people of all the country's nations and ethnic groups of a high standard of interest in communal living and the qualities of patriots and internationalists;

our country's openness to the outside world and the free exchange of ideas and information;

- a world free of violence, the threat of annihilation, and ecological catastrophe, the solution of global problems by the common efforts of all countries and peoples;
- the defense of the environment and the conservation of nature for future generations. The open discussion of major economic projects. The introduction of ecological studies and measurements complying with international norms. Universal access to data about the state of our environment;
- participation in the creation of a world information expanse [prostranstvo].

Assistance in the formation of a broad view of the world and the life of our contemporaries both in the USSR and abroad. The development of youth tourism and international youth exchanges. Participation in European, Asian-Pacific, and other regional program for youth exchanges, including our country's association to the international "Interrail" system of international transport concessions for young people and integration programs in the field of education.

The creation of real opportunities and legal guarantees for young Soviet people for free entry and exit, the finding of jobs, traineeships, and study in other countries.

Assistance for the consolidation of democratic forces in the international youth movement, proceeding from the new political thinking, world outlook tolerance and the primacy of general human values. The unification on

this basis of a broad spectrum of youth forces into a renewed world festival movement as a world forum for the discussion of youth and global problems.

The development of contacts with youth organizations of various political orientations. The Komsomol will seek to deepen cooperation with the left-wing forces in the international youth movement—young communists, social democrats, and socialists.

Mironenko Report to Komsomol Congress 11 Apr

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[Report by V. Mironenko, first secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee, to 11 April 21st VLKSM Congress]

[Text] "The future belongs to the youth. It needs the present."

Dear Comrade Delegates!

The 21st VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Congress is extraordinary and essentially special. The league is faced with a choice. Various paths are possible, but all may in one way or another be reduced to two.

The first. To continue evolution under the pressure of changing circumstances and movement toward a narrow, virtually sectarian organization hoping to wait out the difficult times under the party's wing.

The second. To determine its own political position. Formulate the organization's goals in a program document. Adopt new rules. Approach the youth, create everywhere opportunities, if only faint, at least realistic, for the youth's self-assertion in life and force into motion the rusted mechanism of intraleague democracy.

The second way is proposed. What is needed for this? An objective evaluation of the situation and the state of affairs in the league. Consideration of experience, of the past three years in particular.

There is no need, I believe, to repeat what has been set forth in the Central Committee report, which has been published. Nonetheless, it evidently makes sense to speak about certain salient features of the period under review and the conclusions we reached while working in this period.

Work of the Central Committee and Situation in the VLKSM

In evaluating the Central Committee report, it is necessary to bear in mind the atmosphere in which it operated. This was a time of the birth of a new political system.

Fulfilling the decisions of the 20th congress, the Central Committee "debureaucratized" the league and initiated government decisions making it possible to develop a system of financially autonomous associations and

youth centers, the S&T creativity of the youth, and the Youth Cooperatives movement, and to improve the situation of the students somewhat.

A Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] deputy corps was formed, a Youth Affairs Committee created, and the Official Youth Policy Concept and a corresponding bill drawn up. The USSR Youth Organizations Committee was reorganized.

Yet, despite everything, the organization began to disintegrate. The Central Committee found itself in a difficult situation. It had to be seen that the more emphatically and boldly it renounced former bureaucratic and administrative methods, the more obvious it became that without them many of our organizations simply did not know how to live, just as also without financial injections from above.

Initially the "Lithuanian incident," then the growth of anti-Komsomol sentiment in the Estonian and Latvian Leninist Communist Youth Leagues, the sharp decline in the influence of the Komsomol in Georgia, the unsettled nature of the situation concerning Nagornyy Karabakh, the development of part of the "Surgut Alternative" from a renovative into a liquidationist movement, the most acute debate in the Central Committee Bureau concerning the organizational structuring of an RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Leninist Communist Youth League, the exacerbation of relations between large organizations, particularly in the higher educational institutions, and the rayon and city committees of the Komsomol—all this and much else showed that it was necessary to rethink the situation and adopt more radical measures.

The Central Committee was criticized from both the right and the left. But it continued to implement what had been mapped out by the previous congress. We knew that "whatever unpleasantness might occur, there would always be one who knew that this was how it would be."

The retiring Central Committee came in for thankless work. It traveled the hard road toward an understanding of the VLKSM's place in the new situation. The time of unitary youth organizations operating on the basis of habituation to a monopoly position has passed.

A new society demanding changes in our entire view of both the youth movement and the VLKSM is taking shape in our country.

The Central Committee would not be playing its part in full were it not to express proposals on three main issues.

What kind of society do we see?

What should a youth organization in such a society represent?

In what direction should the VLKSM develop?

Situation in Society

Sample sociological surveys indicate that 53-55 percent of young people support a socialist future. Almost 22 percent of working youth and 30 percent of students do not believe in the possibilities of socialism. Considerable numbers of young people believe that there is a third way. The party can today count on the firm support of approximately one-third of the youth, the VLKSM on one-tenth. (Footnote: Information of research of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Sociology Center (January-February this year); of the "Paths of the Generation" group, leader M.Kh. Titma (February-start of March this year).]

Historians will respond as to how and why progressive, humanitarian ideas become thought-killing dogmatic teachings; how and why progressive social forces degenerate into closed, bureaucratic structures suppressing initiative and any independent action.

But we need an answer right now to the question: "What happened to us?"

Social development since the October Revolution was not as its organizers had anticipated.

On behalf of the socialist idea and in reverence for portraits of chiefs distorted in accordance with our traditions into icons, violence was done to society and man. Whereas in the first years this could have been understood—the people's hatred for their past and the thirst for freedom and a new life were great—all that then followed can neither be explained nor justified.

In order to achieve its ends any revolution must go considerably further. The French bourgeois revolution, for example, as far as the Jacobin dictatorship and empire. Following the October socialist revolution came Stalin's acts of repression and the Brezhnev marasmus.

But there comes a recovery of sight and a return to the objective goals of the revolution. Life debunks illusions and puts everything in its place. It is in such times that we are living.

We should not tragically roll our eyes and moan for dying socialism. It is not socialism that is dying but a caricature of it.

The smoke of revolutionary words has been dispelled. It has become clear that life is a priceless gift, not a right that one man has to contest with another.

It has become clear that it is necessary to accomplish previously unaccomplished economic, political, and cultural tasks. To hand over power to democratically elected representatives of the people, and the means of production to the producers, to affirm the rights and liberties of the individual, and to emancipate the consciousness for learning and culture.

Nonetheless, we have no cause to renounce our own past. We ourselves need to look into it. This is not only our right, but also our duty.

There have been people capable of understanding this in the CPSU, and this is their historic contribution. That there continue to be people incapable or unwilling to understand in the party and the Komsomol, this is their problem. It is for this reason to a large extent that their authority is declining and the antiparty and anticomunist mood is growing. Not only for this reason, of course, but for this reason also.

The 28th CPSU Congress lies ahead. The draft CPSU "Platform" and Rules for the congress have been published. This is a step forward. But the supporters of a renewal of society and the party will be unable to win without the support of the youth: And without this, I am sure, the Communist Youth League is also doomed to defeat.

We must objectively evaluate the present situation in the country also.

The "rosy," romantic period of perestroika is over. The logic of development has brought some people to revise their "view of socialism," others, to completely reject socialism.

Far from all the measures adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and the government have been profoundly conceived. Some of them have caught unawares both public opinion and those who were to implement them.

There have been no tangible improvements in the socioeconomic sphere. Life has become more difficult for all, except for the smart operators of the shadow economy and corrupt and privileged government officials.

The country has been shaken by social and national discord and torn apart by shortages, and crime has grown. Features of paranoid, arrogant thinking and a lack of readiness for compromise and acceptance of a different viewpoint have been manifested in policy.

New forces are moving into the political arena. Programs have been showered around the heads of people, who have lost their faith and who are tired of day-to-day problems. The programs are virtually indistinguishable. Having put together 15-20 proposals, anyone can write them. They all proclaim the kind of country it should be, but do not say what needs to be done. But the real question is precisely this.

All these programs have one particular feature. They say nothing or virtually nothing about the youth.

The position of the youth has meanwhile deteriorated. People's Deputy Fedorov spoke about this very well, it seems to me: "The youth cannot do what is most important—it cannot earn itself an interesting life. Because in order to live interestingly material foundations are needed—a good apartment, a handsome car, an opportunity to travel and to have news media that satiate

one with new ideas. We have given them nothing. When he needs to have children, when he wants to fall in love and to travel, a man at the height of his powers obtains R120. When he can clamber up to R500 in wages, he is nearly 60 years old. He does not need anything. He needs yogurt and a purgative."

Serious steps in this direction have not been taken. Even with an understanding of the government's difficult position and with gratitude for the recent decisions concerning young families and students, it has to be said that inattention to the requirements of the youth, which constitutes one-fourth of the country's population, is as yet proving hard for us to surmount or virtually insurmountable.

Let us be fair to the N.I. Ryzhkov government. It is not this that has brought the country to the edge of the abyss. It is tackling very difficult problems and, what is most important, as distinct from its innumerable critics, assuming responsibility for the decisions it is proposing.

But we have a right to expect of it, as of the Supreme Soviet, a future-oriented policy.

We understand that many of the youth's problems derive from the problems of the whole of society. In my view, the congress could declare its solidarity with the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet, and the government in their aspiration to ensure a peaceful, gradual transition to democratic socialism.

The youth should assume a substantial part, the bulk, perhaps, of the concern for the country's future, even if it is not destined to make this future.

The Youth Movement

Social development will be determined by people's aspiration to freedom, democracy, and justice. The majority of the youth advocates this. It may be assumed that the youth movement will aspire to a variety of youth organizations, societies, and associations. The emergence of new political parties will summon into being a number of new political youth organizations closely associated with them.

Therefore, however much our opponents may criticize us, we should consider as correct the VLKSM's support for the emergence of diverse, independent youth associations and organizations. The efforts of the VLKSM Central Committee geared to the creation of official and all-Union youth coordinating structures: The Youth Affairs Committee and the USSR Youth Organizations Committee, and to the elaboration of the fundamentals of youth policy and the corresponding bill, were justified.

Considering the objective stagnation of the formation of new parties and the absence as yet of legal provisions and official support for the creation of new youth organizations, and also the fact that the Komsomol cannot become democratized itself without supporting the

rights of the youth to itself choose its organization or create it, it would be both politically and morally justified initially to assist, together with other public organizations and the state, the newly created organizations of a democratic, socialist orientation.

Opportunities for all-around development. Their priority and preferential nature. Participation guarantees. Encouragement of initiative. Support for youth organizations which set development as their goal. A strong official youth policy. Society's tolerance of the searchings and mistakes of the youth. Such is the vision of the future of the youth movement in the country.

The VLKSM and Its Goals

Having initially been the sole youth organization and then a "drive belt," the VLKSM performed the role of assistant of the party in the embodiment of the socialist idea, and failed to notice how it had become emasculated and been turned into a brutal dogmatic teaching, to which each and everyone had to submit.

The league lost the features of public organization and became a part of a structure that could not exist for long, and we are seeing this today.

The contradictions within the league have proven more profound than we anticipated three years ago.

What to do in the current situation? First, to declare our independence. From now on the Komsomol subordinates its entire activity and all its few resources to the defense of the interests of the youth.

There can be no place in the new social structure for organizations that cannot specifically formulate their goals, prove their usefulness in practical fashion, and determine their social base.

Second, the VLKSM should define its field of activity as defense of the country's future. Against whom, it is asked. Against stupidity and myopia. Against the temptation to solve today's problems at the expense of future generations. We are today trying to change priorities and to begin to educate the "educators" themselves—adults, people invested with authority. They need this, seemingly, no less than the youth, at least this is what our experience tells us. In any event, they need to hear its opinion, its voice.

Third, the future belongs to the youth, this is true. But it needs the present also. All that we do should be subordinated to the main goal—achieving conditions for the free development of each, and not under communism but today. Our social base is the youth, primarily the part of it that cannot count on prosperous parents and must achieve everything on its own. They more than anyone else need a strong youth organization advocating social justice.

It was this that guided the members of the commission when they formulated the Komsomol's "three points," if they may be so called.

This is not a program. It is rather a first attempt to escape the immensity of the tasks and groundless obligations to be responsible for all of the youth that were suggested to us.

This short document contains the main idea. The attitude toward the decisions proposed to the congress will depend on acceptance or rejection of this.

The Komsomol is not a political party. It is a youth social and political organization. There is a considerable difference here, I believe. The program of any organization should have a pivotal idea which justifies its existence. This pivotal idea for our organization is the young person and his all-around development.

The goal, which is common for the party and the youth organization on the same ideological basis, displays its human side directly for the youth league.

Created in the "image and likeness," our league failed to notice or was unwilling to notice this distinction, and has paid dearly for it.

Only by having made the interests and the development of the young person of paramount importance is it possible to progress. Everything needs to be measured by this yardstick. If this policy, this law, this social institution serves the development of the young individual, we are for it. If it ignores or holds it back, we are against it.

So we need to effect a "Copernican revolution"—not the individual for the organization, but the organization for the individual—and to reorganize its aims and structure from the individual and his interests.

It may be asked: "How so? Is the Komsomol avoiding politics, abandoning its political role?" Not in the least. The first and most important condition of man's development is his freedom. Without free access to all sources of information, freedom to express one's thoughts and of creativity, choice of place of residence and type of activity, there can be no question even of any development.

Just as without recognition of the "dignity inherent in all members of the human family and their equal inalienable rights" as the foundations of freedom, justice, and general peace (I quote from the UN declaration adopted in 1948).

A condition of free development for each person is justice and accessibility to education and culture regardless of his social origins, nationality, sex, and property situation.

Freedom of belief, assembly, organization, the press—all these are also conditions of free development, and all these determine the Komsomol's support for democratic transformations on the one hand, and emphatic rejection of the vestiges of Stalinism and dogmatism in the consciousness, economy, and policy on the other.

The political position of the Komsomol is based on the socialist idea, but is not determined by dogma. It is dictated, just as the need to participate in the solution of all questions of the life of society without exception, by its main concern—concern for the rights of the youth and the possibilities of self-development and "self-realization."

We do not renounce the socialist and communist idea. But we do not believe that its development has come to a stop with anyone and that it remains for us merely to confess ready-made truths. We should not recognize a monopoly on its development either for some individual organization or some specific individual.

We accept the socialist idea in its continuous development and in the context of all human culture and all knowledge accumulated by man.

The ideals of liberty, justice, and the solidarity of people building their life by reliance on free labor, knowledge, and culture—this is our understanding of socialism, and this could be proposed as the basis of our new unity.

The Central Committee proposes the exposition in the most general form of our views on the times in which we live and the aims of the league, and its arrangement in a declaration addressed to all Komsomol members. I will permit myself to read it out.

Declaration of the 21st VLKSM Congress

The totalitarian system, in which under the cover of the pseudo-communist idea the personality was suppressed for many years, is disintegrating before our eyes. The confrontation of the new with the old is being accompanied by outbursts of violence, national discord, social tension, and a clearly marked confrontation in ideology and policy. Society is agonizingly overcoming the dogmatic, conservative consciousness and feeling its way toward paths of transition to an intelligent democratic arrangement of life. Real parliamentary practice, a multiparty system and a decentralized multistructural economy are emerging, and man is gradually moving to the center of all transformations.

Without claiming to express the opinions of each member of the VLKSM, but aware of their responsibility for the further fate of the league, congress delegates consider as important goals of the Komsomol the creation of conditions for the free development of the personality of the young individual and the defense and expression of young people's specific political, economic, social, and spiritual interests and requirements. This is how we define our role in the building of a society of humane democratic socialism.

Having embarked on this path, the Komsomol will be unsuitable for many people. For this is a path of surmounting the concept of the Komsomol rooted in the old political consciousness and political practice as a "drive belt" and "loyal assistant," and of overcoming the distrust of the youth and the consumer attitude toward it.

Ideological and political proximity to the CPSU presupposes participation not only in the implementation but also in the formulation of party policy, proceeding not from political opportunism but from the league's actual tasks. The logic of renewal renders any other choice doomed and unnecessary for the young person himself, our league, and society.

The Komsomol cannot realize these goals in its present form. Therefore, in proclaiming itself today an organization of the socialist choice and an equal part of the broad democratic movement, the VLKSM is entering a period of fundamental transformations.

The emphatic removal of rigid hierarchical structures, debureaucratization, affirmation of the freedom of debate, unity of purpose, and respect for the rights of the minority and the majority—such is the path of renewal of the league.

A new quality of unity is essential for us.

Basing its activity on the understanding of communist ideals as humanitarian values common to all mankind, aspiring to a democratic model, and defending its integrity, the VLKSM will develop in the direction of a federation of independent organizations diverse in terms of forms of association and activity, at the center of which is the young person and his rights and interests.

We consider it necessary to define our organization as the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League—Federation for Democratic Socialism.

Development of the League

If we accomplish the "Copernican revolution" in principle in our consciousness and the congress agrees with this idea, then, taking this as the starting point, we will be quite consistent in drawing up both the program goals and new principles of the organizational structure of the league.

The structure of the program goals is built on three basic principles. The first is young people's participation in political life and the solution of all problems of society. The second is development, in which we set forth our initiatives addressed to the government and society and at the same time propose programs that we can realize on our own. Finally, the third is our aspiration to achieve civil peace, concord, openness, introduction to world culture and modern social thought, and readiness to abandon isolation and exclusiveness from the whole world and the crazy notion of some particular exclusivity and right to teach others how they should live.

Our league directs all its own activity toward the creation of additional opportunities for development. And it itself is essentially such an additional opportunity, with all its material and organizational resources made available to both members of the organization and all of the youth.

The concentration of some resources for the implementation of important development programs such as, for example, the creation of a single social service, the "Intellect of the 21st Century" fund, and international youth exchanges is, in my view, absolutely essential.

Recognized and acknowledged as priorities, goals of development in the mutual exchange and mutual enrichment of cultures, languages, and traditions will become an effective counterweight to the centrifugal trends rending the league on a national and social basis.

Our Relations With the CPSU

This question naturally preoccupies many delegates, the more so in that the majority of them are party members. We could in the congress process, incidentally, discuss the letter of the CPSU Central Committee published today (11 April—editor's note) and formulate our attitude toward it. But now about relations with the CPSU as we conceive of them.

The party is currently in a very difficult situation. We cannot make common cause with dogmatists, but this is not a reason for those who have for so long a period of time enjoyed its support to turn their back on the party at a time of difficulty for it. This would be the worst type of political unscrupulousness. We need, on the contrary, to actively join in the intraparty debate and the renewal of the party and supply it with fresh young forces.

We support the independence of the league and the right to express our own attitude and opinion on issues, including political. We do not recognize the old methods of leadership of the Komsomol, when apparatus directed apparatus and when the party apparatus, through the Komsomol apparatus, directed the league, but are oriented toward the CPSU as a political force.

The Nationality Issue

The nationality issue is of exceptional significance for our league.

While remaining convinced internationalists, we cannot fail to acknowledge the existence of imperial vestiges in our national-state arrangement, economy, and thinking, or to welcome national revival. But we do not accept the idea of national exclusiveness, from whomever it proceeds, in any form.

Nationalism and chauvinism are the last resort of the scoundrel. This has nothing in common with the aspiration to preserve the national culture, traditions, and distinctiveness of any people.

The factors which engendered people's aspiration in some union republics to secession from the USSR may be understood. Only the genuine sovereignty of each of them and the right to self-determination providing in the best and fullest way opportunities for the development of each people may serve as a firm basis for their natural convergence, inevitable economic integration, and mutual exchange of cultures.

But is it necessary to tear down in order subsequently, by virtue of objective conditions, to create anew? Would it not be better to remove together all that engenders inequality or impedes development, and make full use in common interests of the advantages of a federation of truly equal and free republics. It seems to us that we need to propose and support precisely this path.

Those who are attempting to portray our league as an anti-national force are simply lying. In the VLKSM we have always felt ourselves equal in our national dignity and in our rights.

The Komsomol Press

The steady trend toward the conversion of Komsomol publications from organs of committees into organs of the corresponding organizations is a normal process, which not only does not undermine the foundations of the Komsomol press but, on the contrary, strengthens the newspaper's ties to the reader, and the Komsomol committees' ties to the youth.

We must recognize also that we are as yet monopoly owners of the youth press. The Press Law which is in preparation, stipulating the broadest rights to publishing activity, will not under our conditions of acute paper and printing plant shortage remove but, on the contrary, increase many people's aspiration to acquire their own press at the expense of the Komsomol.

We have departed from orthodoxy in advocating pluralism in the youth movement. Also natural is the next step—our central publications and many republic and oblast papers are finding room for the reflection of views, positions, and platforms of groups and associations opposed to the Komsomol.

The following practical steps might be suggested to the congress, and I ask that these be taken only as a proposal. Approval at the congress of the chief editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Commissioning him to propose the composition of the editorial board, having accorded a Central Committee plenum the right to approve it. Delegation to the latter of the right to elect the editor between congresses and to decide contentious issues arising between the editorial board and the Central Committee Bureau.

The editorial board should be independent in its choice of personnel and management of the creative process.

This question should be taken up in detail by the new Central Committee following enactment of the Press Law. The question of the status of all our other publications could be studied at that time.

International Activity

The VLKSM's international activity has been practiced in a rapidly changing world. The principles of new political thinking proclaimed by our country are producing the first tangible results. Confrontation and a bloc approach are becoming a thing of the past, giving

way to an understanding of the wholeness and interdependence of our world. The events that have occurred in East Europe against this background have radically changed the alignment of political forces. As a whole, entirely new conditions for the exercise of international youth cooperation have been created.

Not the export of our ideology and our model of development, but an orientation toward the interests of the organization itself should be the essence of our international work. Strategically, the youth league, whose basis is humanitarian principles common to all mankind, should be open to cooperation with the widest spectrum of political forces.

The priorities in international activity will undoubtedly depend on the decisions of the congress, on the nature of our league and the ideal to which it aspires. Proceeding from the nature of the VLKSM, which has proclaimed as its program task work in the channel of the socialist perspective, our closest allies in the international youth movement should be forces in its left spectrum. As before, a most important policy is that of a strengthening of the unity of forces of the left and the utmost development of our strategic cooperation with the young social democrats.

Our country is traveling a complex, very difficult path of integration in the world community. The VLKSM sees as its mission helping the young person become a full member of the world pan-human civilization and introducing him to its achievements and values.

Together with this our sympathies and solidarity will always be with those who advocate freedom, democracy, and social progress.

Name of the League

It may be assumed that the question of the name of the league first and of the resources of the VLKSM and the material base which it possesses currently, second, will be a cause of big argument. We need to determine our position here.

Many people are advocating that the league change its name, abandon the definition "Leninist Communist," at least.

Those who advocate this have their reasons. They amount to the following. The exaltation of any personality, even a most outstanding one, is unacceptable, deification and conversion into a cult and "icon" all the more so. This was characteristic of the times when we renamed oblasts and cities and gave streets and enterprises, up to and including specific factories, the names of leaders and outstanding politicians. It is impossible not to agree with this reasoning to some extent. But in this case the name of Lenin in the name of the league is not simply a tribute of respect. In the present situation it is, even more than in 1924 perhaps, still an essential characteristic of the league and a declaration of its

devotion not to "barracks communism" but to democracy and "socialism with a human face."

We remain a communist youth league. This is our political character. The VLKSM is a league of youth emphatically breaking with dogmatism and basing its activity on an understanding of communist ideals like humanitarian values common to all mankind, the most consistent expression and development of democratic and socialist ideas, and the dialectical unity of freedom and justice. We should not abandon our ideals, even less be ashamed of them, but dissociating ourselves from vulgar socialism and all that has discredited the socialist idea is essential. We should not succumb to political opportunism and change from being the "index finger" to the political "chaff."

We should not abandon the name of our league. This does not mean that it may not be changed in the future. But the main thing now, most likely, is not changing the name but determining the essence of the changes which should be occurring in the VLKSM.

VLKSM Resources

First, we cannot accept the idea of division and fragmentation, primarily of monetary resources, which are currently the property of the whole organization. It is necessary to preserve a certain financial base for the organization's activity in the interests of its members and the youth in a difficult situation. Concentration of resources for the realization of important, union programs is essential.

Second, expenditure on the upkeep of Komsomol staffs should proceed from our actual possibilities. It is essential that we move toward a considerable reduction in it and people's reorientation from the bureaucratic sphere, so to speak, of Komsomol administration toward that of direct activity in the youth centers, clubs, and so forth, in other words, to withdraw them from enterprise and educational institution Komsomol committees.

Third, we welcome the formation of a broad democratic youth movement in the country, but the Komsomol could not finance the development of this movement even if we wanted to. We need to view things realistically and tell all who intend organizing their own leagues: A diversified youth movement will require appreciable state subsidies; let us strive for this.

The basic resources would form a "federation fund" used for purposes with which all its members agree. The new associations and societies may be provided with resources upon the adoption of a decision by consensus.

The central authorities would be financed according to estimates approved by the Central Committee, and it would adopt decisions on the amounts and utilization of the mutual assistance fund.

Members' dues and money attracted at all levels of the organization will be the main source of capital.

A basic principle of activity on a league-wide scale will be specific programs financed from the resources of the organizations concerned and, partially, from the "federation fund."

Individual members or organizations shall withdraw voluntarily with the amount of property which has taken shape at this level.

VLKSM's resources and the basic funds of the youth press and tourism should be indivisible. All this has been created by many generations of Komsomol members and serves all of the youth. Any other decisions would lead to the disintegration of the organization or to it becoming discredited in the eyes of the youth.

The VLKSM as a developing federation for democratic socialism—the model of the organization most corresponding to today's realities. Together with the rules of the member leagues, societies, and associations we should have our own common rules also. If only because the danger of the diktat of the VLKSM Central Committee being replaced by the diktat of a Union republic Leninist Communist Youth League Central Committee is perfectly real. For this reason we must have common organizational principles guaranteeing defense of the rights of the primary and base organizations and members of the VLKSM. We cannot, therefore, agree with the proposal for no adoption of rules at all or that we confine ourselves merely to an agreement.

Undemocratic, unitary, dogmatic, extremist organizations cannot be acceptable in our renewed organization.

Thus the following practical steps are proposed.

1. To discuss and adopt a declaration of the 21st congress on the development of a democratic youth movement in the country.

2. To discuss and adopt the declaration of the VLKSM—Federation for Democratic Socialism.

To offer this document together with program aims to members of the league and organizations for self-determination.

3. To discuss and adopt new VLKSM Rules and for all members and organizations to be guided by them, making the necessary changes at subsequent stages.

4. To form a central committee or, perhaps, if the idea of its formation by the representation method is accepted, a central council of the VLKSM. To elect its chairman. To entrust the central council with the formation of a federation bureau or council and, at the proposal of the chairman, to approve secretaries of the central council for specific areas of work. This is the minimum, in my view, that the congress must do.

There lies in your hands, comrade delegates, not only the fate of the VLKSM. The formation of a youth movement of the country and, consequently, whether the youth will have an opportunity to express and defend its interests in

the very difficult and contradictory transition period in the history of the whole country and each republic will depend on what decisions the congress adopts.

I would request that the congress discuss these proposals with an understanding of the tremendous responsibility to the youth and our league borne by each delegate.

There has been much talk recently of the youth's loss of ideals, nihilism, and apathy. There is much truth in this.

If a young person has lost faith in "great ideals" and in people, it is worth him trying to acquire belief if only in himself and in his capacity for being such a person as he would like to see in others. We want to help the millions of such young people, through the discovery of belief in themselves and in their talent and uniqueness to discover a belief in people and, consequently, in their capacity for the intelligent and just organization of their life. It is not that important in this case what the actual forms of this society are, it will be socialist not in name but in essence.

Mironenko Interviewed on Komsomol Resignation

90US0837A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 19 Apr 90 p 1

[Interview with V. Mironenko, former first secretary of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee, by a team of duty journalists from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA: "Why Did You Leave the Stage?"]

[Text] Interview with Viktor Mironenko, who voluntarily resigned the post of first secretary yesterday evening.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Did your son join the Komsomol?

[Mironenko] A long time ago. My eldest son. Soon my youngest will join, and for that reason I have resigned.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Do you know where you will go?

[Mironenko] No.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Why did you leave the stage after the congress gave you a standing ovation?

[Mironenko] Please understand that it is fairly complex, psychologically speaking.... I did not leave because they applauded, but for other reasons....

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] "Solid philosophical affirmations... which are not supported by the same sort of basic measures...." How do you feel about this evaluation in one of the speeches?

[Mironenko] I believe that there is a basis for it. Although I always tried to do whatever I had maintained. Was I always fully successful? No, not fully.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] When you talked about "new people," which of the nominated candidates did you have in mind?

[Mironenko] You know, I would not want to answer that question. I would very much like it if one of the young fellows who worked on the rulings of this congress were elected. At least for a while.... But I would be very pleased if it were one of the young people.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] On what day and under what circumstances did you make the final decision to resign?

[Mironenko] Perhaps.... On the 16th, on Monday.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Speaking candidly, we have been concerned about you. Did you have some troubles in connection with congress' passage of the Address to the CPSU Central Committee?

[Mironenko] No, I would not say so. I had many of the most varied conversations with the most varied people, but there was no pressure put on me.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How did the president of the USSR take your decision to leave?

[Mironenko] He did not comment on it. But it seems to me that he understood.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] And how did your family take it? The same as the president—with understanding?

[Mironenko] My wife took it with understanding. My youngest did not comment, while my eldest thought that I should continue working....

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Does "reaching out to each" include him?

[Mironenko] In his case, I hope, I will have the opportunity.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] This is not the most delicate question. Recently you have often quoted the same sources. Do you not have time?

[Mironenko] It is true, I never have enough time. For 15 years I have been reading KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA for the most part....

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] ...The journalists of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA who were accredited at the congress appreciated the witty remark of the speaker at its true value and wished him success.

Komsomol Resolution Protests Draft Tax Law

90US0796B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 13 Apr 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Resolution of the 21st All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League Congress"]

[Text] At the end of the second day of the congress, in connection with information received on the submission to the USSR Supreme Soviet of a draft USSR law "On Taxes from State, Leased, Cooperative, Public, and Other

Organizations, Associations, and Organizations," the congress interrupted the debate to adopt a resolution expressing disagreement with the procedure proposed in the draft law with respect to taxation of sociopolitical and public organizations (including youth organizations) and their enterprises.

The congress appeals to all public and sociopolitical organizations to support this resolution.

With the support of the government, during the past two years a network of enterprises has been created in the country whose purpose is to solve youth problems and implement social programs.

The economic activity of these enterprises makes it possible to realize youth initiatives and the desire of young men and women to take part in independent economic activity, to provide employment for young people, to promote the spread of up-to-date methods in managerial work and develop business initiative, and to rear a generation of modern leaders. While recognizing the need for their own contribution to development in the social sphere, the cost-accounting public youth organizations have in recent times transferred more than R50 million to implement social programs and beneficial goals.

It is essential to take into account the fact that 90 percent of Komsomol enterprises started their activity without government investments or the allocation of the resources, quotas, and funds they required.

Recently, however, within the USSR Government and its financial organs there has been a lack of understanding regarding the importance of and the conditions in which the enterprises of public youth organizations function, and there has been no interest in their development. This has been reflected in the latest decisions of the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR Ministry of Finance, and also in the draft USSR law "On Taxes from State, Leased, Cooperative, Public, and Other Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations." Passage of the law in its present form will lead to a curtailment of the activity of more than 4,000 enterprises belonging to public youth organizations and to an end of funding for a whole range of social programs, and it will deprive more than 200,000 workers in the youth enterprises of the All-Union Komsomol of their jobs and as a result will undermine the faith of young men and women in the reality of perestroika.

It is time that the USSR Government and Ministry of Finance understood that collecting the last assets from everyone without distinction, from the gigantic monopolies that have adapted themselves to the system to the youth centers, can lead only to an insignificant amount to cover the budget deficit, but over the years will turn back the economy and remove all willingness to engage in anything at all.

In the developed countries economic activity by young people is encouraged and advantages are provided, and the creation and activity of youth organizations are financed by the state.

As a legislative initiative the 21st Komsomol Congress proposes that the USSR Supreme Soviet review the procedure set forth in the draft law for imposing taxes on public and sociopolitical organizations and their enterprises, and give due consideration to the interests of youth when working on the concept of new taxation procedure.

Adopted by the 21st VLKSM Congress, 12 April 1990.

Agenda for 4-5 May Komsomol Plenum Outlined

PM2504102790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 24 Apr 90 p 1

[Notice "For the Attention of Komsomol Central Committee Members"]

[Text] In accordance with the instruction of the 21st Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Congress the first Komsomol Central Committee Plenum is being convened 4-5 May 1990 in Moscow. At the plenum it is planned to discuss questions connected with the formation of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau, the approval of the chief editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, the election of the Komsomol Central Committee secretaries, and the principles of the formation of Komsomol Central Committee commissions and also to discuss the draft documents adopted for examination by the drafting commission of the 21st Komsomol Congress and referred for the decision of the Komsomol Central Committee.

Members of the Komsomol Central Control Commission, USSR people's deputies from the Komsomol, first and second secretaries of the union republic Komsomol Central Committees, first secretaries of Komsomol kray and oblast committees, chairmen of the councils of Komsomol organizations and assistant political directorate chiefs for Komsomol work of branches and categories of troops of the USSR Armed Forces, leaders of Komsomol Central Committee departments and subdepartments, and leaders of central youth mass media who are not members of central elected organs of the Komsomol will take part in the work of the plenum.

KGB Official Addresses Union Border Problems

LD2504005390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
2230 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Complex days on the border. It is said that calm days do not occur on the border. The current time has become particularly worrying for border guards. Colonel Parakhin, the chief of the Border Troops Staff Department of the USSR KGB, spoke about this at a briefing in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs on Tuesday.

In particular, he reported that units and subunits of the border troops protecting the state borders within the boundaries of the territory of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic had been increased and transferred to an intensified mode of service performance. Additional measures have been taken to protect borders at sea as well.

Monitoring of possible contacts between Soviet and foreign vessels in territorial waters and within the boundaries of the economic zone of the USSR has also been established. The movement across the borders of all cargoes and means of transport is monitored in the most thorough fashion. All coastal fishing vessels, without exception, are watched by border details.

There is a necessity for such measures. It is sufficient to recall the 240,000 [figure as heard] hunting cartridges discovered 12 April on board the MV [merchant vessel] Marat Kozlov which had arrived from the FRG. The cargo was destined for the Lithuanian international company Litimpex.

Things are no better in Moldavia. During the past three months, more than 300 [figure as heard] occasions of border violations have been noted here, more than 10 during April.

In Colonel Parakhin's words, there are also many alarming reports from the Soviet-Iranian border in Azerbaijan. More than 16,000 people violating the border have been detained since the middle of January. Moreover, half of those arrested were attempting to engage in contraband deals on territory on the other side of the border. Border guards have confiscated 260 arms units, 250,000 pieces of ammunition, more than R155,000—more than 7 million Iranian Rials—and other contraband amounting to R750,000.

Sometimes attempts to violate the border end in a tragic fashion. On 6 February in a rayon of Azerbaijan, a border detail was shot at by automatic weapons by border violators from Iran. During the exchange of fire, one of the violators was killed and six detained.

In Tehran, in February on this year, a memorandum on mutual understanding between the government of the USSR and the Government of Iran on the simplification of the crossing procedure for the inhabitants of border regions was signed. These individuals have the right to cross the border four times a year. The representative of the USSR KGB noted that on the Iranian side, active work is being done on the establishment of admittance points. The government of Azerbaijan, he stressed, has so far been organizing such work extremely slowly, which might again complicate the situation in this region.

Things are calmer on the state borders in Central Asia. Nevertheless, attempts to violate it by citizens from Iran and Afghanistan, mainly with contraband aims, occur regularly. During 1989, almost 34 kilograms of drugs were confiscated by border troops in these republics.

The issue of the situation in relation to crime for the beginning of this year was also considered at the briefing. According to forecasts by specialists of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the tendency towards crime growth in our country will be maintained until 1993. It is true, it was said to journalists, the pace of crime growth will decrease. But this is a matter for the future. For the moment, the picture looks like this: during January-March of this year 595,443 crimes were registered by internal affairs bodies and by the procuracy. This is 17 percent more than for the same period last year. Moreover, an increase in crime is to be noted in all the union republics except Azerbaijan. Every sixth crime is a serious one.

Party Factionalism Seen as Undemocratic

PM1904135690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
18 Apr 90 Second Edition pp 3-4

[Vladimir Markov article forming part of "Discussion Platform No. 24" feature: "Is Factionalism Democratic?"]

[Text] The pregress debate over perestroika in the party has brought to light an enormous range of opinions and uncovered a great diversity of views, approaches, and even concepts. The party Central Committee appeal "For Consolidation on a Principled Basis" is very timely in this respect, reminding us as it does of the need, in the course of the pregress polemics, to seek solutions to the pressing tasks in society and the party and not to allow the debate to be transformed (such attempts have been made) into empty verbosity, infighting, and incitement to destructive, damaging actions against the party, its ideology, and the values of socialism.

It is time to see what aims are pursued by the "ringleaders" responsible for these sound effects, which sometimes mislead a good many decent people—both non-party people and communists. It is time to cut off the destructive trends, remembering that perestroika in the party has the aim of cleansing and strengthening it, but not splitting it or losing influence on the public. Anyone who sincerely cares about the party's fate will take to heart the words of the Central Committee appeal: "We are in favor of the consolidation of the party's ranks on a principled basis, in favor of the firm unity of all who value the goals of perestroika and the ideals of a humane, democratic socialism."

On this basis every participant in the debate can measure his own views and actions against its key goals—the goals of renewal of the party and society. It is clear that since we seek a humane, democratic socialism, in formulating our proposals and critically evaluating other people's opinions we will not support anything that is contrary to socialist ideas and values or detrimental to the process of democratization and the establishment of humanism in our daily life. Conversely, we will rebuff any attempts to abandon socialism or flout democracy and humanism. We see the desired political result of the pregress debate, which goes far beyond the bounds of

the party (a "purely" intraparty debate is probably impossible nowadays), as being the unification of the broadest possible social forces around the goals of perestroika, as formulated, in particular, in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform.

This consolidation is necessary both in the party and in society, although the difficulties of implementing it cannot be doubted. The process is hampered first and foremost by the old ideological stereotypes—old in essence, even if their content appears unfamiliar and entirely new expressions are chosen. It is a question of the old method of thinking: when the really fundamental ideas of scientific socialism are replaced by private theses which are turned into a "symbol of faith," when intolerance toward diversity of views is encouraged, and when comradely debates are replaced by a bitter fight to the death. Unscrupulousness about the methods used in polemics is expressed particularly vividly in the fact that a trenchant and biting politically and morally negative characterization of the adversary is presented (often without foundation), creating the "image of an enemy"—an enemy of perestroika, progress, democracy, the homeland, and so forth. We have been trying to overcome these "polemical tactics," these Neanderthal morals and ideological and sociopsychological stereotypes, for years now, though without success.

It is not difficult to acknowledge in general terms the vital necessity for democratization of our society: Not many people who support the old ways now believe that democracy leads only to harm and moral decline. It is easy to acknowledge, in equally general terms, the need for pluralism of opinion, which is a component part and essential condition of the democratic organization of public life. But as soon as it comes to the practical application of these generally acknowledged things, serious difficulties begin. Everyone proposes his own criteria for democracy, his own limits on the permissible level of social pluralism, and often this is not based on objective criteria or social needs, but on personal tastes, preferences, and prejudices. Here there is enormous scope for explanatory work by party organizations and unprecedentedly complex and responsible tasks in bringing about changes in the public mentality.

I do not think there is any need to prove the point that the consolidation of the broadest possible social forces around the goals of perestroika and the renewal of socialism—and, in an atmosphere of democratization of society, these forces are displaying a growing heterogeneity—requires a broad framework of socialist pluralism, bringing together everything that is not contrary to the cause of socialism, the processes of democratization, and the values of humanism. This condition brings another along with it: In order to lead this process of consolidation, the party must widen its own ideological, political, social, and spiritual base.

And here complications also arise when it comes to defining the limits on the pluralism of opinions, views, currents, and platforms that should be guaranteed within

the party itself. On the one hand, we need real, full-blooded intraparty democracy, we need real—not merely verbal—pluralism. On the other hand, in no circumstances should the face of the Communist Party be lost or eroded: its loyalty to scientific Marxist theory and methodology and the revolutionary traditions of Leninism, its consistency in the struggle for the working people's interests and the all-around social progress of mankind. In short, everything that forms the basis of its intellectual, political, and moral authority and influence. The quest for the potential and limits of this kind of intraparty pluralism and the broad democratization of the party's life coupled with the simultaneous strengthening and enrichment of its ideology constitute, in my view, one of the main tasks of the entire preCongress debate.

This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that a whole series of "alternative" platforms have been put forward. However, the quest is proceeding mainly by means of trial and error, and some of the "trials" go far beyond the bounds of acceptability for party members, while the errors often amount to a repetition of the old narrow sectarian approach, albeit on a new basis.

For instance, a very dangerous proposal is the revival of factions in the party. This rejects out of hand the lessons of the factional struggle that at one time all but brought the party to the brink of destruction. The 10th Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Congress resolution "On Party Unity" is now being subjected to many attacks, and some writers derive from it the start of the collapse of intraparty democracy, trying thereby to relate the command coercion of Stalinism with the traditions of Lenin's time. But the content of the congress protocols offers no grounds for this. The aforementioned resolution, as is clear from its text, was directed against "the emergence of groups with special platforms and with the desire to some extent to isolate themselves and create their own group discipline"—and at the same time "against bureaucracy and for the expansion of democratism." In other words, the existence of factions is not by any means a condition of the consistent development of intraparty democracy, freedom of criticism and debate, pluralism of opinion, or even the putting forward of different platforms.

The "democratism" of the recognition of factions is deceptive. Their very existence drastically reduces the opportunities for intraparty democracy. Factionalism is contrary to freedom of opinions and criticism and the development of comradely debates: After all, membership of a faction carries an obligation to adhere to group assessments and protect "us" from critical fire, and cultivates distrust and intolerance with regard to "them," that is, everyone who does not belong to the faction, to the closed group. By giving organizational form to isolationism, factionalism destroys the discipline that is the same for all party members and undermines party comradeship.

The dangers of advocating freedom of factions are great. Not because they will necessarily be set up after such advocacy—I do not think things will go that far, the party masses will not allow it. But because in our public life there are still strong petit bourgeois survivals of egotism and cliquism, group psychology and morality, which often turn a debate or discussion into a string of humiliating squabbles and scandals and merciless backbiting among groupings. Furthermore the ideological and organizational isolation of factions inevitably entails a narrowing of the ideological and theoretical base of practical activity, sectarianism in policy, intolerance in polemics, and violations of democratic principles in organizational work.

Anyone who wants to form an idea of the grave consequences that a victory of factionalism could lead to, should remember our history. The establishment of Stalinism in the second half of the twenties meant precisely the triumph of one faction within the party—Stalin's "order of sword-bearers." Then Stalinism appropriated the right to determine the party's general line and canonized, after its own fashion, a reinterpreted, distorted, impoverished version of Marxism-Leninism. The Leninist norms of party life were shamelessly flouted and intraparty democracy was undermined. The full might of the state repression machine was turned on all who disagreed or even doubted. For many decades the party's internal life was stifled by unconditional subjugation of the "lower strata" to the "higher strata," the virtual impotence of primary party organizations, administrative edict methods, and the bureaucratization of the apparatus. These are the prospects that emerge from the advocacy of freedom of factions....

In this connection it is worth taking another look at the so-called "Democratic Platform of the CPSU," which was published in PRAVDA together with materials from the 3 March "roundtable." Let me emphasize particularly the words "so-called," because I am sick and tired of the unceremonious and unjustified way in which various groups and groupings lay claim to exclusive rights to democratism, progressiveness, radicality, revolutionariness, loyalty to Marxism, humanism, and so forth, while denying these qualities out of hand to everyone else who does not agree with them.

I would like to warn against exaggerated assessments of the "Democratic Platform." It is loudly publicized by its authors, and was also treated with excessive goodwill at the aforementioned "roundtable," whose organizers apparently did not want to offend their guests. True, it contains reasonable propositions, but these, as a rule, had been voiced long before the creation of the "Democratic Platform." Its main content, however, should be assessed in a sharply negative way: Far from contributing to the strengthening of the party and the reinforcement of its influence as a powerful factor for social consolidation, it directly opposes the resolution of these urgent tasks.

Categorically rejecting the CPSU's vanguard role in Soviet society, the authors of the "Democratic Platform" in effect also reject the idea of the party as a factor for social consolidation. Yet if you think about it, the call for the party to renounce the role of vanguard of social forces is patently absurd. Among the many thousands of political parties in the modern world you will hardly find one so impoverished that it does not seek a place at the front, in the forefront of public life, and struggle for the right to be the ruling party. Voluntary retirement into political oblivion is a kind of "antiutopia" that is totally contrary to the nature of a political party. All the same, for the CPSU this option is, as we have seen, being proposed, formulated, and even "justified" with fine-sounding words about the need to re-form as a "party of the parliamentary type" and begin to win public influence from scratch, so to speak.

If the democratization of the party is to proceed successfully and prove lasting, not even the smallest loophole must be left for the revival of factionalism. From this viewpoint it would be an unjustified concession to future factionalists, in my view, to incorporate in the draft new CPSU Statutes the "Democratic Platform's" so-called "horizontal structures," although the draft does not contain those words as such. The trouble is that (I quote the draft—V.M.) "forms of party work that unite communists by interests and problems," such as "councils of party organization secretaries, party clubs, theoretical seminars, and discussion centers," instead of being expounded in Section II, "Intraparty Democracy," are enshrined in Section II, "Organizational Structure of the Party." That is unfortunate and inappropriate. While the level of political culture in society (and in the party, why deny it) is insufficiently high and group consciousness and selfish group interests are strong, it is necessary to take the utmost care to exclude or minimize any possibility of allowing them organizational expression in party structures.

The logic of perestroika in society and the party forces us to tackle one of the most complex dialectical contradictions of today: How are we to ensure broad democracy and pluralism of opinion without destroying society's unity and undermining the consolidation of the party? The general direction of this work is indicated both in the draft Central Committee Platform for the congress and in the CPSU Central Committee's open letter to the country's communists. I think the opportunities for intraparty pluralism in our day are sufficiently wide. There is an opportunity to establish unity and harmonious work by all the party's healthy forces, including, of course, the supporters of various "alternative" platforms. Extremists will "dissociate themselves," normal people will stay. Positions, approaches, views, and opinions that differ in some respects among themselves can easily coexist within a single party provided, first, that they are not in conflict with the common goal—progress toward a humane, democratic socialism, and, second, that they constantly interact and are improved and refined in the course of comradely debate,

which consciously sets the task of attaining the truth, overcoming delusions and dead-end views, and finding the optimum solutions for society and the party. Naturally, with experience constantly providing a yardstick.

The era of ideological frenzy is receding into the past. On an international scale the CPSU is finding a common language with various socialist and revolutionary democratic parties and movements (and many others). In our country there is experience of fruitful cooperation between a number of party committees and so-called "informal" associations. Everyone tackles the problems in their own way, and there is plenty of work for everyone. So on what grounds should we consider it futile to ensure unity of action—within a single political organization—by all sincere, committed supporters of the renewal of socialism, irrespective of differences in their views? Let us trust each other politically, morally, and intellectually. We are capable of developing. Life is moving forward, people's views are changing, too, and prejudices and delusions are gradually receding into the past. Along with other panhuman values, the authority of the truth is being restored. That is a good starting point for rallying.

Therefore, in our political (and other) debates we should more consistently assert the authority of scientific truth and orient ourselves toward constantly improving the level of intellectual culture. This, to be truthful, is not yet going very well. Very often even the most categorical opinions published in very popular and authoritative publications are not sufficiently supported by the facts of life or by scientific data. And this method of persuasion is sometimes used by people who are well educated and even have academic degrees. This situation could not, of course, have been foreseen by Hegel when he wrote that "the more uneducated a person is and the less he knows about certain properties of the objects he wishes to examine, the more he is inclined to talk about all kinds of empty possibilities, as sometimes happens, for instance, in the political sphere with so-called saloon politicians." This part is sometimes played by doctors of sciences, deputies, and former party workers. As a rule, they are still CPSU members.

The 21st century is not far off, and that puts certain obligations on us. There is neither beauty nor use in an uncivilized debate. Any polemics may reach an impasse and degenerate into futile infighting unless it observes the paramountcy of the truth, scientific knowledge, and joint work by the opposing sides to get to the crux of the matter. Truth, the conformity of words to deeds, and of both words and deeds to the truth, scientific ideas—these are among the main components of the authority and influence of socialist ideology.

One last observation. A successful political debate presupposes as an essential condition the creation of a favorable social atmosphere. In this case we are talking about establishing in the party (and this is necessary in society, too) relations of socialist comradeship. This area of essential sociopolitical, cultural, and educational work

is currently badly neglected in our country. Whatever sharp criticism we may rightly make of the history of socialist building in the USSR, the formation of new social relations—albeit in an undeveloped or distorted form—has taken place. We are entitled to regard the relations of socialist comradeship as an appreciable contribution by the new society to the store of panhuman values. It is now necessary to consolidate and develop this asset, cleansing it of alien accretions, dirt, and rust.

The establishment of comradely relations is an important task of perestroika, which unfortunately is frequently lost sight of. For instance, the draft new party Statutes do not even contain these words, although for communists, comradeship is as necessary as the air they breathe. Seeking to consolidate the party on a principled basis is inconceivable without a victory of comradeship in intraparty relations and a resolute struggle against cliquism and self-interest in various forms. To rally party members for this struggle and establish comradely unity in the resolution of practical tasks is to go halfway toward ensuring success for the consolidation of the party and success for perestroika.

Increased Role for USSR Procuracy Viewed

90UN1226A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with G. Tarnavskiy, prosecutor of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, by IZVESTIYA commentator Yu. Feofanov: "The Eye of the Law: Procuracy Oversight in the System of Democratic Authority;" date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] [Feofanov] The procuracy in our native land was founded in the 18th century—at that time it was called the "eye of the sovereign." It was an organization rigidly centralized from top to bottom. When the procuracy was initiated in the Soviet Union, it remained centralized in principle to the same degree. Today our Union is being recreated in a way. Fine—the USSR Supreme Soviet has appointed a general prosecutor. He in turn appoints all the lower echelon prosecutors—including you, as republic prosecutor. But the republic is acquiring real status as a sovereign state which is part of a federation. Will not the republic itself want to appoint the prosecutor? But then the principle of independence from local authority will be violated.

[Tarnavskiy] In old Russia the procuracy was a formidable institution. Everyone feared the prosecutor, including the governor. After the revolution, the procuracy was eliminated as the protective organ of the exploiting class. For five years we held on without a prosecutor, but then we reverted back to this institution all the same. True, at first it was reinstituted in abbreviated form—executing very limited functions under the Ministry of Justice, under the Supreme Court. But when decisions of party, soviet, and government organs on economic issues started appearing in great numbers, the procuracy was targeted to exercise oversight regarding the legality of economic decisions. Here a different status

emerged for the prosecutor—he began to accomplish entirely unaccustomed functions, functions not known in world practice. And there was no one to learn from. We learned from our own practice, proceeding from a socialist sense of justice and guided by principles of socialist legality.

[Feofanov] Might we understand this in the sense that the command-bureaucratic system built the procuracy as an adjunct to itself?

[Tarnavskiy] Perhaps the command-administrative system did not even think about this. Everything was constructed of its own accord. It was an overall process. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was established in 1922. A socialist federation. Essentially a unitary, rigidly centralized state. No one gave any serious thought to sovereignty of the federation's entities. The procuracy conformed precisely to this schematic—strictly single-minded in purpose, a rigidly centralized organ appointed from above. The practice of appointing all prosecutors from above conformed to this, and no problems arose. Today in Moldavia, the Ukraine, and Latvia, we see consideration being given to the prospect of the prosecutor being appointed by the republic Supreme Soviet—involving at most the consent of the general prosecutor.

[Feofanov] Do you think we will reach the point where the Supreme Soviet appoints the republic prosecutor? And then what about the independence issue?

[Tarnavskiy] Not the republic, but rather the USSR Supreme Soviet. Like the general prosecutor. Only then will this be an authorized representative of Union authority. You should understand that I am responsible for evaluating acts of the highest organs of state power and republic government.

[Feofanov] This does not contradict the principles of a federation of sovereign states?

[Tarnavskiy] Well, here we require a decision of principle. Presently, we are going to have treaty relations between the Union and union republics. We must define the status of the procuracy. Because if we follow the old path—appointment by order of the general prosecutor, this will be a violation of republic sovereignty by a public official.

[Feofanov] In short, the status of republic prosecutor must be enhanced. But to what end? The procuracy, if we simplify everything somewhat, has protected the authority. But—protection of the rights of citizens, trampled upon by the command-bureaucratic system from top to bottom, is now rising to the surface. The general prosecutor expounded on it thus to the Supreme Soviet upon his appointment. It seems to me that accomplishing this function is more difficult than organizing the struggle against the mafia, against embezzlement of public funds, etc. It is a heavy lot to become unpopular in the eyes of one's own local authority. Are your personnel ready for this? The Soviet citizen is defenseless before the doorman of the public catering facility as

well as before the all-powerful ispolkom [executive committee]. Prosecutors have not been too eager to stand up for "the orphaned and poverty-stricken." It is unheard of to institute criminal proceedings against an official bureaucrat scoffing at the people. Do you have sufficient powers? Can you get through the attempts at persuasion, the protests and declarations, etc., and take such decisive measures as bringing charges against officials in high positions, not only when they have been caught embezzling, but when they simply ruin the natural environment, destroy monuments, and encroach on the rights of citizens? Or are the prosecutors powerless here?

[Tarnavskiy] No, I would not say so. Procuracy organs wield great authority and theoretically can apply the law in any instance, beginning with disciplinary and administrative liability, material responsibility, and on up through criminal liability.

[Feofanov] Well—would you be able to cite just a single example in which these powers were exercised with respect to a highly placed official?

[Tarnavskiy] There are many such instances. But the fact of the matter is that they tell us little—the system protects itself quite reliably. The authority of law has been eroded with us. We have no intrinsic need to subordinate ourselves to the law—from ordinary citizen through minister. In the eyes of the people, over many years the procuracy appeared only as a punitive organ, not as an institution defending people's legal rights. The prosecutor's sanction of search and seizure inspires fear.

[Feofanov] Forgive me Georgiy Stepanovich, but let us ascertain just who it is that is experiencing fear. The citizen—yes, but can it be that a minister or deputy minister is afraid, assuming of course that he is not embezzling or accepting bribes?

[Tarnavskiy] He is afraid—if he is engaging in padding, violating state discipline, or polluting the environment. True—ministers do not fear being arrested, but many of them have received punishment up to and including removal from office. Although, quite frankly, this is extremely complicated and does not happen without taking its toll. Prosecutors do not always decide to apply the law. You have to understand that the prosecutor requires some kind of protective wall—he himself is not protected from the bureaucratic system. Let us say that I arrive in the republic, and that I am appointed by Moscow. I have to live somewhere, make arrangements for my family, set up a decent office. If I don't adapt in some sense, they will force me to adapt. This is my 35th year working in the procuracy and I have always managed to find a common language with party and soviet organs.

[Feofanov] Must the prosecutor find a common language?

[Tarnavskiy] He should. There should be some kind of psychological compatibility with the local authorities—but nothing against the law, of course.

[Feofanov] Let us say that we have not found a common language in the bad sense of the word. The prosecutor can raise an objection to a decision of the executive authority, can issue a declaration or citation. How valid are these? What will happen if a department simply sweeps your objection under the rug? And another question is always on my mind—conceptually, all executive power comes under prosecutor oversight. But prosecutor oversight stops short at the government. Don't you think we should raise our sights? Constitutional oversight will be busy with other problems, and so it turns out the government lies outside control of the law.

[Tarnavskiy] Well, that is what I had in mind at the very beginning. If the prosecutor of a union republic has been appointed by the USSR Supreme Soviet, then logically this should entail the right of oversight regarding the legality of all governmental acts and functioning.

[Feofanov] Georgiy Stepanovich, you are a USSR people's deputy. Why don't you propose a legislative initiative?

[Tarnavskiy] There have been discussions on this in committees of the Supreme Soviet, and in the Constitution Commission. I am prepared to propose such an initiative. But surely you can see how many pressing issues our parliament has to deal with.

[Feofanov] Let us return to the problems of protests, declarations, and citations. What do you think in view of all this—are prosecutors effective or powerless?

[Tarnavskiy] I believe everything depends on the prosecutor. But I must say that many prosecutors simply do not know what to do when complicated questions of general oversight arise. After all—we do not train the prosecutor. Essentially, he is self taught. You have an individual who lives and works as an investigator—fit and well qualified. Then suddenly he is appointed rayon prosecutor. He is invited to the Presidium, to the Soviet, to the party raykom [rayon committee]. He enters the leadership elite. Here is where one must show character. If he does not do so right away, he turns into a compromiser who disturbs no one and suits everyone. Here is where the trouble lies. This is the answer to the question as to why the prosecutor is a terror to the citizen and "one of ours" to the official. And you know local authority has thousands of ways to try to bring pressure to bear on a prosecutor with character.

[Feofanov] Apartment, nursery school, office?

[Tarnavskiy] This is gross. A sensible local authority will not resort to this. I remember one session at which I criticized a minister. The leadership was offended by me. And I heard—look at this prosecutor. What is he doing? How many murders and thefts does he have? Is he doing his own job? When I started working in the republic, right away I was put on many ministry collegiums—in the Forestry Ministry, Ministry of Construction. The talk began—what is going on there? Have crimes been committed? Why is he here? Well, I had had some

experience—I was the general oversight department head at the USSR Procuracy. But can you imagine a young man starting out as rayon prosecutor?

I am certain that the effectiveness of procuracy authority with respect to departments and ispolkoms depends more on the prosecutor's principles than on formal laws. If no attention is paid to an objection he makes, this is a reflection of his poor effort, of a lack of principle in the procuracy. The law provides the right to apply measures up to and including holding individuals criminally liable for failure to enforce the law. In other words—for misuse of authority. Let the court impose censure—it will still be a ruling, a court ruling. Just the fact itself of instituting criminal proceedings against an official who does not subordinate himself to the law will dampen ambition.

[Feofanov] You have an active political life—rallies, demonstrations, and marches are becoming a regular affair. But in my opinion, neither the citizen nor the authority is capable of acting within the framework of the law here. Isn't it true that when citizens violate the law on rallies and demonstrations, procuracy oversight is severe? But when the executive authority, let us say, refuses unjustifiably to permit a rally, the prosecutor gives in. A great deal was published in the press about the 30 October march in Minsk which caused such a sensation. Accusations were leveled mainly against the city authorities for not allowing a peaceful demonstration. Did the prosecutor take a principled stand?

[Tarnavskiy] I do not believe the procuracy lacked principle.

[Feofanov] Do you think the authorities acted properly on 30 October?

[Tarnavskiy] Not always. And not in every aspect. But what if the authorities did not violate existing law, refusing to authorize the rally? The prosecutor is the eye of the law. The law has given the ispolkom the right to permit or not to permit a mass event. For the prosecutor, the law is always the law and only the law. This must be understood. He exercises oversight of the legality of the activity of the authority and not the advisability of decisions made. The 30 October march encompassed several rayons. One rayon ispolkom permitted it, another refused permission. A city ispolkom intervened. It was referred to the Council of Ministers, which itself was supposed to decide the matter. But things turned out otherwise and it was handed over to the city ispolkom, which did not give approval. When the city prosecutor reported to me that the rally was not authorized, i.e. was illegal, I could not, I did not have the right to declare it lawful. Everybody tried to convince me—look, we have perestroika; you are being a conservative, you are this, you are that. To this day I believe I acted properly in confirming the illegality of the rally.

[Feofanov] One might think the authorities here are so law-abiding that there is no need for procuracy oversight.

[Tarnavskiy] Why? There is enough work around. Elections, for example. I found out that the electoral commission refused to register about 100 candidates nominated by new social organizations following the announcement of elections 23 December of last year. The decision was made 23 January, one month later. We registered an objection with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The interpretation of the republic Central Commission was declared unlawful and practically all those who had been nominated—over 100 individuals—were approved as candidates.

[Feofanov] Georgiy Stepanovich, we have not touched on the fight against crime. As it has been in the past, this is one of the tasks of the procuracy. The growth of organized crime is especially disturbing to people. A great deal is being said and written about this now. But the procuracy is faced with a "double-task," if we can describe it this way—to fight crime while at the same time ensuring the legality of this fight. Isn't there a certain contradiction in the prosecutor's position hidden within this duplex task? It is elementary—"everyone knows it"; the prosecutor "knows it when he sees it." A "criminal" stands before him, yet the evidence is weak, strained, and further inquiry fails to fill in any of the gaps. To close our eyes to weak evidence is to open the door to arbitrariness. You've arrived at your present position after the nightmarish Vitebsk affair which thundered across the entire country. This is clear testimony of the truth that the slightest permissiveness in violating the law for the sake of the most noble aims leads to tragedy. An innocent man was executed....

[Tarnavskiy] Yes, 14 people were convicted—one was executed, one declared not liable, and 12 innocent persons spent eight to 10 years in confinement. But what must be noted is this: Not a single investigator, prosecutor, or judge was bribed by the mafia. None made any profit. What a terrible result! Nor can you deny the professionalism of the investigators and judges. When I looked at these cases, I was amazed to see that flaws in the evidence were clear. Moreover, it was evident that these kids who were brought to trial for rape had not in fact committed the crimes.

[Feofanov] But they confessed. What was going on here? Torture? Beatings?

[Tarnavskiy] Hardly. Things did not reach that point. But they were subjected to psychological pressure. We have to take into account the fact that our citizen is legally illiterate. He is told—"the investigation is aware that..."—and he believes something is indeed known.

[Feofanov] And no lawyer was present....

[Tarnavskiy] Well, it is a curious thing that no one even once requested a lawyer.

[Feofanov] But do you explain the confessions to crimes most grave through simple legal illiteracy?

[Tarnavskiy] Of course not. I had to file charges in these cases against people in the procuracy and police. I arrested some of them. There were no grounds for accusing these people of malicious intent. Each "performed his duty" and exposed a dangerous criminal. And "in the interests of the investigation," certain negligible violations were allowed to take place. Procuracy oversight closed its eyes to petty procedural violations, and a chain of "petty violations" led to the tragic result—an innocent man was sentenced to death.

[Feofanov] Democratization of our lives, affirmation of political freedoms, the informals movement, economic independence—all of this brings with it certain complexities, from the point of view of safeguarding law and order. It is as if the prosecutor is caught between a rock and a hard place—he must safeguard the rights of the individual and fight those who use these rights for evil....

[Tarnavskiy] Yes, that's the way it is. But there is nothing you can do here. No one will remove the responsibility of the procuracy for either task. It is more difficult to ensure law and order, to maintain legality, in a democratic society. But in a non-democratic society, it is not even worth talking about lawfulness and legal, I stress—legal, procedure. There the procuracy is not the "eye of the law," but rather maintains the role of underling to bureaucratic power.

Union Republic's Foreign Ministry Officials Meet

LD1704190190 Moscow TASS in English 1802 GMT
17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—The first consultations with representatives of the foreign ministries of union republics were held in Moscow on Monday and Tuesday. Their aim was to improve cooperation in drafting and implementing Soviet foreign policy.

Participants exchanged opinions on how to take efficiently into account the national interests of union republics in this sphere.

They stressed the need to raise the contribution of the foreign ministries of union republics in drafting and implementing the Soviet foreign policy.

The consultations were sponsored by the Assessments and Planning Department and co-sponsored by the Division on Union Republics and the Research Centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Meeting participants were received by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valentin Nikiforov.

Peasants Congress Scheduled for June

LD1804230190 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1338 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 Apr (TASS)—The all-union peasant's congress will take place in June this year in Moscow. The decision on this was made today by the organizational

committee set up by the deputies' group of agrarian workers at the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies which took place in March.

During the exchange of opinions at the session, proposals were discussed on the draft rules of the future organization which the convened congress is to institute. In working materials, it is called "the Peasant Union of the USSR". The proposed aims of the union are announced, among others, as the creation of a mass movement for radical socioeconomic transformations in agriculture, the spiritual revival of the peasantry, the guarantee of the free and equal [ravnopravnyy] development of various forms of property and management, standing up for and defending the social, economic, and legal interests of villagers.

Labor, Employment Policy Centers Established

LD1304100990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0400 GMT 13 Apr 90

[Text] Around 13 million Soviet citizens who are fit for work are not employed in the national economy today. Of them, 2 million are covered by the definition of unemployed status accepted in the world: People who have lost work, are looking for it, and are prepared to retrain.

These data from the State Committee for Statistics signify in real and harsh terms yet another problem already existing today, but its manifestations await us most acutely tomorrow, in the transition to a civilized market in our economy. To solve it, the country's State Committee for Labor and State Committee for Education have adopted a joint decision to establish an All-Union Professional Orientation Center. It is intended to elaborate a policy that takes into account the changes in the situation regarding labor resources.

The USSR State Committee for Labor plans to organize an Institute for Employment Problems, which will forecast the situation in the future labor market.

Fees for USSR Joining Interpol Disussed

90UN1540A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by S. Aleksandrov: "We Are Entering Interpol"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA (No. 103) reported that our government has decided to make the Soviet Union a member of Interpol. The decree adopted regarding this gives the Ministry of Internal Affairs all the authority for officially registering the USSR in this international criminal police organization whose membership includes 150 countries.

What must the Soviet police do now?

First of all, submit the official application. According to the rules that are in effect, it is first considered by the general secretary of Interpol (this position is now held by a former Scotland Yard worker, Englishman Raymond

Kendall). Then the application is discussed at the Interpol executive committee and it is finally approved at its General Assembly which takes place once a year. The next one is in September in Ottawa.

Our application is not ready yet. They are working on it. But initially it has every chance of being accepted. As Raymond Kendall himself told journalists at a press conference during his recent trip to the USSR, there has not been a single case in which an application has been disapproved. Yes, actually, Interpol, which is essentially an immense data bank on international terrorism, drug trafficking, economic crimes, and crimes against individuals, has no reason to refuse anyone. It is paid money and it helps in the exchange of information and in the practical activity of the police.

We do not know yet exactly how much we will have to pay. At least Vasily Ignatov, chief of the administration of international ties of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, reported that the final amount of the USSR entry fee has not yet been determined. The fact is that usually the fees are measured in budget units (one unit is now equal to approximately 17,500 Swiss francs). Depending on various factors—the condition of crime in the country, the volume of information needed, and so forth—Interpol members contribute varying amounts of units. The minimum is one, the maximum—80. But now Interpol intends to change this policy and set the maximum at 100 units and the minimum at two, and also to revise the amount of the budget unit itself. The question will be decided in June at the executive committee meeting. That is apparently when our amount will be established as well. But, judging from the fact that the decision to enter the Interpol was made by the USSR Council of Ministers, we have the money.

But money is not just needed for entry. According to the existing rules, we will have to organize our own national Interpol bureau. It will have to have both skilled workers and the most modern means of communication and powerful computers. Interpol does not give anybody any money for this but only recommends what kind of equipment is needed.

"It has not yet been decided specifically where the Interpol bureau will be located in Moscow," said Vasily Ignatov. "But most likely it will be in the building of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs."

Poll on Republic Secession, Presidency Cited

90UN1524B Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 13, Mar 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Do You Support This Position?"]

[Text] The harmonization of relations between the republics of the Soviet Union and the renewal of our federation are becoming increasingly urgent tasks. How does the public assess movement along this path? The figures that we publish today were obtained by the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Center

for Sociological Studies during the course of a study entitled "The CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress: Assessment, Extent of Support by the Public, Expectations." In February and March 1990 on the basis of a national sample from 17 parts of the country, a total of 1,510 people were polled.

The platform defines a clear-cut position of decisive opposition to those movements that are working for the secession of their republics from the USSR. Do you support this position?

39 percent yes
40.1 percent no
19 percent undecided
1.9 percent no response

The party has advocated the conclusion of a Union Treaty between the republics. Do you support this position?

69.9 percent yes
9 percent no
19.7 percent undecided
1.5 percent no response

The CPSU Central Committee Platform supports the right of peoples to make their native tongue the official language on their own territory. Do you agree with this position?

71.2 percent yes
16.4 percent no
11.2 percent undecided
1.2 percent no response

Do you support retention of the Russian language as the vehicle for interethnic dealings?

92.5 percent yes
3.4 percent no
3.1 percent undecided
1 percent no response

How would you describe the political situation in the country at the present time?

Improving, 8 percent
The same, 21 percent
Deteriorating, 57 percent
Undecided, 14 percent

What is your attitude toward the establishment of the post of head of state as a president with all necessary powers?

61.4 percent support
11 percent do not support
25 percent undecided
2.6 percent no response.

Poll Shows Majority in Favor of Socialism

LD2404151990 Moscow World Service in English
0700 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] The latest public opinion polls conducted in the USSR have shown that a majority of the population favors the socialist way of development. The polls were conducted by different centers, but their results coincide totally: 87 percent of those questioned in one poll, for instance, accepted fully or partially the choice made in October 1917. However, many of them believe that the historic opportunities opened as a result of the revolution have not been fully used.

Editor on TV's Role, Plans for New Channel

PM1104135790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 7

[Interview with Eduard Sagalayev, member of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting Collegium and chief editor of the Central Television Main News Desk, by Yuriy Makarov under the rubric "Television and Us"; "Vremya" and the Time"—date and place of interview not stated; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] "Where is television going?" is a question asked in many readers' letters and is the main topic of our conversation with Eduard Sagalayev, member of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting Collegium and chief editor of the Central Television Main News Desk.

[Makarov] One of the most popular words nowadays is "alternative." In particular, a great deal is now being said and written about the need to create alternative television in the country. People can see the prototype of the future alternative television—independent and free from semi-official stereotypes—in certain programs that exist already. Among others, there are programs with which you have been or are now directly connected: "Twelfth Floor," "View," and "Seven Days," which has strangely disappeared from our screens. In your view, were these programs not a movement toward a future alternative television?

[Sagalayev] Not at all. In a recent issue of OGONEK my colleague Vladimir Vladimirovich Pozner to my great regret spoke out in support of organizing alternative television. There, he believes, it will be possible to express yourself freely. Then every word uttered on alternative television will not be viewed as the government's point of view. And the journalist will obtain relative or even total freedom. Pozner even proposed himself for the post of general director of this alternative television. I think that he would maybe have recruited me for this television. So it would appear that I have nothing to worry about personally. But to be serious, this is the first question. Who would watch alternative television? How many people would watch it? At the

moment Central Television's First Program can potentially be received by 96 percent of the country's population. The Second Program can be received by 72.5 percent. But the fourth, which is the only one that alternative television could use, can only be received by approximately 10 percent of the population. Just 10 percent! This is where the second question comes in, a much more important question. What will happen to the other television, the "main" television, if the possibility to express yourself freely is transferred to alternative television? If you follow this logic, then 10 percent of viewers will watch sharp, creative, independent, clever television, while practically the whole Soviet people will be subjected to boring, insipid, and ponderous officialese?

Incidentally, M.F. Nenashev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, supports the idea of an "alternative" in PRAVDA (5 February 1990). Only the aim is rather different. He also agrees with "the formation, alongside state television, of alternative television reflecting the views and evaluations of various social organizations and groups. In that case, it would be clear who wants what and what they are driving at. The position of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting would become stricter and more comprehensible...."

I am afraid that the realization of this idea with the aim of disowning those who are "driving at the wrong thing" would lead not to the victory, but to the defeat of state television, which tens of millions of people watch or are compelled to watch.

[Makarov] The same article by the chairman of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting questions the very possibility of reflecting broad pluralism of opinions on Central Television. It says: "Many of our difficulties... result from the fact that we try, within the framework of a single state television service, to combine and reconcile the various social positions, views, and attitudes which now really exist amid the democracy and pluralism in society." This thesis leads to the idea that there is a need to create alternative television, thus, as it were, squeezing pluralism outside the framework of state television.

[Sagalayev] But the principles of political pluralism and a multiparty system are being established in our state. And if this is really the people's television in the people's state, then it simply must embrace the whole spectrum of existing points of view. For example, France had a law of the "three thirds." One-third of television time was handed over to the ruling party, one-third to the opposition, and one-third to all the others. I am not saying that we should copy this outline, as today we are not able to "divide the airtime" like this because social structures are still not ripe for this. Today we must speak of the right of every Soviet person in the society of humane democratic socialism, as the CPSU platform expresses the goal, to be heard and the right to inform society of his point of view.

If we think about shoving all the controversies into the compartment of alternative television, so to speak, people will simply stop watching the First Program. Because there is the video boom on the one hand and the intrusion of television from outside on the other hand. After all, the time will come when the Soviet people will watch American, British, and French television, and the fact that they do not even know these languages will not prevent them from not switching on our own television. There is also the rapid development of local television, which will also be renewed thanks to the renewal of local organs of power. There will be a lot of "little Lenigrads." Then state television would turn into a government mouthpiece with an audience of 250 million. All the rest will be free, but local. This is absurd. In brief, I am for diversity and competition, but I am against the mechanical division of television into "free" and "official."

[Makarov] So you are for the state television that exists in our country now?

[Sagalayev] We have no state television.

[Makarov] ? [as published]

[Sagalayev] It so happens that the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, in its structure, continues to remain a fragment of the administrative edict system. It is mainly the party-government apparatus that governs us through resolutions, instructions, conferences, and telephone calls. And you can understand this apparatus: The power of television is only too strong. In a situation of political instability it can play the role of a kind of fuse or a catalyst for dangerous processes.

But the paradox of our time is that the administrative methods in which many leaders continue piously to believe either do not work or have the opposite results. Among the many talented and honest television workers, a spirit of resistance to pressure arises and an opposition to the leadership is formed. Semi-illiterate opportunists and television frauds—of whom, to be honest, there are plenty here in Ostankino—feel fine in this strained atmosphere. They align themselves now with the left, now with the right, and talk about the interests of democracy, the people, and the party, but they make pompous and superficial programs.... Thus we do not have organic television that is permeated with the highest state interests, but a patchwork of programs—official ones and opposition ones, vivid ones and dull ones. There is almost none of the centrism I so like, or spiritual and moral balance.

[Makarov] Not a very rosy picture, to put it bluntly....

[Sagalayev] It is not all so terrible. Now, at this alarming time, dialogue between the authorities on the one hand and the creative intelligentsia and journalists on the other hand is more necessary than ever before. Here is a concrete example. At the "top" there are people who say

that one of the most popular Central Television programs—"View"—should immediately be taken off the air. Our leadership, in a state of nervousness, for unclear motives, takes the new year edition of the program off the air. But Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze invites the moderators of "View" on an extremely complex trip around countries on the African Continent and spends many hours in close and open communication with them.

It is time to understand that in the delicate sphere of art and journalism (and television is a fusion of the two) there can be no chiefs and subordinates—there can only be partners.

At the moment, people occasionally say to us television people: "Who keeps you in food and drink, who pays you? The government!" We think otherwise—it is the taxpayer. We do not get money from the Ministry of Finance, the Council of Ministers, or the Central Committee because all these organizations, including our own, are financed exclusively by the people. It is time that those who manage and those who make television programs understood this.

[Makarov] So, in your view, that is the key to understanding state television?

[Sagalayev] There is a well known expression: "Whoever holds television in his hands holds power in his hands." This is true. But if in our country power belongs to the people, then the right to govern television must belong to them as well!

[Makarov] As a declaration, that sounds wonderful, but how can this right be really exercised?

[Sagalayev] This is very serious, because there are indeed mechanisms whereby the people can delegate their right to manage television. For example, the weekly rating, the viewers' assessment. If a program is watched by 0.001 percent of the people, then it is immediately taken off the air on the basis of those results, because no one wants it.

But that is not the most important thing. Central Television, in my view, must be a political and creative organization subordinate to the people and to its viewers via parliament. The main mechanism for delegating the people's right to television could be leadership of television by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Maybe, in view of television's importance and special role, we should form a television commission to which both the chairman and the collegium of Central Television would be accountable, according to special regulations.

Our television will genuinely become state television only if it is guided by the constitution and the Law on the Press and if it genuinely reflects prevailing points of view in society.

But we still have a long way to go. A high-ranking functionary can today grossly violate a television journalist's authorial rights and can literally shut his mouth by taking a program off the air or cutting the most

important thing in it. But journalists, too, sometimes use the colossal force of their influence and the television audience in order to cast aspersions, circulate rumors, and intrude into people's personal lives. Television, like the whole of society, is still infected with the virus of lawlessness.

This has a particularly serious effect in the sphere of television news, to which I have devoted this past year of my life.

[Makarov] What has this year been like?

[Sagalayev] It has been very full, very difficult, and unfortunately, very bitter. First of all, because we have had to report on tragic events that are hard for the country to bear, and sometimes to be the first observer of them. Second, because we have often been forced to violate the sacred laws of the genre, which stipulate that news be timely, objective, and impartial.

Events are taking place in one of the "hot" regions. The "Vremya" program contains a series of items in which representatives of various nationalities denounce extremism and separatism. Kolkhoz [collective farm] chairmen, steelworkers, the usual sort of thing. The paradox is that we do not give people information about what is going on there, but they speak out and issue denunciations on our program.

In fact, today we very often carry out an anti-people, anti-state policy, if you like. Do you think that I am exaggerating? Well, suppose people don't see anything about some topic or other. The world does not collapse. But when, for instance, there had been pogroms for days in Baku and we remained silent, then by remaining so, we caused enormous harm to the Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and all other peoples in the country. I stress that I am speaking now only about news, and not about evaluations or analytical commentaries—news, which, as is well known, practically does not brook epithets or labels. Yes, people want to see the "Vremya" program as a source of information regarding what is happening in the country and the world, and not the authorities' information about how they would like to see the country and the world.

The tactics of silence and of glossing over and "tidying up" the facts deprive everyone of objective information: from the ordinary viewer right up to the president. Objective information is a reliable support to the authorities and to those who exercise power. Anything else is the path to a looking-glass world.

Therefore I don't want state television just to be called state television, but to actually be that.

A great deal of work needs to be done to achieve this. I am afraid we may miss the obvious things during stormy debates about structures. Such things as, for example, the amorphous identity of the First and Second Programs on Central Television—at the moment they do not have a clear identity or direction. Another problem is that

television is strongly politicized to the detriment of artistic content, and soon congresses and sessions of people's deputies will be relayed on all channels. A sense of proportion is necessary. Third: Russian television is a vast realm for creative work.

All the same, I admit that I too would like to dream, to peer into the future of television. By vocation, I am a teacher, not a politician, and my plan was born under the influence of the most interesting work on our educational television program.

In contrast to those who believe that today we need alternative television, there is the idea of creating the first public television company on the same fourth program. It would be called "21st Century TV."

[Makarov] In what way would it be different from alternative television? All the same, you can see a certain parallel structure, but under a different name. Is that not the case?

[Sagalayev] Not at all. The "21st Century TV" is a project which has a specific aim and a clear task. It can prepare people of all ages—but mainly children and young people—for life in the 21st century. The founders of this public television service may include the Culture Fund, the Ministry of Culture, the State Committee for Public Education, and other social organizations concerned with how we are going to enter the 21st century. We need to create in the country a channel of highly cultured and highly spiritual television which would have, for instance, one news program, but which would mainly familiarize the viewers with the highest achievements of world civilization, and particularly culture. We need to bring together, within the framework of this channel, directors, scriptwriters, authors, editors, and managers attracted by the idea of enlightenment. I am not just saying this for the sake of it—there are interesting bids, there are people who are prepared to be involved in this. The concept of public television is supported by Rolan Bykov and a number of people's deputies and social organizations. The Union of Leaseholders, in the person of Pavel Bunich, is prepared to invest millions of rubles in the public television fund in order to teach Soviet entrepreneurs in a special program. We can and should give people fundamental preparation for life in conditions of the scientific and technical revolution. This, of course, is relative: The 21st Century has already practically begun in Japan, for instance....

[Makarov] So for us, unfortunately, it is more a "campaign to banish scientific and technical illiteracy."

[Sagalayev] I see the project rather as a television high school. It seems to me that this is a rewarding task if you gradually extend the number of viewers and make videocassettes of the most successful films. I dream that in time our people will have video libraries containing not just "Red Dawn," but also courses on the English language and the history of world culture, and the treasure trove of world theater and cinema.... But everything must be assembled and bought, and we must get on

with it, so that people can see things on the screen and want to have them at home. This is a public channel which would look to the future in its work, though perhaps not the very distant future.

Twenty-first century man must know how to operate a computer, to find his way easily in the business world, and know at least two foreign languages, the Bible, mythology, and philosophy. That is, the Soviet person must be able to compete as an equal with representatives of any other country in the world in the intellectual, moral, physical, and other respects. I understand that television by itself cannot resolve such a great task. But it can participate in doing this. Perhaps this is an alternative to alternative television.

[Makarov] The idea is a very interesting one and I would like to wish success to those who are obsessed with implementing it. But we have been carried away by the future. Let us return to our weekday routine. Will we ever again see "Seven Days," which, according to Britain's THE INDEPENDENT, "shook up Soviet television and brought glasnost to a new level?"

[Sagalayev] I hope so. And I am working on this.

Agricultural

New Agricultural Export License Rules

LD2404162690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1300 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] As of 1 May this year, licensing is being introduced for the export of cereal crop seeds, as well as for exports and imports of veterinary substances. The USSR customs bodies have been instructed to allow these products to pass through the USSR state border only if the suppliers and clients possess licenses issued by the relevant bodies.

Agricultural Situation, Prospects Viewed

PM2404100990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
23 Apr 90 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with V.V. Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Commission for Food and Purchases, by N. Musiyenko; date, place not specified: "The State of Affairs in the Fields"]

[Text] From dawn till dusk the fields are filled with the roar of engines—the sowing campaign is in full swing. And readers' letters contain a multitude of questions... We put them to V.V. Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Commission for Food and Purchases.

[Musiyenko] Vladilen Valentinovich, what hopes do you have for the current sowing campaign?

[Nikitin] Enormous hopes. Indeed, the empty shelves in foodstores are extremely distressing. We need to feed the

country as quickly as possible and if not eliminate, then at least reduce as much as possible the dependence on imports of grain and other foodstuffs, stop wasting hard currency on something we are capable of producing ourselves, and stop living in debt.

There are real prerequisites for this. What are they? First and foremost the fact that the government has given rural workers a free hand, and they have been granted unprecedented economic autonomy. Kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] are now entitled to make their own decisions on crop structures and production volumes and disposal of the crops. Material incentives for farmers are increasing, and they are becoming increasingly committed to high end results. The USSR Council of Ministers will review purchase prices for grain and some other products of the current harvest. Prices of potatoes, vegetables, fruit, and berries will depend on supply and demand. Look how enterprisingly the collectives which have switched to leasing and other sensible forms of labor organization and to payment are operating. They have achieved successes—their contribution cannot be put down to anyone else, nor can their mistakes, for that matter...

[Musiyenko] To "capricious" weather, for example... Incidentally, experts have presumably already determined the state of the winter grain crop.

[Nikitin] Winter crops have overwintered much better than in past years' nevertheless, some are rather thin in some parts of the Ukraine, in the Central Chernozem Zone, and in the Non-Chernozem Zone. We also acknowledge the possibility of winter crops' perishing on some fields in the Volga-Vyatka area and the Ural area because they have rotted under the snow. Plant development has been adversely affected by sharp drops in temperature and night frosts. In southern parts of the Ukraine and a number of parts of Russia and Moldavia there is little moisture in the soil. The crops there are in a sad state.

[Musiyenko] So the threat to part of the harvest is very real?

[Nikitin] Dead crops can still be replaced. Feed grain, spring wheat, millet, buckwheat, and corn will be sown on 3.5 million hectares to replace winter crops. Incidentally, much more has been resown than in previous years—around 6 million hectares. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes have all the seeds they need to sow spring crops and resow winter crops. The state helped those who were short. The seeds are also of better quality than in past years.

[Musiyenko] The editorial office is receiving alarming reports that not all the machinery has been overhauled and sent out into the fields and, as in the past, there are shortages of fuel, spare parts, and mineral fertilizers.

[Nikitin] Unfortunately, it is a chronic "disease." We simply cannot cure it. What is more, it is progressive. The point is that field work started earlier than usual, but

the departments supplying the agro-industrial complex with material and technical resources failed to consider this. Moreover, the railroad workers have not done their part—because of them agriculture failed to receive hundreds of thousands of carloads of petroleum products in January-March.

The countryside is bedeviled by a shortage of spare parts. Many enterprises of the Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building are falling down on their contract commitments. Look how widespread the debt situation is: Frolovskiy steel smelting, Yaroslavl engine, and Pavlodar and Volgograd tractor plants; Melitopol and Yeletskiy tractor hydraulic turbogenerator unit plants; Kharkov tractor engine plant; and "Simferopolselmash," "Altayselmash," and "Odessapochvomash" production associations.

The chemical industry workers have also disappointed. Despite the scarcity of mineral fertilizers they have supplied even less than last year. Incidentally, the hurried closure of certain chemical enterprises was a factor here.

[Musiyyenko] Will this delay the sowing?

[Nikitin] The pace of work is not bad in general, despite some hiccups in supply. Early grain crops have already been sown in the Ukraine, in Moldavia and Georgia, in the Central Asian republics, in Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays, and in Rostov and Belgorod Oblasts. Sowing of cotton, sunflower, sugar beet, rape, potatoes, vegetable crops, and fiber flax is continuing.

[Musiyyenko] What specifically needs to be done to spare the sower extra work and the unenviable role of petitioner and help him to grow a fine harvest?

[Nikitin] I do not want to be an oracle, making hoary appeals and uttering truisms. I will just say that the government is adopting prompt measures to provide peasants with all that they require for sowing. But I will take this opportunity once again to remind everyone on whom normal operations depend, above all the collectives of industrial enterprises and the transport workers, who owe the grain growers something: The food situation in the country will not get any better unless supplies of material resources to the countryside cease to be disrupted.

And another thing: Many farms simply cannot do without help from citizens. I believe worker collectives and local soviets are aware of this. I would like them to be able to speed up their search for forms of mutually advantageous cooperation between city and countryside.

Scientific

Computer Incompatibility Blamed for Launch Delays

PM2404120590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by S. Leskov: "Latest Launch Delay"]

[Text] The launch of the "Kristall" technological module, considered one of the main "space" events of the year, has once again been postponed.

It is hard to calculate how many times the launch of the technological module, on which for the first time in the history of space exploration the industrial production of various materials with fundamentally unattainable properties under earth conditions is to begin, has been postponed. As a result cosmonauts Viktorenko and Serebrov, who have been specially trained to conduct technological work and who even "held back" their launch for several months, were simply unable to wait for the module in orbit. The last in the series of launch dates was 18 April. However, the "Kristall" module, which has already been at Baykonur for a long time, did not head off into space on that day either.

The next launch date is 1 June. Yet Solovyev and Balandin, who are currently working in orbit, are to complete their flight in July...

What held up the launch this time? V. Blagov, deputy flight chief, told IZVESTIYA's correspondent that the launch postponement is not directly associated with the technological module's readiness—"Kristall" is perfectly in order. But the powerful "Salyut-5B" on-board computer is currently being tuned up on board the "Mir" orbital complex, where new spaceships are constantly docking. It is already difficult for the former "Argon 16B" computer to control the complex with the complicated spatial configuration and with the significantly increased quantity of apparatus. Thus, five mainframes with a total capacity of over 2 million operations per second are currently operating on board the "Mir" complex. This is quite commensurate with the large ground-based computer complexes installed, for instance, at the flight control center itself.

However, according to V. Blagov, it proved considerably more difficult than first imagined to organize intermachine compatibility. All this is not so much a fault as a problem of space exploration. The problem of intermachine compatibility is successfully resolved in many countries, but it is hard to expect a breakthrough in this field with our electronics.

The first-stage tests confirming that the computer is successfully performing all the basic operations were only completed 19 April. However, we will have to wait a while before further checks since "Mir" is to receive the "Progress" tanker in early May, and it is only compatible with the old computer.

Hopefully it will prove possible to avoid further delays with the "Kristall" module launch. But even then the lag behind schedule will inevitably result in a reduction of approximately 20 percent in the technological, medical, and biophysical studies conducted using apparatus carried by the module within this expedition. If we take into consideration the fact that, according to general designer

Yu. Semenov's figures, the expedition's economic efficiency was estimated at R105 million, then the losses from the latest postponement alone may be estimated at R20 million.

Delayed launches of modules destined for the orbital complex, which was also conceived as a conglomerate of many space facilities, have become regular occurrences. At this rate, it is not known when another two modules, in addition to "Kristall," will reach "Mir." After all, the orbital complex, which was put into orbit four years ago, is steadily coming to the end of its resources.

'Mir' Cosmonauts Continue Scheduled Experiments

LD2404094690 Moscow TASS in English 0921 GMT
24 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 24 TASS—Cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovov and Aleksandr Balandin continue with the flight schedule aboard the Soviet Mir space station.

On Monday, they began an experiment with the Gallar installation to grow a monocrystal of the gallium arsenide semiconducting material in conditions of weightlessness.

The experiment will last 220 hours.

Solovov and Balandin continue research of space radiation levels and space impact on physico-mechanical qualities of different materials.

They continued reloading the Progress-M-3 cargo spacecraft, taking out delivered cargo to Mir's main modules and placing used equipment in Progress's cargo bay.

On Monday, the crew used Progress's power plant to correct Mir's orbit.

The flight is proceeding normally. Both cosmonauts are feeling well.

Agreement on Joint Space Flight Signed

LD1804122490 Moscow TASS in English 1130 GMT
18 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Grigoryev]

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—The Soviet Union and West Germany have reached agreement on a joint space flight on board the Soviet orbital Mir station in 1992. It will last eight days, including six days on the station.

The agreement was signed today between the Licensintorg Foreign Economic Association, representing the interests of the key Soviet piloted space flights association Energia and the German Aviation and Astronautics Research Institution (DLR).

The project will be carried out on commercial lines. It envisages a wide range of joint material studies and

biomedical experiments in conditions of microgravitation. Soviet experts will help their West German colleagues prepare and carry out the experiments, detailed programs for which will be drawn up during the flight preparations.

The results of the experiments, received by West German cosmonauts and including various materials, records or videodata, weighing up to 10 kilograms, will be delivered to the earth after the joint orbital flight.

The agreement envisages the work of specialists from both countries in the USSR and the FRG, regular information of the public about the project's implementation and possible joint advertising campaigns, devoted to the flight.

Nuclear Safety Statistics for March Cited

PM1904103990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by Yu. Rogozhin incorporating interview with N. Shteynberg, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Safety in Industry and the Atomic Power Industry; date and place of interview not specified: "Nuclear Power Stations in March"]

[Text] The USSR State Committee for Safety in Industry and the Atomic Power Industry continues to report incidents at nuclear power stations [AES's].

There were 47 power units in operation in March 1990. The statistics for unscheduled reductions in capacity and shutdowns look like this: [The columns in the table represent the following: A—reductions in capacity; B—shutdowns through the fault of personnel; C—shutdowns due to equipment failure; D—total shutdowns]

AES	A	B	C	D
Rovno	1	2	3	5
Zaporozhye	-	2	2	4
South Ukrainian	1	1	1	2
Balakovo	1	-	2	2
Novovoronezh	-	-	2	2
Kola	1	1	-	1
TOTAL	4	6	10	16

There were no violations of safe operating limits and conditions. The radiation situation at nuclear power stations and in monitored zones on the whole is within the limits set for normal operation. The previous summary (IZVESTIYA No. 68) indicated that two shutdowns occurred at the Chernobyl AES in January and February; in actual fact there were two reductions in capacity.

N. Shteynberg, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Safety in Industry and the Atomic Power Industry, answered the editorial office's questions.

[Rogozhin] Nikolay Aleksandrovich, Magadan reader A. Kuznetsov asks: Why do your summaries not mention the Bilibino nuclear power station?

[Shteynberg] The Bilibino nuclear TETS [heat and electric power station] has several peculiarities. First, it is situated in Chukotka, in a remote area, and is not connected to the country's integrated power system. Second, each of its four power units is of low capacity—12 megawatts. And third, it is a nuclear heat and electric power station, and one of its most important tasks is to supply heat to the city of Bilibino. But generally we have talked about power stations. Nevertheless, our committee constantly supervises safe operation, which includes the Bilibino nuclear TETS. I will mention that its work is notable for its reliability and steadiness. Thus last year only three unit shutdowns occurred at the Bilibino nuclear TETS.

[Rogozhin] Another question from the mail: How is waste stored at an AES?

[Shteynberg] Today liquid and solid waste is stored on-site at the AES in special storage facilities whose design incorporates several engineering barriers which minimize the chance of radioactive substances getting into the environment. The integrity of these barriers is monitored by measuring the activity of samples taken from special observation wells located around the storage facility building. I know that the problem of waste worries the public. It also worries power engineers. So state guidelines for dealing with radioactive waste are now being prepared and will outline solutions to all the problems of burying radioactive waste once and for all.

Chernobyl Area Termed 'Ecological Disaster' Zone

LD2404214690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1457 GMT 24 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Dmitriy Kiyanskiy]

[Text] Kiev, 24 April—The setting up of a system to monitor the Dnieper cascade, the biological effect of low-intensity radiation, and how the 1986 Chernobyl accident affects the health of the population were at the center of attention of those taking part in a scientific and practical conference held here 23-24 April. Employees from various scientific institutes took part in it.

It was noted at the conference that in a number of rayons of Kiev, Zhitomir, and Rovno Oblasts, which turned out to be within the western zone of the accident fallout, high levels of radiation pollution have affected the natural characteristic features of the sandy soils of the Belorussian and Ukrainian woodland area. As a result, cesium here finds its way into agricultural output 10-100 times faster than in other places. That is why the permissible soil pollution levels introduced in 1986 do not guarantee that the radionuclides content in the animal husbandry output here is kept within the limits of temporarily permissible norms. These have now, in practice, been

given up. It was stressed at the conference that it is necessary also to repeal them officially without delay.

It was said in the speeches that in a number of rayons, affected as a result of the Chernobyl accident, the radioactive pollution is accompanied by pollution by heavy metals emitted from the reactor during the process of eliminating the consequences of the accident. As a result, there is an entire complex of negative factors never before encountered on such a scale. Taking this into account, stressed the participants in the meeting, the region should be declared to be a zone of ecological disaster posing a risk to the population residing here, and assistance should be sought from the world community.

Continuing Risk at Chernobyl AES Described

LD2404060990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1320 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 23 Apr (TASS)—It would be risky to affirm that, after all the improvements to the physical characteristics, the reactors operating at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station [AES] have become completely safe, Yuriy Tsoglin, chief of the Department of the Safety of Nuclear Power Stations of the Institute of Nuclear Research at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences told a TASS correspondent.

"If the 'improbable' circumstances of 1986 were to arise again today, there would be no accident," the scientist thinks. "However, fears do exist. First, a protective cover, thereby creating a hermetic zone, cannot be erected over the reactor. Second, the construction of a unit does not ensure the localization of the accident if three or more technological channels are ruptured simultaneously. The third major defect: the reactor is not equipped with a modern, fast-reacting diagnostic system allowing the operator to evaluate the situation in a few moments and to take the optimum decision."

The same shortcoming is characteristic of the safest Soviet reactors, Yuriy Tsoglin acknowledged. That is why the Institute of Nuclear Research has proposed that all units be equipped with an effective system of diagnosing and early prediction of emergency situations. "The scientist recalled that the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station will be taken out of operation before 1995. "It is difficult to do that more quickly," Yuriy Tsoglin said. "We still have very little experience." It will take at least 10 years to dismantle the station completely, he suggests. All economic activity should be excluded on the site of the nuclear electric power station and on a 30-km zone surrounding it and the territory should be declared a reserve, giving it to botanists, zoologists, physicists, and hydrogeologists for observation. To prevent the migration of radio nuclides, there are means of slowing it down—the stabilization of soil by a cover of vegetation and various hydrological measures.

Academy Reinstates Expelled Scientists

LD2404223990 Moscow TASS in English 2101 GMT
24 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 25 TASS—Members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, who had been expelled from it without grounds under Stalin's rule, were reinstated posthumously as academy members here.

Soviet science suffered considerable losses due to false accusations. Many prominent scientists were declared "enemies of the people" and subjected to repressions.

Others were expelled from the academy under crude political pressure or had to leave the country because of unbearable living and working conditions.

"Paying tribute to the memory of innocent victims and appreciating their outstanding contribution to the development of Soviet and world science and culture, the general session of the Academy of Sciences has reinstated more than 40 scientists as full and corresponding members of the academy," the session's resolution says.

Four foreign scientists—Olaf Broch of Norway, Henry Hellett Dale of Britain, Herman Joseph Muller of the United States and Mehmet Fuat Kepruelue of Turkey—were reinstated as the academy's foreign members.

Russian writer and Nobel Prize winner Ivan Bunin and public education activist and cultural personality Pavel Ignatyev were again given the titles of honorary members.

The session decided to build a memorial in Moscow to repressed scientists.

Marchuk's 'Traditional' Academy Speech Criticized

PM2404132590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by IZVESTIYA special correspondents Yu. Danilin, K. Smirnov: "Who Should Lead the Academy? General Meeting of USSR Academy of Sciences Members Opens in Moscow"]

[Text] A general meeting of USSR Academy of Sciences members opened in Moscow's House of Scientists on 23 April. Over the next five days they will be electing the leadership of the union Academy of Sciences: the president, vice president, chief scientific secretary, presidium, academician secretaries of departments, and chairmen of regional branches.

These elections are a normal, periodic situation in academic life. This time, however, they have aroused special interest not only among the scientific community but also among the broad public.

It is impossible to renew Soviet society's material and spiritual life and take our society to the height of world civilization without relying on science. However, our academy, which is expected to play a prominent role in

this renewal, has found itself in crisis and increasingly devoid of the features traditionally associated with the Soviet scientific community, such as receptiveness to the latest ideas, discussions, and dialogue with young people.

The diktat of the main establishments, monopolism, and other ills of departmental science have begun to affect fundamental academic fields. Are we not tired of waiting for "priorities" in such key fields as information science, biotechnology with practical applications in agriculture and medicine, and economics? Do we not too naively refer to the times of Lysenko, a practice which prevented us in the past from retaining primacy in various scientific fields? Everything said and written on this subject is the bitter truth. But quite a lot of time has passed since then. We could—indeed should—have learned from this truth long ago.

Finally, however many complaints are addressed to the USSR State Committee for Education for miscalculations and losses in our system of education and upbringing, it is time that we all realized one simple truth, a truth known even to Peter I, who created the triune "organism": grammar school, university, academy of sciences. The simple truth is that responsibility for the reproduction and cultivation of society's intellectual potential must be borne first and foremost by the USSR Academy of Sciences and not by some minister or state committee chairman.

A big discussion on the crisis in academic science and ways to resolve this crisis has been conducted through IZVESTIYA for several years. The majority of those who have taken part in this discussion agree that the democratization of the USSR Academy of Sciences is lagging behind other democratic processes in society and that it must be sharply intensified. Great hopes in this respect are being pinned on the renewal of the academy leadership.

Although, judging by the traditional—not in the best sense of this word—report delivered by Academician G. Marchuk, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, there is going to be a long wait for such changes. Once again, there is an abundance of unresolved problems, like a "baton" that has to be passed to the new leadership of the academy. But the situation was the same three years ago, even 10 years ago. The report showed no desire to analyze why these problems are still problems—as if this state of affairs has not intensified the already far from happy condition of our science.

The nomination of candidates for the post of president of the USSR Academy of Sciences had begun when we sent this report. The following have been named (in order of nomination): Academicians G. Marchuk, N. Basov, S. Shatalin, Zh. Alferov, Yu. Osipyan, and A. Gaponov-Grekhov. The latest information is that five of these candidates have refused to stand. This leaves Academician G. Marchuk as the sole candidate.

Military

Maj Gen Discusses Military Reform, Defense Law

LD2404165490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1040 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Interview with Major General Ivashov, head of the Department of Affairs at the USSR Defense Ministry, by correspondent Sergey Guryanov, with introduction by presenter Aleksandr Korshunov; place and date of interview not given—recorded]

[Text] [Korshunov] The contours of military reform and the Law on Defense are already being outlined in respective drafts. Our correspondent Sergey Guryanov talks in more detail about this with Major General Ivashov, head of the Department of Affairs of the USSR Ministry of Defense, who is very closely connected with the preparation of this document.

[Begin recording] [Guryanov] Leonid Grigoriyevich, what is the concept of this new defense law of ours?

[Ivashov] Well, I would first of all like to point out that the Law on Defense will be no isolated act. It will be an organic part of the system of military legislation. I can describe only a few of these, the main ones, so to speak. In addition to the Law on Defense, there are laws on general conscription and military service, on the status of the military serviceman, on martial law, and on criminal accountability for military crime.

[Guryanov] Leonid Grigoriyevich, you mentioned the law on the status of the military serviceman. I have a question in connection with this: At present, the serviceman, either a soldier or an officer, has practically no legal protection such as the personnel of the internal affairs organs, for instance, enjoy. Yet in our very difficult times, the military man frequently carries out tasks which are even more difficult than those the militiaman copes with, for example. Does the law on status provide for the legal protection of the officer or soldier who is carrying out a task of state importance?

[Ivashov] The Law on Defense states, among other things, that while fulfilling his official duties a serviceman is the representative of state power. I should like to go on to point out the following aspect: Unlawful actions against servicemen while they are carrying out their official duties, and also against their near and dear ones and relatives, count as aggravating circumstances when a court verdict is pronounced on persons who have committed these unlawful deeds against servicemen.

The Law on Status is already being drawn up, it will follow after the Law on Defense.

[Guryanov] Can you tell us what new aspects there will be in the service procedure for officers?

[Ivashov] The Law on Defense enshrines the principle of voluntary service. This was in fact previously enshrined in law, too, but it is now being genuinely implemented;

this means the right of the officer to enter military service voluntarily, and his right, after a specific period of time, to leave the service voluntarily or under other circumstances, without waiting until a military service time limit has expired.

[Guryanov] Leonid Grigoriyevich, the draft Law on Defense is already essentially ready to be submitted to the Supreme Soviet, is it not?

[Ivashov] Yes, the USSR Law on Defense was examined at a sitting of the collegium of the Ministry of Defense on 10 April and in the main was approved. The military legislation commission is currently revising it, so to speak, in accordance with the results of the discussion at the collegium sitting, and the law will be sent to the ministries and departments concerned before 25 April. Then, in June, it will be submitted to the Supreme Soviet.

[Guryanov] Work on the draft Law on Defense was thorough and took a pretty long time, in all. A very great number of changes have taken place during this time in the life of our state, in particular the introduction of a presidency. The president, as we know, is the commander in chief of the Armed Forces. Does the Law on Defense take account of this?

[Ivashov] Yes, substantial amendments were made to the prepared draft Law on defense with the introduction of the institution of presidential power. In accordance with the draft law, the president should sanction the Soviet military doctrine and especially important programs for the development of weapons and military technology; should present to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals for earmarking allocations for defense; confer military titles from major general and above upon servicemen; and make appointments to leading posts in the Armed Forces—from the commander of troops of a military district and fleet, and above, is the intention; by way of reciprocal measures, take the decision and issue a command on carrying out military actions and use of nuclear weapons; authorize the conducting the nuclear tests; and also tackle other issues within his competence.

These are the main powers of the president in the sphere of defense which it is intended to grant him through the draft law on the defense of the USSR.

[Guryanov] Leonid Grigoriyevich, the Law on Defense should indisputably become the legal basis for reform of the Armed Forces, as you have already told us in detail. As we are aware, military parliamentarians also have conceptions of military reform.

[Ivashov] Study of the variant of the conception of military reform proposed by a number of people's deputies shows that along with some interesting aspects—some quite good solutions have been found for issues, so to speak—at the same time, one cannot describe this concept as being scientifically based today. One cannot do so for a number of reasons. A number of issues are not based on knowledge of the actual state of affairs in the

Army and fleet—the actual position in the Army today, so to speak, upon knowledge of the reasons for some negative processes; and, without doubt, as the comrades working on the concept of military reform themselves admitted, they do not have the fundamental data on, for example, the military strategic situation, the aims and tasks and designation of certain groupings of troops, and other aspects. These are just some of the evident negative aspects in the concept proposed by the people's deputies. Although on the whole, I reiterate, there are many positive things in it.

[Guryanov] One innovation in the new law is contract-based service for servicemen, including (?conscript servicemen). Could you say something about this?

[Ivashov] Yes, the draft USSR Law on Defense proposes that new terms of service be introduced. This is first of all one of the steps toward professional armed forces. It is proposed that the principle of filling posts by contract will be put into effect through the law on universal military service. So what will this be like?

It is proposed that the serviceman be called up on the basis of military conscription, and that he will then serve for a set period of time—say, six months. Having received training in one military specialty or another, he will then be entitled to submit a report and conclude a contract with the Ministry of Defence for a further two and a half years. First and foremost it is proposed to fill posts among senior NCOs and posts for specialists requiring special experience and knowledge in this way. Later, probably, other categories will be filled in the same way. Of course, conscript servicemen who conclude contracts will have rather different conditions of material reward and social conditions, distinct from those for conscripts serving under standard conditions.

[Guryanov] Approximately how much will a contract soldier receive?

[Ivashov] Well, here we can refer to what Vladimir Nikolayevich Lopatin said recently on television, that a soldier who agrees to a fixed term of service will get R300-350. If that is all, then that would hardly be realistic; it is hardly realistic that anyone would agree to serve as a soldier for R300 or R350. However, when it comes to the principle of contract service, of serving for two years, then I think that somewhere around R150-200 for two and a half years—that amount plus certain other social concessions—would probably be realistic. [end recording]

General Staff Holds Lenin Anniversary Conference

PM2404101990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[Report by Colonel A. Morozov: "Conference Held"]

[Text] "Lenin's Teaching on the Defense of the Socialist Homeland and the Present Day" was the topic of a scientific and practical conference marking the 120th

anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth held at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

The speeches of Lieutenant Generals V. Gulevich and B. Strelchenko, Major General N. Kutsenko, Colonel V. Smirnov, and others stressed that many Leninist tenets on questions of military building, the organization of party political work, and the maintenance of discipline and good organization are as relevant as ever today.

Great attention was paid to analyzing from a Leninist methodological standpoint contemporary problems of military building and of ensuring the priority of its qualitative parameters and to examining how these problems are reflected in the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress.

Specific proposals were made at the conference regarding the content of the concept of military reform on which the General Staff and main and central directorates of the USSR Defense Ministry are working and the improvement of the work style of officials and party organizations.

More on Conference on War Anniversary

PM2304150590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Heroic Deed for the Sake of Peace"]

[Text] The all-union scientific conference on the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 began work in the M.V. Frunze Central House of the Soviet Army in Moscow on 19 April. It is organized by the USSR Defense Ministry, the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, the USSR Academy of Sciences, the CPSU Central Committee Marxism-Leninism Institute, and the USSR Defense Ministry Institute of Military History.

The conference opened with an introductory speech by Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister.

Time is unable to dim the grandeur of the immortal heroic deed performed by Soviet people and Soviet Army and Navy servicemen during the war, he said. Our victory transformed the world and opened up new highways in the development of world history. Even today it exerts an active influence on all social processes, is a powerful factor in maintaining peace and international security, and serves as a source of our country's revolutionary renewal.

Much has been written about the Great Patriotic War. However, the truth about it has still not been fully revealed. Many problems are quite often covered in a simplistic and tendentious manner.

It is our conference's aim to elaborate a scientific, strictly objective, and truthful concept of the history of the Great Patriotic War.

A report entitled "The Soviet People—Victor—People in the Great Patriotic War" was then delivered by Army General D.S. Sukhorukov, USSR deputy defense minister. He noted that the just aims of the war which the Soviet people waged created the potential for victory. However, to transform that potential into reality demanded colossal exertion of all the state's material, military, and spiritual resources and enormous energy and willpower on the part of the people.

The Soviet Union was forced to enter the war in an extremely unfavorable situation. The country's military and economic preparation to counter aggression was incomplete. This had been impeded by Stalin's deformations of socialism and lack of time.

Victory was won at heavy cost. The true figures for our losses were long hidden or distorted. Stalin in 1946 set our losses at 7 million people. Khrushchev later gave a new figure—around 20 million. But all these figures were derived on the basis of dubious estimates.

More realistic figures have now been determined as a result of painstaking analysis. The Soviet Union's total losses in the war are estimated at 27-28 million people.

The greater part of our losses belong to the first period of the war, when the Soviet Armed Forces fought in extremely difficult and unfavorable conditions. In subsequent operations enemy losses were at least as great, and in the final period of the war even greater.

Our victory was not just a military victory but also an economic one.

The following statistics alone indicate the scale of this work: The total number of people evacuated was around 25 million. No less than 1,360 major industrial enterprises were resited in the east. During the war our

industry produced 102,800 tanks, 825,200 guns and mortars, 134,100 aircraft, more than 10 million tonnes of munitions, and 16 million tonnes of fuel. Socialist agriculture, despite the temporary loss of extensive territory and the departure to the front of the most able-bodied and skilled workers, largely supplied the country with food and raw materials, albeit with great difficulty.

The moral and political superiority of our people and Armed Forces personnel was even more significant for the successful outcome of the war. The cohesion of Soviet society, the just aims pursued by the Soviet Union in the war, and active party political work played a crucial role here.

The friendship of the Soviet peoples was a very important factor in determining victory over the enemy. Common ideals and the desire to support one another in the fight against the enemy formed the basis of the peoples' mutual understanding.

The main role in political leadership throughout the war belonged to the CPSU. At the outbreak of war its ranks numbered 3.8 million full and candidate members. Through its organizational and ideological work the party was able to impart the necessary defensive thrust to the creativity of the masses, the functioning of state institutions and economic organs, and the activity of all cadres. It became indeed the moving spirit of the martial and labor deeds of the people, the speaker noted.

Sections devoted to specific topics—"The USSR Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War," "The Party at the Head of the Fighting People," and "The Soviet Rear in the Great Patriotic War"—then began work at the conference.

The all-union scientific conference resumed work 20 April.

Baltic Republics

Landsbergis Reacts to U.S. Position on Sanctions

LD2504110590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian
0901 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Speech by Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] Good morning, esteemed colleagues: Today I am not going to give an exhaustive report on the situation because this will be done by the Council of Ministers. This was decided earlier.

I just want to tell you about several issues: what the presidium is doing at the moment, what the commission is doing. I am taking part in the meetings of this commission—I mean the commission headed by Kazimiera Prunskiene, which is the Commission on Measures against the USSR Economic Blockade.

You were given a draft which is the work of the last two days. This is a draft law of the republic of Lithuania concerning provisional measures under the conditions of the economic blockade imposed by the USSR.

Here mandates are given to the government and, if necessary, to the local authorities as well. It indicates how resources and the labor force should be used, how to ease the problems caused by artificially created unemployment, and so on. I think we are going to discuss this. Therefore, I only wanted to remind you what is being done here in Lithuania in the situation of this economic crisis imposed on us.

You know that our delegation is in Moscow. It is headed by Bronius Kuzmickas, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council. Reports from Moscow do not give us any joyous information. So far our delegates did not have any important meetings. An attempt to see Chairman Primakov ended with a rather impolite proposal to go home and do what Moscow says.

A letter to President Gorbachev was written by our delegates and was handed in. However, there is little hope of any special instructions from the president concerning a meeting, because according to their information Gorbachev is leaving for Sverdlovsk for a week. Therefore, he will not deal with these issues.

Today Deputies Laurinkus and Gudaitis will try to go to the Supreme Soviet to look for contacts with Lukyanov.

Meanwhile, you have probably heard that the U.S. President promised to announce what reciprocal sanctions the United States will adopt against the Soviet Union in case it uses force in Lithuania, although the Soviet Union promised not to use force. Now the President announced that he is refraining from imposing sanctions. Comments indicate that yet again this refraining from declaring sanctions is temporary because of consultations or something else. However, in this case,

this is yielding to the threats of the Soviet Union, which have been formulated very simply: U.S. sanctions against the Soviet Union would cause a worsening of the situation in Lithuania—including the use of military force. It is very difficult to understand the logic of this. However, blackmail does not need any logic. In this situation the President argued that he did not want to escalate the situation in Lithuania, therefore, he refrained from imposing economic sanctions. We know here who is escalating coercion in Lithuania. This is a means of shifting the blame onto others for what the propaganda and the diplomatic force of the USSR is doing, while at the same time winning some more time.

For ourselves, we must orientate ourselves toward the democratic forces in the USSR. On the other hand, our struggle is not the problem of Lithuania and the Soviet Union only; it is a problem of the fundamental restructuring of the Soviet Union as well as the problem of confronting democratic forces with the forces of conservative coercion.

In turn, this statement—or rather explanation—will cause further political actions in the capital of the United States as well as in other cities. We are not going to predict these, we will simply see them. We must rely on our diligence, consistence, and endurance.

I also think that we should have some opinion poll service working on a permanent basis. Contacts between our deputies and their electors should be used as a means of helping to collect and generalize the opinion of our electors on a weekly basis. Until recently, we used to hear this in the reports of individual deputies.

Foreign Minister Cites Envoy on Energy Supplies

LD2504105190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian
1019 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Statement by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] I want to inform you—this is stated in the Soviet press, which I am going to read in Russian in order not to translate it incorrectly:

The Norwegian Agency NTB has published a statement by the Soviet ambassador in Oslo, Aleksandr Teterin. According to him, the USSR Government will not prevent the Baltic republics from obtaining oil and gas from abroad.

This is a statement by the official ambassador, the Soviet representative, who was summoned by the Norwegian foreign minister.

Vilnius Radio Carries 24 Apr Council Session

Citizens Contribute to Antiblockade Fund

LD2404140790

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1200 GMT on 24 April begins carrying a live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council proceedings in the Supreme Council Palace in Vilnius.

Deputies Ceslovas Stankevicius and Aleksandras Abis-alas are jointly in the chair.

At 1202 GMT Deputy Stankevicius proposes the following agenda: a report by the mandate commission on newly elected deputies, the draft budget law, the draft state control law, and the composition of the antiblockade commission.

At 1205 GMT the mandates of the new deputies were put to a vote.

At 1211 GMT the mandates are confirmed unanimously.

At 1212 GMT a vote is taken on the budget law. (details indistinct)

At 1213 GMT a report on the draft state control law is submitted.

At 1235 GMT questions are put to the rapporteur on this issue.

At 1253 GMT a proposal is made that this draft law should be published in the press because the general public may have something to say in this respect. At 1255 GMT Deputy Antanatis said that this draft law should be submitted to the commissions and they will decide whether to publish this draft law in the press.

At 1300 GMT a citizen of the republic of Lithuania, Gintautas Svedas, makes the following statement to the session: "I ask you to accept my contribution to the republican antiblockade fund. This contribution is the badge of the USSR State prize received in 1965." Svedas presents the badge to the secretary of the Supreme Council, Sabutis. Svedas makes the following statement:

"Esteemed chairman and esteemed deputies, today, when the republic is in difficulties, allow me to discharge my citizen's duty. Accept from me to the republican antiblockade fund a contribution in kind. This badge is rather heavy and, if I am not mistaken, anything can be bought with it. It can be oil or something else. I would ask to accept my badge and I hope that this step will be appreciated by my friends with whom I worked and received these awards, and that they will follow my example."

At 1305 GMT Deputy Sabutis thanks Svedas for his contribution, and delegates applaud.

At 1307 GMT names of the members of the commission to draw up and carry out an antiblockade plan are proposed and approved by the deputies. The chairman of the commission will be Kazimiera Prunskiene and her deputy will be Ceslovas Stankevicius.

At 1315 GMT the chairman announces that a plenary meeting of the session will begin on 25 April at 0900 GMT and will continue in the afternoon. On Thursday the council will work in commissions and there will be no plenary meeting.

Landsbergis Addresses 23 Apr Council Session

LD2404094590

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0938 GMT on 23 April carries a 37-minute speech by Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis from a live relay of the Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

Referring to the address made by a representative of the Azerbaijan People's Front, Landsbergis says that many more such examples could be quoted, especially from people in the USSR. These are signs that slogans "For our and your freedom" mark the future of Lithuania, he says. Landsbergis goes on to explain that the government is preparing a report on the economic situation in the republic and speaks about the visit by Prime Minister Prunskiene to Scandinavian countries, although a comprehensive report will be presented by the government on Wednesday, he states.

Speaking about the economic blockade, Landsbergis says that sabotage measures are also employed by Moscow. He refers to instances when supplies already en route to Lithuania are not allowed in or are taken through Lithuania without leaving the goods wagon at the appointed station. He also speaks of sabotage by tanks—the deliberate worsening of bank operations and delays.

Continuing, Landsbergis says that the fact that supplies are continuing to arrive from some oblasts of the USSR indicates that reliable commercial partners can be found and, therefore, the government should be looking for them.

Speaking of the blockade fund which has been started, he says that money is being raised not only in Lithuania but also abroad, where Lithuanians are collecting money to help the republic in this difficult situation. The Lithuanian fund founded by Lithuanians abroad has provided \$1 million. He said that perhaps other rich states of the world will also contribute.

Going on to speak about the reaction of the West to the situation in Lithuania, Landsbergis says: "Although currently the reaction of western politicians has been restricted to statements, probably this will not remain so." He mentions the EEC foreign ministers session where the problem of the economic blockade was discussed. He says that ministers expressed their concern

about the situation, believing firmly that this crisis cannot be solved by such measures. He states:

"The USSR, it seems, has been certain for some time that some European countries which are more dependent on the Soviet Union will give less support to Lithuania. They could perhaps begin to visualize a different situation now. Of course, we would like very much the Soviet Union to look for political solutions, as was promised earlier. It has been stated in international forums for several years that nowadays all conflicts should be solved only by political means.

"Unfortunately, when they themselves have to do just that, their words differ from their deeds.

"Also, very different words are heard. For example, Marshal Akhromeyev declared that force could be used in Lithuania. This would be an admission of their own helplessness, their inability to find political solutions, their inability to show any flexibility in looking for points of contact, looking for compromises. As you know, from our side we have officially proposed to find these points of contact and today the presence of our delegation in Moscow is also a concrete attempt to find the start of a dialogue."

Landsbergis notes that the presence of the Lithuanian delegation in Moscow is also a test of Moscow's intentions, because "various signals, even contradictory ones, are reaching us through direct and indirect channels from Moscow".

Next, Landsbergis says "Apart from what we have been doing here perhaps it is worthwhile thinking about our own attitude and what attitude we should recommend to the people of Lithuania in case of an extreme situation, because it is highly possible that increasing economic difficulties, the artificial creation of unemployment in Lithuania, and misleading people could all be aimed at achieving social unrest. This is one thing—social unrest, the aim of which, as the prime minister has stated, would be to crush the leadership of Lithuania.

"Well, yet another goal could be to create the slightest perceptible pretext for using force and the introduction of presidential rule, which has been the dream of the CPSU branch here. We should be ready for just this kind of situation.

"Let us simply say this: if one morning we find these premises occupied, do we know what to do then? Do we go, for example to the hall of the Academy of Sciences and continue our job there, or do we go to another hall? Or do we start some sort of hunger strike, or we do not do anything? Or do we make a declaration to the world about the occupation in its pure form: armed aggression and occupation in the face of the entire world, and let the world decide if the Soviet Union should be condemned as a aggressor, if this sort of behavior is permissible?

"That is one thing. Yet another thing is what we should recommend to our people what to do. Some could

recommend various forms of resistance, some will recommend not to do anything and to submit, to be careful and to save as many people as possible because the Soviet Union is collapsing anyway; therefore, we do not need any unnecessary victims. It is not difficult to predict various points of view. General civil disobedience could be announced, in a sense that the solidarity of citizens in Lithuania should not recognize the functions and functionaries of an alien state." "A civil disobedience campaign and how this could be expressed could be suggested. We have already witnessed this when an attempt was made to destroy the system of jurisdiction in Lithuania and our lawyers passed this test with honor: that is the Procurator's Office, the Supreme Court, and the courts of law. And if they continue to stick to this line and the courts do not accept any cases which would be sent from Procurator Petrauskas or some other person—a strange sent in from outside, regardless of his name—then perhaps the occupational government would have to bring in its own judges the way they bring in their doctors, because honest Lithuanian doctors did not agree to work at the military recruitment offices."

He says that all these points could be taken into consideration. Speaking about world reaction to the crisis Landsbergis notes there are signs causing him concern. He states: "On the part of the Soviet Union there is a tendency to stake everything, or at least to create this sort of illusion. President Gorbachev is artificially placed in a position of a very inflexible policy and in a desperate situation so that later in the the outside world—which in this instance plays an important role—a dilemma could be presented. This is already appearing sometimes in the press; it which reads: who should be supported? The Gorbachev who sacrifices Lithuania, while dreading the thought of what will happen there, is not Gorbachev but somebody else in Moscow."

Landsbergis goes on: "the Soviet Union itself—or at least a certain trend in its foreign policy—is expressed as a certain pressure on the world. For example, even concerning the summit at a time when more and more voices are heard about impossibility of such a meeting under the present conditions."

Next, he says that it is obvious that other points of influence also exist, as can be confirmed by the refusal by the Canadian and U.S. administrations to grant entry visas to representatives of the Republic of Lithuania. He notes to Lithuania by foreign diplomats are hindered or not allowed.

Landsbergis continues: "Even the reasoning which appeared in PRAVDA testifies to a certain loss of moderation. The United States is accused in terms such as morality is something which has nothing to do with the American way of life. I do not think that such expressions have been used for a long time.

"Attempts are made to present Lithuania to the world as a wrecker of international peace; how everything could have been nicely settled between the East and the West

were it not for that wretched Lithuania—as if the world could not see that Lithuania is not alone, that there is the whole of Eastern Europe and the republics in the USSR which are aspiring to the same goal.”

Further Landsbergis analyzes the response in the Western media, stressing that the West sees all the initiative coming from the Lithuanian side, while Moscow remains inflexible. He referred to these reports as indicative of a moderate attitude to the crisis, speaking of this, Landsbergis says:

“This moderate line has been helped by the spreading of false reports in the Soviet press about the changing positions in Lithuania and inconsistency, about a split in the views of the leadership of Lithuania, as well as, I would say, such peaceful statements made by minister Shevardnadze which make the Soviet Union look full of good will and full of good intentions toward Lithuania, which helps to postpone discussion of the problems.”

He goes on to speak about President Bush and his consultations with his western partners and possible measures taken.

Speaking about events which are currently taking in Latvia, Landsbergis mentions the decision by Latvian deputies to demand that the first session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, which is due at the beginning of May, should restore the independence of Latvia.

He mentions also the position the Estonian government has adopted toward the Soviet Union: Estonia has been termed an occupied country; Soviet laws are not applicable in Estonia, and military service is not compulsory in Estonia. It is evident, he says, that Lithuania is not alone, because all these issues have been raised in many other republics. Landsbergis concludes: “And this is an indication of the crisis in which the Soviet Union has found itself. The Soviet Union has no other way out but to carry out essential reforms on an extremely large scale, starting with its political thinking and with revising its views on Lithuania. Let us hope that this is not too far off.”

Prunskiene Interviewed on Moscow's Blockade

*AU2404115190 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
23 Apr 90 pp 173-75*

[Unattributed interview with Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimira Prunskiene; place and date not given: “Gorbachev Would Be Finished”]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Madame Prime Minister, were you taken by surprise by the Soviet oil and gas blockade, or did you expect Moscow to realize its threat?

[Prunskiene] We were not taken by surprise by the sanctions because Moscow had been announcing them for days. It was rather the threats that came as a surprise because the Soviet Government must have known that such sanctions would also affect the Soviet Union.

[DER SPIEGEL] In what way?

[Prunskiene] If we receive no mineral oil, our large refinery in Mazeikiai will no longer work. This not only creates problems in our republic but also in the Soviet region of Kaliningrad. Also, the Soviet Union will no longer be able to meet its obligations for the delivery of oil products to the West via the ports of Klaipeda and Ventspils. In addition, the supply of energy to enterprises that work mainly for the Soviet Union will be stopped.

[DER SPIEGEL] Well, now it is mainly Lithuania that suffers from the sanctions.

[Prunskiene] Of course, we will be facing numerous problems. We urgently need gas and mineral oil products for our economy, and our stocks will only last for six weeks.

[DER SPIEGEL] What will happen then?

[Prunskiene] We are already setting priorities. Agriculture and households receive preferential treatment. We will save in other spheres, such as in the transportation sector, for example. The halt of gas supplies affects us most heavily. Our engineers are testing new methods of producing liquid gas. This stimulates research and leads to new economic activities. Thus, there are also positive sides to the problems that Moscow is creating for us.

[DER SPIEGEL] This does not help you in the present situation. At the moment, Lithuanians cannot heat their apartments, and they will probably have no light in the near future and will have to eat cold food.

[Prunskiene] It will certainly take a few months for the situation to deteriorate to such an extent. However, I consider it unlikely that the Soviet Union will harass us for such a long time. Of course, one can switch off or bypass electricity. Our energy specialists, however, do not believe that such drastic steps will be taken.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you expect further sanctions?

[Prunskiene] We rather consider the current measures a lessening of Moscow's most aggressive ambitions—it threatened to use the Army some time ago. In a certain sense, the sanctions are tantamount to a renunciation of the presidential powers in Lithuania. Reactionary people's deputies from other republics demanded that Lithuania be placed under direct presidential rule. This really worried us. Compared with that, we consider economic sanctions less severe.

[DER SPIEGEL] However, you will not be able to survive them very long.

[Prunskiene] We still have the possibility of direct exchange with producers and suppliers of the other republics, which in turn would promote the development of normal market-oriented relations with the Soviet Union.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you not taking things seriously enough? If Moscow stops supplies completely and cuts off relations—what will happen?

[Prunskiene] In the case of a total blockade, we could sell our products, particularly foodstuffs and construction material, which are very sought after, in the whole Soviet Union. If Moscow terminates its obligations unilaterally, we will not continue to meet our obligations either.

[DER SPIEGEL] This does not seem to impress Moscow greatly.

[Prunskiene] A great deal also depends on the further democratization process. How will the governments and parliaments in Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere develop? Will they agree on all issues with the central government? Nobody knows at this point. Even Gorbachev himself has to find a way between the democratic movement and the reactionaries. He is probably not pleased with the current situation. Thus, the last word has certainly not been spoken.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you expect help from the West?

[Prunskiene] Yes, we expect the West to call on Moscow to lift the blockade and to agree to normal negotiations. We also expect economic aid if the blockade persists. We are facing financial difficulties because Moscow is trying to hold back foreign currency earned by our companies in trade with the West.

[DER SPIEGEL] Have you received any promises from the West?

[Prunskiene] To this day, we have neither received nor expected specific aid. We do not need any foodstuffs, because we have a sufficient amount. What we need is aid in the sphere of energy supply.

[DER SPIEGEL] This was one of the reasons why you traveled to Norway. You want Norwegian mineral oil. How should it reach Lithuania—provided that Norway is willing to supply oil—if the ports are controlled by the Soviet Union?

[Prunskiene] The transport is not a technical but a political problem. If Moscow sealed off Lithuania completely, this would be an aggressive or even bellicose act against our republic. I cannot imagine that the West and the rest of the world would tolerate this.

[DER SPIEGEL] To what extent do you think Gorbachev can still tighten the blockade?

[Prunskiene] I think that his possibilities are nearly exhausted. Moscow has tried nearly everything, including a parade of the Army, a blockade of telephone lines with the West, threatening telegrams and resolutions, and now economic sanctions.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you not consider it possible that the Kremlin might use the Army after all?

[Prunskiene] No, I do not consider this likely. Gorbachev knows that he would be finished as the initiator of perestroika and as a democrat.

[DER SPIEGEL] However, will he not be seen as a paper tiger if he does not succeed in bringing the tiny Lithuania to its senses with all his presidential powers?

[Prunskiene] He certainly does not like the situation, but he cannot act like a Tsar any longer. The economic crisis in the Soviet Union forces him to seek cooperation with the West. His planned economic reforms can only be realized in free societies. He depends on the West and the rest of the world.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you still trust him and his perestroika?

[Prunskiene] I can understand that he does not like our independence. Gorbachev must not only prove himself as a democrat but also as a leader of the Soviet Union, as an administrator of an empire. For us, this means that we must be both confident and cautious. We mainly trust in ourselves and all democratic forces that support us.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you disappointed at the current lack of political support by the Western democracies?

[Prunskiene] Sometimes we were disappointed. Every country tries to safeguard its own interests. However, some governments probably see the situation only from a single perspective. There can be no normal development in Europe after 1992 and no open relations between East and West unless a solution is found to the Lithuanian problem and unless the remainders of World War II are cleared.

[DER SPIEGEL] Your President Landsbergis even turned to the Pope. How can he help you?

[Prunskiene] Lithuania is a Catholic country to which the Pope is not indifferent. As a result of the increasing role of religion in the Soviet Union in the wake of perestroika, the Pope is also a moral authority there.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you think that it would have been possible to prevent the exacerbation of the conflict if Lithuania had proceeded more cautiously—such as its Baltic neighbor republics—and had not simply confronted Gorbachev with the unilateral declaration of independence?

[Prunskiene] Our conviction is increasing that this was the only possible decision. Otherwise we would have had to wait for independence for many years to come. Moscow's current reaction provides conclusive evidence of this. It shows Moscow's determination not to grant us real independence. This conflict erupted because we are now implementing this independence. This may be difficult and even dangerous, but it is possible.

[DER SPIEGEL] Did you have to run your head against the wall? Could you not have acted like the Estonians who pursue the same goal?

[Prunskiene] I have the impression that the Estonians are no longer really happy about they way they have chosen. If we had done the same thing, it would have been possible for Moscow to postpone independence indefinitely with delaying tactics. Our choice was clear. Now the world knows what we want. If we had not declared our independence, nobody would have to feel obliged to assist us.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why did you not press harder in negotiations?

[Prunskiene] We did that. However, Moscow referred to the Constitution all the time, and we did not make any progress. Thus, it was right and important to confront Moscow with accomplished facts. Even the theoretical right to secession from the Soviet Union would not really have increased our prospects for independence.

[DER SPIEGEL] Thus, the mouse decided to fight against the bear. Do you think that you will succeed in the end?

[Prunskiene] Irrespective of its size, every nation has a right to its own existence. Very often, small nations can master conflicts better because they are more flexible whereas larger ones like the Soviet Union are paralyzed by internal conflicts.

[DER SPIEGEL] How do you think this will continue? Both sides express threats, send letters, but are not ready to talk.

[Prunskiene] This style was forced upon us by Moscow. It tries to settle everything from a distance and in letters. Moscow insists that dialogue can only start if Lithuania withdraws its declaration of independence. Only then will Moscow be ready to discuss specific issues. I do not want to assess the situation incorrectly, but I think that we are moving toward negotiations.

[DER SPIEGEL] What compromises would Lithuania be ready to agree to?

[Prunskiene] We have submitted specific proposals for compromise. I signed them myself. We are ready to grant rights to the Russians and other minorities. We are ready to accept "double borders"—which means that we would allow the Soviet Union to continue to control our border with Poland if it is open for our economic use. Our parliament is discussing the possibility of not developing further the laws that have been adopted since 11 March. We would even allow Moscow to draft soldiers in Lithuania—but only on a voluntary basis, not against our will.

[DER SPIEGEL] Does this mean that you will not withdraw the declaration of independence?

[Prunskiene] This is out of the question. We do not want to go backward, but only forward.

Lithuania's Prunskiene Comments on Tasks Ahead

LD2404225190 Vilnius International Service in English
2130 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] The Lithuanian Prime Minister, Kazimiera Prunskiene, returned from her visit to three Scandinavian states to submerge into the problems and hardships of the economic blockade that the Kremlin had started during her stay across the Baltic Sea.

The evermore complicated economic situation in Lithuania, however, seemed to have no effect upon her charming smile, if only it shines now on a more tired face. Together with her cabinet, Kazimiera Prunskiene took to searching ways which would make the bite of Moscow's sanctions less painful.

Speaking to Radio Vilnius reporters she pointed out at the very start that the newly formed Lithuanian government was working more than at full speed. [Prunskiene in Russian fading into English report] The situation in Lithuania is really very hard. On coming to the office this morning I saw that the government was not simply engaged in work, it was actually harnessed in the problems that are so urgent to Lithuania now, says Kazimiera Prunskiene.

The stranglehold on Lithuania is most painful in two spheres: the reduction of complete severance of supplies from the Soviet Union to Lithuania, and second the problem of the railways. Deliveries by rail are purposefully hindered so that not only Lithuania's direct links with various republics of the Soviet Union should be complicated but also the transportation of goods inside Lithuania might be paralyzed.

The greatest hardships are certainly still ahead. It was observed at today's sitting of the cabinet that the population of Lithuania was very calm during the first days of the blockade. Yet with a whole range of factories being forced to stop Lithuania may be facing some 35,000 unemployed already at the end of this month.

Kazimiera Prunskiene defined the prospect as alarming. People have no savings she said, so it is not only the issues of social guarantees that arise sharply but also those of survival. The essential thing now Kazimiera Prunskiene considers is the search for new sources rather than the desperate distribution of the goods that may pretty soon dry up altogether. Kazimiera Prunskiene:

[Prunskiene in Russian fading into English report] Because Moscow has imposed a blockade upon us, we are changing our strategy towards the Soviet Union, said the Lithuanian prime minister. We are contacting directly the newly elected democratic city councils. I met Anatoliy Sobchak, chairman elect of the Leningrad Council, yesterday. I also met with representatives of the Lvov Council, a city in the West Ukraine. There are a lot of people in the Moscow Council who are disposed favorably towards Lithuania. Most of these cities are experiencing grave shortages of food stocks. Lithuania could supply them directly with meat and milk in

exchange for goods that we need. This is one of the ways to start breaking the embargo said Kazimiera Prunskiene, and another way leads us to the West, as popular support for the ultimate goal of Lithuania is growing there all the time.

The Lithuanian prime minister stressed that though Lithuania has no means of threatening Moscow, the Soviet Union will experience losses several times greater than Lithuania itself due to the economic blockade. There are even cases of evident discontent among the Russian people with the policies of their government. Reports say that the workers of the Tyumen region in Siberia have demanded Moscow to decentralize the distribution of crude oil and allow them to sell 10-15 percent of the oil to other countries, including Lithuania, for receiving food products in return. In case direct agreements are reached with Soviet enterprises the work of the railroads should be normalized. One way or another, ended Kazimiera Prunskiene, Lithuania is living through a crisis, by looking for new economic strategies instead of asking Moscow for help. This might be the turning point for Lithuania.

Prunskiene Comments on Foreign Aid Offers

*LD2404231990 Vilnius International Service in English
2130 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Report on news conference held by Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas in Vilnius on 23 April]

[Text] Late yesterday night the Lithuanian Prime Minister, Kazimiera Prunskiene, and the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Algirdas Saudargas, met with a large group of home and foreign journalists. The news conference was held in Vilnius within a few dozen minutes after the two Lithuanian officials returned by plane from Stockholm via Moscow.

Concrete palpable results of the visit to Scandinavian countries were predominant in the questions of all the journalists present at the news conference and the answers aroused on equal interest of all those who watched the news conference on TV. Lots and lots of concrete measures of assistance were named and spoken about, Kazimiera Prunskiene replied with here usual invincible and irresistible optimism.

The Premier Kazimiera Prunskiene and the Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas visited Norway, Denmark, and Sweden at the invitation of the ruling parties of those countries. A number of governmental level meetings were held at which Lithuania got guarantees of survival in conditions of blockade.

According to Kazimiera Prunskiene, the Scandinavian states realized that the Lithuanian problem extends far beyond the boundaries of Lithuania and presents a serious test for the world as to the real level of democracy in various countries. The link is especially important against the background of establishing new type relations

in Europe and in the whole world. Kazimiera said she was confident that the world would not tolerate a situation when Lithuania was strangled on all sides.

The question that the Lithuanian delegation very often received in the Scandinavian countries was what help do you need most badly. The answer was brief and clear: Support of other states coupled with a strict stand towards the USSR. Mrs. Kazimiera Prunskiene visited one of the leading Norwegian oil companies where she had a talk on terms of purchasing oil. It remains to date a commercial and political (?secret) where and how much oil is going to be obtained and how it is going to be delivered to Lithuania.

Many parties organizations, firms and individuals in Scandinavia are willing to help Lithuania. The Stockholm Bank has opened an account number 5720-1600 to assist Lithuania and it was the first to make a donation amounting to 100,000 dollars.

At the news conference held late at night yesterday the issue of the gold of the republic of Lithuania also came to the fore. That is the gold that was frozen in foreign banks in 1940. Although some of the foreign banks have even lost all documentation with regard to the Lithuanian gold, possible circumstances of the return of the gold to Lithuania are becoming the topic of serious consideration at present. It is estimated that in the banks of France, Great Britain, and Sweden there may be over seven tons of gold belonging to Lithuania.

Prunskiene on Canadian, U.S. Trip Postponement

*LD2404181890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Text] The situation in Lithuania and the processes linked with it remain the number one subject for a majority of politicians and mass media of the European and North American continents. Over to Boris Parkhomenko, commentator:

[Parkhomenko] Let me begin with a report which came to us in a somewhat roundabout way. Its source is in the capital's Sheremetyevo Airport. Subsequently it made its way to London and only after that, as a dispatch of the REUTER NEWS AGENCY, it landed in Mayak's editorial office. The Moscow correspondent of this agency reports that Kazimiera Prunskiene, chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, following her trip to Norway, Denmark, and Sweden made a stopover in Moscow and held a news conference at the airport. It is known that during her trip Prunskiene strove to achieve support for Lithuania's unilateral declaration of independence made on 11 March. A week later she intended to go to Canada and then to the United States. However, we were temporarily refused visas, stated Prunskiene, who was clearly dissatisfied.

Replying to correspondents' question why, in her view, was her trip postponed, Prunskiene refused to explain the reason, having said only: Compare the dates, think

about what is taking place in the world and everything will become clear to you. Here the chairman of Lithuania's Council of Ministers undoubtedly has in mind the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting and the United States' unwillingness to put its results at risk by any hasty decisions. Prunskiene's dissatisfaction is, of course, also caused by the fact that not a single Western government officially recognized Lithuania's independence.

Prunskiene's European cruise has given rise to what is, literally, a barrage of opinions, reactions, utterances, assessments, and forecasts. This is how the NTB [NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA] agency commented on the results of the Lithuanian delegation's visit to Oslo: The oil the Lithuanian prime minister succeeded in getting from Norway fits into a small flask given her by the representatives of the Høyre youth organization in Stavanger, the center of the Norwegian oil industry. Nonetheless, Prunskiene, at the end of her trip, expressed satisfaction with its results and thanked the Norwegians for their moral support, reports the agency.

As far as economic assistance is concerned, which was the main purpose of the trip, the results here are altogether nil, opined the local political observers. The results of Prunskiene's visits to Denmark and Sweden are assessed in more or less the same way. The \$100,000 donated to the republic by the U.S.-based European Investment Bank is a negligible consolation here. Harking back to the U.S. stance on this issue, let me cite the words of the prominent American public figure and director of the "World Citizens' Diplomacy," Douglas Mattern: The U.S. Administration or the U.S. Congress which are spending huge funds in support of the corrupt El Salvador regime, of the contra's subversive actions in Nicaragua, and which have perpetrated a military intervention in Panama does not have the moral right to criticize the USSR's positions vis-a-vis Lithuania, Mattern stated. The situation in Lithuania, echoed by THE NEW YORK TIMES observer, and the entire process of reforms in the Soviet Union, will be lengthy, uneven, and difficult. At every pothole along this road the U.S. Administration will discover the correctness of its policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is being disputed by voices from the right, from the left, and from the center. It is precisely for this reason that the fragile mechanism of detente, which has been achieved through suffering with so many difficulties by the leaders of the two great powers, should not be turned into a hostage of the so-called Lithuanian problem.

Effects of Lithuanian Fuel Shortages Seen

PM2404153490 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN
in Russian 25 Apr 90 p 3

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent N. Lashkevich report under the rubric "News From the Republics": "Realism or Arrogance?"]

[Text] Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]—So the Lithuanian parliament's response to the message

from the USSR president and the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers is now known. Adopt no new political legislative acts before 1 May, call on the Soviet Union to renounce "economic violence," and propose the holding of consultations about talks, to which end a plenipotentiary delegation of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet is to be sent to Moscow. That, in brief, is the essence of the resolution adopted by Lithuanian deputies. More constructive proposals, in particular on the suspension of the 11 March act of independence, were not passed.

Meanwhile Lithuania's economy is on the brink of an abyss toward which its romantically inclined politicians have recently been pushing it vigorously. Silence reigns in the streets of Vilnius, cars are rarities. Every driver is today feverishly doing complicated mental arithmetic: How can the strictly rationed 30-liter gasoline allowance be stretched to last a month? Some of the undying breed of "shadow" economy dealers and skilled speculators are busy with different arithmetic—calculating the possible profits: In the conditions of an acute shortage, there is very fertile soil for machinations. Individual cab drivers, whose numbers have declined sharply in the last few days, are increasing tariffs—they are "robbing" passengers of 40-60 kopeks a kilometer.

Economists are also calculating the probable and, indeed, already real damage. Thus as a result of the reduction in energy supplies by 40 percent, the total losses, it appears, will amount to about R600,000 a day. The energy system, not counting the Ignalina Nuclear Power Station, which is still idle for technical reasons, has enough resources for barely two weeks. Whereas formerly the daily norm for natural gas deliveries to Lithuania was 18 million cubic meters, now it is only 3.5 million, and the 0.6 million cubic meters of gas which the republic has to hand over to Kaliningrad Oblast should be deducted from that figure. In short, it is enough to make a sensible person's head spin.

True, judging by the Lithuanian parliamentarians' response, they cannot be said to possess the qualities of pragmatists and realists. Vague hopes pinned on the West, which "will certainly help," or on Norwegian or Danish oil are not yet proving justified and in general can hardly be practicable. Indeed, tankers from the Scandinavian countries are surely not going to enter Soviet waters without the USSR's permission...

In the countryside the situation is rather better. Primarily because agricultural machinery, as you know, mainly operates on diesel fuel, and there are stocks of this in the republic. And also the delivery norms have not been reduced as drastically as for, say, gasoline or gas. L. Asmonatas, the republic's new minister of the power engineering, stated the other day that "there is no need to restrict diesel fuel." However, after visiting Shvenchenskiy Rayon I became convinced that the reverse is true: They are restricting it, and it is possible that the norms will be lowered even further.

"Some 80 percent of the former daily norm for diesel fuel is currently being issued for agricultural needs"—V. Baranauskas, deputy chairman of the rayon soviet executive committee, cited these figures—"and 60 percent of gasoline. What are we going to do? Luckily we have almost finished the sowing. The solution lies in strict control and a policy of rigorous thrift in fuel and energy resources. We will send certain categories of drivers on leave. But it is already clear that this will not solve all the problems. How can we control it? How can we ensure fair distribution? Whereas formerly the rayon received 1,105 tonnes of gasoline per quarter for agriculture, now the figure is less than 700 tonnes."

True, there are few grounds for optimism. Especially as regards gas supplies. In Lithuania's villages 80 percent of farmers use liquefied gas. According to specialists' calculations, stocks are sufficient for 17 days. And then? In Shvenchenskiy Rayon they have decided to issue gas canisters only to a certain category of rural inhabitants—mainly those living in prefabricated houses manufactured at the Alitus house building combine.

That is not to mention the fact that the fuel shortage will instantly affect the efficient utilization of all agricultural equipment in general. It is very likely that even the limited quantity of fuel that is entering and will enter Lithuania will in the near future simply have nowhere to go. The point is that serious holdups have occurred with the supply of equipment to the Lithuanian countryside. For instance, Belorussia, as A. Brazauskas, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, has stated, has already refused to deliver certain types of tractors, loaders, and other machines. Lithuania has managed to conclude contracts for deliveries of only 40 percent of the quantity it needs. Hitches are already occurring in the supply of chemicals. The Jonava nitrogenous fertilizers plant is on the brink of a stoppage.

In short, there are signs of a very acute economic crisis. For decades, Lithuania has been linked to the country's economy by a great many ties. By putting itself outside the Union through its declaration of independence, the republic deliberately broke these ties. Despite all the rosy predictions, the political secession from Union structures entailed purely economic consequences. And on this point the Lithuanian government had no program. Could the Lithuanian parliamentarians seriously have believed that the USSR Government would regard with equanimity unilateral legal acts that strike at its authority and perhaps its economy?

And the most important thing is—have all these acts brought the long-awaited independence closer, has it become a reality for the republic? Probably, on the contrary, the contours of that independence have now become even more vague. Representatives of the Lithuanian Communist Party in parliament, who have declared themselves publicly as an opposition force for the first time during these tense days, propose one of the most sensible options for resolving the problem: to declare a kind of moratorium on laws affecting bilateral interests.

But it is doubtful whether the deputies representing Sajudis will heed the voice of reason. Furthermore at the second Sajudis Congress, which ended its work last Sunday, there were calls for the Lithuanian Communist Party to be declared a "criminal" organization. Calls which, incidentally, got a good deal of applause. Common sense and realism are today, alas, once again drowning in a sea of arrogant euphoria and ultimatums from certain leaders of Sajudis and the Lithuanian parliament.

Further on Gas Shortages

LD2404195390 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 24 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by special correspondents A. Shashkov and I. Kutub-Zade in Vilnius]

[Text] Today, as in preceding days incidentally, Lithuania is living with the worries connected with the decision to cut supplies of oil and bar supplies of natural gas to the republic. Outwardly this is manifested only in lines at the gas pumps, it is true, and in the fact that there are less vehicles on the streets. Otherwise Vilnius is continuing its usual daily life. [video shows street scenes, vehicles lining up for gas] You start to feel the tense rhythm on opening the local papers. [video shows newspapers at kiosk] Incidentally this is almost the biggest shortage in the capital of the republic, if, of course, you do not count fuel. Yesterday the Mazeikiai oil refinery stopped work. From 24 April the procedure for the distribution of certain petroleum products has been tightened. Now gas will not be available for drivers of vehicles from trade unions, the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation and Navy, party organizations, committees of the party and the All-Union Leninist Youth League and some other public organizations. Only 10 liters of gas a day is allocated to other official car transportation. Private motorists have to be satisfied with 30 liters a month. Difficulties are being experienced by practically all industrial enterprises in the republic.

[R.A. Tarasevicius, Lithuanian deputy minister of material resources of Lithuania, identified by screen caption] At the Ekranas television tube factory: of three furnaces for making television tubes two furnaces are now only being maintained at half heat and one furnace has been left on four percent of capacity. At the Okeanskiy cement works: It has fuel oil for only five days, so it will work at half capacity for 10 days. On half capacity it will produce only a fraction of the cement the country needs.

[Correspondent] The republic's Supreme Soviet is looking for ways out of the crisis, as is the Lithuanian Council of Ministers commission regulating the economic situation which is headed by Algirdas Brazauskas. As an economy the number of bus services has been reduced. Lithuanian television has from today stopped daytime transmissions and the second channel of Central Television is not transmitting during the daytime.

Some hopes are being pinned on the visit by Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene to the Scandinavian countries. Late last night she returned to Vilnius. The ever optimistic premier said she naturally had not brought any oil in her suitcase but her trip was successful. [video shows meeting, Prunskiene at press conference] For instance, an account in aid of Lithuania has been opened at a Swedish bank. I remind you that according to the calculations of the Brazauskas commission the republic needs \$5 million a day just for fuel and energy expenditure. So the solution of Lithuania's economic problems lies in the field of politics.

Correspondent Reports on Conditions in Lithuania

LD2404175690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
 1500 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Correspondent Elena Kurkleyte in Vilnius speaks with commentator Vladimir Bezyayev]

[Text] [Kurkleyte] I'll start with the Lithuanian government communique on the republic's economic situation, which is published daily in the republican newspapers. Today's communique says that during the past 24 hours there were no centralized deliveries to Lithuania from the USSR. Enterprises are operating on leftover raw materials. The Lithuanian government has instructed its representative attached to the USSR Council of Ministers to obtain on demand official documents announcing the economic blockade of Lithuania. He was instructed to find out precisely which goods had deliveries stopped under the conditions of the Soviet Departments' unauthorized widening of the list of blocked materials.

[Bezyayev] Can you cite specific examples of the fact that, apart from oil and restricted gas supplies, deliveries of other materials have been stopped, as you said?

[Kurkleyte] Yes, there are many such examples. For instance, Alytus refrigerator works has been idle for the second day. It previously manufactured 1,400 refrigerators daily. They were delivered to many republics as well as to foreign countries. The works is not being supplied with metal and a few other materials. All this is being blocked on the railway under the instructions of the Railways Ministry.

[Bezyayev] You have said that reports are being published. Evidently, some definite figures summing up the results of these work stoppages are given in these reports?

[Kurkleyte] A special commission dealing with the issues of the economic blockade meets daily at the Lithuanian Council of Ministers. This Commission discusses not only urgent matters but also tries to surmise the damage. As academician Eduardas Vilkas said recently, the initial damage inflicted on the Lithuanian economy by the economic sanctions amounts to R1,000 million, which amounts to R10,000 million if one counts up the damage for the entire country.

[Bezyayev] You know that the president's message to the country indicated precisely where the original cause lies and where the consequences lie. I would like your view as to what the attitude to all this is of people—for instance, workers.

[Kurkleyte] Well, you know, there are different attitudes. On the whole, the inhabitants of Lithuania are reacting to the situation with restraint. Even at the gasoline pumps where private car drivers are lining up for gasoline—they are issued with 30 liters of gasoline a month and many official cars are issued with 10 liters a day—there are no commotions or disturbances, even though one has to wait for four and five hours. It is difficult to predict how such a situation will evolve because next week many other enterprises will cease operating, too. Vilnius was deserted yesterday. It was already midnight when I returned home after Kazimiera Prunskiene's press conference and I had to wait for the bus for almost an hour. Many streets were barely lit and some streets were entirely unlit—electricity is being saved.

[bezyayev] Excuse me, what was said at that press conference, in particular about the assistance from Scandinavian countries?

[Kurkleyte] Kazimiera Prunskiene replied to just such persistent questions: Of course I couldn't bring any oil with me in my suitcase, but the first contacts have been established and some firms are promising concrete assistance. One of the Swedish banks has opened an account in aid of Lithuania and the first remittances are already reaching the aid foundation.

Well, this is a brief account of what was said at a fairly lengthy press conference. That is all my news from Lithuania.

Exports Cut to USSR; Ozalas Cables Ryzhkov

LD2404132690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian
 1100 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Romualdas Ozalas, the deputy prime minister of the republic of Lithuania, has sent Nikolay Ryzhkov a telegram. We now quote it in abridged form.

Because of the sharp reduction in the supply of natural gas and the halt in the supplies of oil and other materials, raw and otherwise, the government of the republic of Lithuania has, since 19 April 1990, been obliged to switch the national economy to a special regime of work. A continuation of the economic blockade will inevitably result in the complete stoppage in the next few days of a significant proportion of the republic's industrial enterprises and consequently in the complete halt to the supply of a whole range of goods and commodities produced by them both for the USSR's domestic market and for export. These include, gasoline for cars, diesel fuel, fuel oil, mineral fertilizers, man-made fibers, plastics, fuel pumps for diesel engines, autocompressor [word indistinct] for car braking systems, motors and compressors for household appliances, color television

tubes, integrated circuits, other [words indistinct] for special purpose (?radio measuring) and audio-recording apparatus, domestic video and tape-recorders, televisions and refrigerators, [word indistinct] assortment in the sphere of light industry and other things.

The state of affairs is being worsened by the blockade imposed by the Ministry of Railways on rail freight, including foodstuffs being sent from other republics by direct agreement for consumers in Lithuania. It is essential for the USSR Ministry of Railways to ensure the immediate passage of freight sent to consumers in the republic, and not to designate it as export goods. Moreover, labor collectives are seriously concerned about the significant delay in settling accounts for the supply of products (?by means of offsetting accounts against one another in) the USSR State Bank. This results in delays in paying wages and in suppliers dispatching goods. With the object of normalizing the accounting system, as of 1 May this year the republic is to start organizing the offsetting of accounts in Vilnius. The USSR State Bank should give similar instructions to banking institutions in the USSR.

Gasoline Restrictions Introduced in Lithuania

*LD2404135590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian
1100 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Text] Effective today, the distribution of some petroleum products has been restricted: Until 20 May, gasoline will not be supplied to vehicles used by trade unions, the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, sports organizations, party and Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] committees, driving schools, or other public organizations. If the situation does not change, there will be a further announcement on supplies of gasoline. Local organizations of the Lithuanian Society of Invalids should draw up lists of their members who own cars and pass them on to their local petroleum products base. They will be allowed 100 liters of gasoline per month. Ten liters of gasoline a day are allowed to cars on official duty, and 50 liters to heavy goods vehicles.

Vehicles are to be filled once a day. As of today, filling stations are forbidden to serve vehicles from local organizations that have their own gasoline pumps. All 13 of the republic's oil bases are to be manned from 0900 to 2100. The telephone number of the duty officer at the Lithuanian petroleum products and fuel supply enterprise is 62-41-85.

Lithuanian Statement Calls for Economy Measures

*LD2404102390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian
0900 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Statement read by government spokesman Jursenas]

[Text] I will read excerpts from a government statement: In view of the shortages of fuel, power, and material resources it is recommended that industrial associations

and enterprises advance the planned overhaul of installations and change the system of work at enterprises by organizing shift work at night and during days off, by instructing associations, enterprises, and economic organizations situated on the republic's territory—irrespective of their departmental subordination—to organize the calculation of losses caused by the economic blockade and to submit this information in standard form to the statistical department of the republic's government.

In view of the fact that the republic's revenue has declined because of the economic blockade, it is recommended that the Ministry of Finances be instructed to examine a reduction in financing [words indistinct] and to submit corresponding proposals to the republic's government.

And there is yet another point: to recommend to the heads of associations and enterprises to close accounts in debit, open account in credit, and adopt austerity measures for the use of currency.

The protocol was signed by Vice Premier Romualdas Ozolas.

Lithuanian Broadcasts Cut To Save Energy

*LD2404144590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian
1100 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Text] Due to the USSR's energy blockade, as of today, to conserve electricity, the following system for broadcasting programs is being introduced:

The Second Program of Lithuanian radio, which is broadcast on wavelength 271 meters and on ultrashort waves, operates daily from 0700 to 2400. The ultrashort wave transmitters which relay the Second Program of All-Union Radio will operate daily from 0600 to 2400. Cable transmissions will take place daily from 0600 to 2400. On work days Lithuanian television will broadcast the program "Good Morning," and will resume its television programs at 1800. The nighttime broadcast of USSR television's First Program will not be relayed. On work days the Second Program of USSR television will be broadcast from 1730 to closing. On 26 April the 24-hour "Chernobyl telethon", beginning at 2300, will be broadcast in its entirety. Further schedule clarifications will be made as the blockade situation develops.

Lithuanian Official Discusses Blockade Impact

*LD2404141990 Prague CTK in English 1334 GMT
24 Apr 90*

[Text] Vilnius April 24 (CTK correspondent)—Lithuania is working intensively to prevent or at least lessen as much as possible the impact of the Soviet sanctions.

Lithuanian parliament Deputy Chairman Kazimieras Motieka have told CTK that even harder steps are expected to be taken mainly in connection with the

danger of increasing speculations with goods in which the country is lacking. This has been apparent in the sale of fuels so far, he said. He did not exclude the possibility of introduction of rationing.

Speaking about the prospects of foreign aid, the Lithuanian official said they were obviously little, as confirmed by last week's visit by Lithuanian Premier Kazimiera Prunskiene in Norway, Denmark and Sweden. This means that Lithuania must seek a solution mainly in talks with Moscow. Vilnius is aware of this although it attempts to strengthen the influence of foreign countries. Therefore it still strives to resume the broken contacts. Some deputies of the Supreme Council speak about certain hopes connected with the Lithuanian parliamentary delegation currently on a mission in the Soviet capital, Mr. Motieka said and added that a turn is expected this week.

TASS Reviews Lithuania's Economic Downturn

LD2404150290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1335 GMT 24 Apr 90

[By TASS special correspondent Boris Zverev]

[Text] Vilnius, 24 Apr (TASS)—More and more negatives features are appearing in the Lithuanian economy, giving the new government fewer and fewer grounds for optimism.

As the TASS correspondent was told at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU), the increase in industrial production in the first quarter of this year compared with the same period last year has fallen significantly. The number of enterprises failing to meet their contractual obligations has increased. By comparison with last year, production fell at 163 enterprises (39.5 percent of the total number). Plans for oil refining, production of metal cutting machine tools, computer technology, and woollen fabrics have not been met. Food production has fallen by four percent compared with the same period last year.

For the most part, the reason for the situation that has developed in the republic is being presented as the economy's transition to working in conditions of economic isolation as well as the political events of the past few weeks, which have led to the leadership of the USSR taking measures to review economic relations with Vilnius, once it had declared its independence from the Soviet Union.

As a result the republic is no longer receiving oil from the USSR and only a small amount of gas is arriving in Lithuania. According to Algirdas Brazauskas, deputy premier of Lithuania, speaking recently at the republican parliament, vehicle fuel reserves in Lithuania are only sufficient for one month providing they are used economically. There is hardly any motor oil in the republic, which could bring the date on which motor transportation comes to a halt significantly closer. Lithuania's state rayon power station is on the verge of ceasing to operate

because of a shortage of fuel. It is literally a matter of days before the refrigerator factory, a number of chemical enterprises, the confectionary factories, and the glass works stop work. Moreover, Lithuania does not have the necessary currency stocks to make purchases abroad.

All of this is already leading to increased dissatisfaction among a population which is forced to limit its needs. Clearly aware of this, Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, has called on the inhabitants to prepare for deprivations. Speaking on republican television, he stated that "great, very great deprivation will be a trail for everyone." Vytautas Landsbergis expressed hope that the Lithuanians are resolved to endure deprivations. He also hopes for aid from abroad.

It was with this specific aim that Kazimiera Prunskiene, head of the Lithuanian government, made her trip abroad. Back in Lithuania from her visit to Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, she told journalists that during her trip she had considered various versions of cooperation with other countries. At the same time she stubbornly declined to answer questions related to specific possibilities for obtaining aid from abroad, making reference as she did so to "commercial, business, and political confidentiality."

"In essence, the only form of possible cooperation named by the premier was an offer by one of the countries of help in training specialists."

In reply to a question on the possibility of using the gold deposited in foreign banks by Lithuania's government before the establishment of Soviet power in the republic to purchase oil, Prunskiene said, "That is too specific a matter, and one that needs to mature."

Lithuanian Council Forms Antiblockade Commission

LD2404191490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1819 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius, 24 Apr (TASS)—The session of the republic's Supreme Soviet continued its work in the Lithuanian capital today.

Following the elimination of the People's Control Committee, a special department fulfilling the functions of state control was formed in the structure of the state system of Lithuania. The law "On State Control" will enable its activity to be regulated. The draft of this document was the main topic of the parliamentarians' discussion.

The deputies approved at the first reading the draft law "On The State Budget," which determines the budget structure of Lithuania and stipulates budgets for local self-government.

Under a Supreme Soviet decision, a so-called "Commission for Preparation of Antiblockade Measures" was formed, of which Kazimiera Prunskiene, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, became the head.

Ceslovas Vytautas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, became her deputy.

The session is continuing its work.

Commission Meets

LD2404171690

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1020 GMT on 24 April carries a report by political commentator Benas Rupeika from the current session of the Lithuanian government's anti-blockade commission.

Rupeika begins by saying that there have been no arguments or heated discussions; the submitted proposals were well-substantiated and realistic. Algirdas Brazauskas, chairman of this commission, presides over the session, which is also attended by Romuladas Ozolas and Kazimiera Prunskiene.

Algirdas Brazauskas asks the minister responsible for gas supplies to deliver his report. The minister says:

"During the last 24 hours we have been working normally, with consumption exceeding 136,000 [units not stated] above the permitted amount; however, the administration of the main gas pipeline did not demand that we return to the limits, and so far we are going to continue this consumption." The minister speaks about the imposed schedule of operation for enterprises using gas. He says that liquid gas has been delivered according to the plan for April.

Continuing, the minister states that demand in power has decreased for two reasons: the blockade and seasonal adjustment. Some 5,000 tonnes of fuel oil has been used since the start of the blockade; heating systems in people's homes have been disconnected; specific enterprises and their needs for fuel oil have been discussed, and ways of finding reserve supplies of fuel oil have been looked into.

Next, a speaker delivering a report about cement production states that the main cement production enterprise is still transporting cement out of the republic. A. Brazauskas says that cement is of great value and once it is out of the republic it will be impossible to get it back. Speakers comment on the difficulties that the cement production enterprise is facing: lack of gasoline causes delays in the transportation of cement out of the enterprise, when at the same time many customers, including private citizens, badly need cement.

It is reported that sugar production enterprises will remain operational for six more days. It is stated that three cargo ships were directed away from Lithuania with a cargo of about 20,000 tonnes of sugar. There are 2,000 tonnes of sugar in a ship which was in Kaliningrad but the railway refused to transport it to Lithuania. It is noted that soap production enterprises and tobacco companies also have some problems because of the

shortage of some vital ingredients. Flour supplies will last for another month; beer enterprises are operating normally.

Reports on the supplies of some vital food products such as salt are also given; salt supplies stand at 8,800 tonnes. Other foodstuffs such as milk products have problems with their packaging because of disrupted supplies of special paper. It is stated that contractual obligations on the part of the Soviet Union have not been met for the first quarter of this year. These obligations now have obviously been thrown out altogether, while Lithuania has been delivering food products according to these contractual obligations. Minister Knasys says that a telegram was sent to Moscow informing the Soviet Government that as a result of the failure to fulfill the contractual obligations Lithuania is compelled to discontinue supplies to the Soviet Union.

Next, the minister says that on the other hand the failure to supply the combined fodder products was not altogether malicious: the existing allocations of products for Lithuania were on paper only. Therefore, Knasys says, agriculture and livestock raising should now be restructured. He says that the number of pigs reared should be reduced, piglets should be sold only to people raising animals. These would be left in the farms so that livestock raising could be started any time again. As a result of shortage of combined fodder supplies the production of meat will be reduced by about 50 percent.

Following this, possibilities of receiving paint materials from Poland are discussed, although doubts are raised on whether these products would be allowed in. At this point K. Prunskiene, the prime minister of the republic, joins in the discussion.

Prunskiene gives an account of her trip to Scandinavia and describes how she was received. She says that practical proposals were rather similar everywhere. They wanted to know what goods Lithuania needed and to be told how these goods could be delivered:

"I do not want to elaborate on each point here. It is very clear we have to make a list of what we need from the Scandinavian states. It has become clear who and where the help could come from.

Prunskiene says that Denmark is prepared to help with keeping communication lines in operation. She says that many countries expressed their readiness to help, including Israel. On the possibilities of foreign trade she says:

"The possibilities of selling cement, and transporting it across the Baltic Sea in a very convenient way may be difficult. However, the Scandinavian states have already expressed interest in buying cement if we are in a position to handle the produce ourselves. Esteemed A. Brazauskas says that trade across the border has not yet been hampered."

We think that the greatest obstacle at the moment is the fact that we do not know precisely if we have guarantees for ships to enter the port. I was asked in what capacity ships could enter the port." "In brief there are a great many possibilities. We have to group these possibilities according to the specific needs as well as according to the states. For example, oil from Sweden or Norway, but not from Denmark.

"Yesterday I spoke to Sopchak, chairman of the Moscow soviet. He said that they are meeting today and that he would have liked to have visited us this week or at least to have contacted us.

"There is a shortage of food in Leningrad. Leningrad will do everything to break through the transportation blockade. We spoke about the need for us to get control of the railway system in the Baltic region. The railway link with Leningrad could be in operation without the dictate of the center." "These (?programs) between us and Leningrad should be clearly specified so that we know what they could supply us with."

Romualdas Ozolas says: "When will the port of Klaipeda be suitable to receive (?oil) and what type of ships can enter it? What type of transportation do we need to distribute imported goods all over Lithuania? It may be that a cargo ship will be in port and we will be standing there helplessly on the shore."

Prunskiene responds: "Of course, there is also a chance that a ship from abroad will not be allowed to enter the Lithuanian port, creating a cold blockade [as heard]. However, in spite of this we should make every effort so that the ships will come and so that we will receive the goods. This is a much better approach. I would like to stress this point again: Making it impossible for the West to trade with us should be regarded by these countries as harmful to their own interests."

"I think we are worrying too much about ports. Our dry cargo port is operating perfectly and I do not see why we should not be able to receive dry cargo. The problem is of a legal nature. There are no technical problems at the port of Klaipeda. Any cargo, any dry cargo can be unloaded at Klaipeda port.

Brazauskas says that the legal points of receiving cargo through the port of Klaipeda should be clarified by the port's customs services. Minister Asmontas is entrusted with this task. "By the way, yesterday we had the director of this port here with us. He brought a request list with him specifying what was needed in order to prepare the port for the reception of light [as heard] products, including crude oil. This work has been undertaken by the ministry. The minister is sitting right here. Together with your departments the schedule must be worked out within two days." "I think these should be the specific actions to deal with the port."

Shot Reportedly Fired at Vilnius Barracks

LD2404185590 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1820 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Report by TASS Special Correspondent Boris Zverev]

[Text] Vilnius 24 Apr (TASS)—On Monday [23 April], unknown persons fired at a troop unit barracks on the territory of the Lithuanian capital, releasing one shot, probably from a combat weapon.

A TASS correspondent was informed by Major Aleksey Kirichenko of the Soviet Army that at approximately 2200 hours [1800 GMT] when all the soldiers were already in the barracks, a single shot was fired at the open window of one of the buildings. The bullet came through the open window and went out the window on the opposite wall, breaking the glass. Judging by the hole, the experts believe the shot was from a combat weapon and not a hunting weapon.

The relevant authorities are conducting an investigation into the incident.

Decree Augments KGB Border Forces in Lithuania

LD2404133990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1240 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 24 Apr (TASS)—In accordance with a decree from the USSR president, measures have been taken by USSR KGB border troops to strengthen protection of the USSR state border on the territory of Lithuania. According to Anatoliy Parakhin, a representative of USSR KGB border troops headquarters at a briefing here today, the units and subunits of USSR KGB border troops guarding the state frontier on Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] territory have been strengthened by additional forces and equipment. The number of border details [naryad] has thus been increased.

Protection of the sea frontier has also been strengthened. In particular, control has been established "over possible contacts between Soviet ships and foreign ships in territorial waters and within the USSR economic zone in order to prevent weapons and ammunition from being transferred into Lithuania."

Control has also been strengthened over movement across the frontier by people and all forms of transport and freight at border crossing points.

More on Border Situation

PM2404174390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 6

[F. Ivanov article: "Trouble on the Borders"]

[Text] A joint briefing of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and USSR KGB border troops has been held regarding the situation on a number of sectors of the USSR state border.

As Colonel A. Parakhin, chief of a section of the USSR KGB border troops staff, noted, the checking of all types of transport and freight and all foreign vessels has been stepped up.

During the examination of the MV [merchant vessel] Marat Kozlov at the "Klaipeda" checkpoint on 12 April, customs and border services officials seized a container in which they found 240 tonnes of munitions—mainly cartridges and 12mm and 16mm hunting rifles. The cargo had been dispatched by the Soviet-West German company Transnautik, based in Hamburg. The recipient is the Lithuanian foreign trade firm Litimpeks.

Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic: The republic People's Front is inciting people to cross the border in protest against the existing border with Romania along the Prut River and are demanding that it be moved to the River Dnestr. People's Front leaders are also demanding the removal of the border installations [inzhenernyye zagrazhdeniya]. Violations of the state border have become more frequent. In the past three months there were more than 30, in April more than 10.

Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic: Since mid-January 9,000 USSR citizens and 7,000 Iranians have been detained. They were found to be carrying R155,000 and 7 million Iranian rials and contraband worth R700,000 was confiscated along with 260 weapons and 250,000 units of ammunition. In a number of cases armed clashes occurred while border violators were being arrested. Two were killed, one was seriously wounded.

USSR Official Discusses Lithuanian 'Deserters'

PM2404131290 London BBC Television Network
in English 2030 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Interview with Sergey Akhromeyev, presidential adviser and marshal of the Soviet Union, in Russian with superimposed English translation, by correspondent Jane Corbin, on BBC 2's "Panorama" program; time, place not given, "The Red Army Revolution"—recorded]

[Text] [Corbin] Last month tanks rolled through the capital of another republic in a show of strength aimed at forcing Lithuanians to abandon their declaration of independence, but in Vilnius, so far, the Army has stopped short of any real violence against civilians. But it was a different matter when it came to Lithuania's deserters: Troops broke into their refuges in hospitals and returned them forcibly to their units. The Army was sending a clear signal to conscripts in all the troubled republics.

[Akhromeyev] The Army did not interfere in this situation: The Army just ensured the protection of some buildings. But the Army did intervene in one respect: It looked for Lithuanian soldiers who had deserted and took them back to their units. There is a law regarding

conscription, according to which young people must serve in the Soviet Armed Forces. This law is going to be adhered to.

[Corbin] The Army's current restraint in Lithuania is conditioned in part by awareness of likely reaction at home and in the West. Lithuania is a European republic, not an Asian Muslim one. But despite the lessons of Azerbaijan, senior military figures haven't ruled out the use of force in Lithuania.

[Akhromeyev] I think everything will be normal if both sides follow a peaceful path and abide strictly by the Constitution and the law in order to solve this problem. But if the Lithuanian separatists break the law, then we will take measures to enforce the law. That's it.

[Corbin] Are you prepared to use force, if necessary?

[Akhromeyev] You know, I have served in the Armed Forces for half a century. I'm a big military man. I'm afraid of nothing.

Girenko Hears Vilnius Servicemen's Grievances

PM2504125790 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Captain Second Rank V. Gromak: "Meeting at Officers' Center"]

[Text] A. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who had been taking part in the work of the 21st Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) Congress, met 22 April with Armed Forces veterans, Vilnius Garrison servicemen, and members of their families.

The Officers' Center auditorium was full. Speeches were made by Major General A. Visotskis, republic military commissar; Rear Admiral P. Kashauskas, first deputy chief of the Baltic Fleet Military Directorate; Colonel A. Starodub, officer's wife L. Lobnova, and Armed Forces veterans.

What did they discuss? In Lithuania servicemen discharged into the reserve have been stripped of their right to residence permits or to be registered for and receive housing. At the Vilnius Garrison alone there are more than 600 families without apartments; one family in every five lives on the territory of the military units. Resolutions stipulating temporary residence permits for the units' officers and members of their families without accommodation have been suspended. Family members of officers and warrant officers without residence permits are left without medical care and cannot find work. Paradoxical situations sometimes arise: An officer may have a child, and the child cannot be registered. There have been increasingly frequent attacks on officers, servicemen's apartments have been set alight, and there have been cases of violence against their families.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary answered numerous questions from those present and assured

them that people's alarm and concern would be brought to the attention of the USSR president.

Further on Split of Lithuanian Communist Party

PM2404134390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 24 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by G. Fedorov: "Bringing the People the Truth"]

[Text] The delegates to the 21st Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party [LCP] assembled 21 April, on the eve of V.I. Lenin's 120th birthday, in the Vilnius Higher Party School assembly hall. To be more accurate, it was the section of the party that has remained loyal to the CPSU platform and the teaching of Marxism-Leninism. The 768 delegates who turned up at the congress, out of the 789 who were elected, represented around 40,000 Leninist communists. They are all that remains after the split in the 200,000-strong LCP at its last, 20th congress, at which the majority of Lithuanian communists formed the so-called independent republican Communist Party, which left the CPSU. However, looking ahead, we can echo certain contributors to the debate at the 21st congress and say that the minority ranks are slowly but surely beginning to grow, with party members returning to the CPSU-orientated LCP. The congress stressed that both the CPSU Central Committee platform and the recently published CPSU Central Committee open letter to the country's communists have had a beneficial influence on this process.

It would be no exaggeration to say that never before have the Lithuanian communists assembled at a congress in such a difficult social and political situation. Delivering the LCP Central Committee political report, First Secretary M. Burokevicius described the situation as dramatic and as a threat to the future of socialism in Lithuania. Six weeks ago, the new Supreme Soviet, which is dominated by members of the "Sajudis" nationalist, separatist movement, unilaterally adopted an act of independence and restoration of Lithuania's autonomous statehood on the basis of its bourgeois Constitution of 1938. It was essentially a coup d'etat daily deepening the restoration of the capitalist system in Lithuania.

In these conditions, the independent LCP is willy-nilly following in the wake of "Sajudis" policy, while the LCP (CPSU platform) is forced to operate semilegally, as it were. The leader of the former, A. Brazauskas, who was heavily instrumental in splitting the LCP, dispersing communists to different sides of the barricades, and, as a result, helping "Sajudis" proteges win the elections to the Supreme Soviet, has now been squeezed out of the leading role in the republic's life by "Sajudis" and has to be content with the post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. And the leaders of the LCP (CPSU platform)—M. Burokevicius, V. Shved, and others, are actually being persecuted and harassed by Lithuania's

official and unofficial leaders, the media, and participants in all manner of rallies and demonstrations organized by "Sajudis." LCP Central Committee members are being labeled traitors of the Lithuanian people, "agents" of Moscow, betrayers of the nation, and stagnationists.

"Sajudis" people, who have seized key positions in legislative, executive, law enforcement, and economic organs and on newspaper and journal editorial boards, are supplying the people with disinformation and distorting the truth about perestroika in the country.

The keynote speaker and V. Pavlovich, fitter at the "Vilma" production association in Vilnius; S. Tolautas, milling machine operator at the Vilnius calculating machine plant; party workers and activists Ch. Vysotskiy, P. Kasauskas, V. Pirogov, V. Lazutko, I. Vidmantas, J. Abramavicius, and Yu. Slivovskiy; servicemen Z. Dzarakhokhov and V. Nosov; and members of the intelligentsia K. Surblis and P. Sapkevich, who spoke after him; paid a great deal of attention to analyzing the situation at local level, to ways of resolving it, and to forms and methods of work by party organizations and committees in these conditions.

At the congress there was mention of, among other things, the growing social polarization of society in the conditions of the economic and political crisis in the republic. Seven percent of the inhabitants of Lithuania possess approximately one-half of the funds accumulated by the population. It is above all this milieu, people who grow rich via the shadow economy, which is producing the new leaders of the nation, heralds of a Lithuania free from and independent of socialist ideals. These people are primarily interested in restoring the bourgeois order, which will make it possible to capitalize on what has been accumulated. Communists are obliged to explain to ordinary working people who is summoning them in what direction, waving tricolors derived from Lithuania's bourgeois past. Stalin's deportations and repressions and the flaws of the administrative-edict system were, of course, a heavy blow to the young Union republics. But just as you have to see through the trees to the wood, you have to look beyond the tragic mistakes of the past and see the truly historic, majestic transformations that have taken place in the Neman region in the years since the war, the fundamental improvement in the Lithuanian people's life, which no unprejudiced inhabitant of Lithuania can deny. The 80-fold increase in industrial output, the transformation of Lithuania from an agrarian backwater of Europe into a developed industrial republic, and the flourishing of the creative powers of the Lithuanian intelligentsia, of culture, and of art are a fine characterization of the ground covered by postwar Lithuania in the 50 years of Soviet power.

Just the first stage of the congress is over. At it there was a discussion of the political report and the LCP Central Committee and LCP Central Control and Auditing Commission were elected. A congress resolution was adopted on the political situation in the Lithuanian

Soviet Socialist Republic. Mykolas Burokevicius was elected first secretary of the LCP Central Committee and Vladislav Shved was elected second secretary.

Report Views Impasse at Sajudis Congress

PM2504080990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Aleksandr Protsenko report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Impasse or Tunnel?"]

[Text] Vilnius—Sajudis as a union in support of perestroika no longer exists—now it is the Sajudis of Lithuania. The decision to change its name was taken at this sociopolitical movement's second congress, which culminated its work during the night of 23 April.

It was a "congress of victors" who did not really know until the very last moment what to do with their organization next. Brief pre-congress discussions and comments on television and in the press expressed at least three viewpoints: Sajudis has achieved its goal; it has brought to power new people who have declared the republic's independence; there is nothing else for it to do but disband so as not to hinder the development of democracy in Lithuania. The second view, conversely, holds that Sajudis should strengthen itself organizationally and reorganize as a political party. Finally, Sajudis should remain Sajudis—a people's movement supporting all who work for the good of Lithuania and opposing all who harm the republic and its citizens.

However, whereas a week ago delegates wanted a serious debate on the way that Lithuania is going today and how, in the past two days the situation changed drastically. The ending of oil supplies and the restriction of gas supplies which followed the well-known warning provoked an almost instinctive reaction of protest among delegates and many of the republic's inhabitants: They are "pressuring" us—we must close ranks and not give in.

It wasn't only at the congress that such a mood was in evidence—the day before it was clearly displayed in parliament at an extraordinary plenary session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, where the majority of deputies are Sajudis members or nominees. IZVESTIYA has already described how a certain breakthrough appeared in parliament during the Easter week—eventually there were calls to seek a compromise in relations with the USSR Government and a move away from positions of idealism to pragmatism.

But now the republic has been deprived of the bulk of its energy resources. A. Brazauskas, deputy prime minister, gave an analysis of the real state of affairs at a Supreme Soviet session 20 April. Confirming his adherence to the idea of the republic's independence and sovereignty, he warned delegates that only sensible compromises can save the economy from collapse.

Political decisions in Lithuania are taken by parliament, while responsibility for normal economic life in the republic rests with the government. Deputies thus faced a difficult task of choosing the correlation between political theory and economic practice—not for nothing is politics called the concentrated expression of economics. But what reply did one of the government's leaders receive? Accusations that he virtually supports a return to the old ways. That the government is working extremely poorly on practical decisions to enable Lithuania to survive the sanctions with minimum losses. There was even a charge that A. Brazauskas himself, who was Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee industry secretary for 10 years, did nothing at that time to reduce the republic's economic dependence on its "neighbors."

Nor did the speech by V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, shed any light. He tried to show that the republic's parliament has taken a quite lawful decision and that this should be recognized both by the USSR and the whole world.

The reduction of energy supplies to a minimum ensuring only the needs of the population really threatens to halt production at many enterprises. Parliament has proposed the creation of a special aid fund for people who may be left without pay and who may take to the streets to protest. One deputy even recommended that parliamentarians donate one-half of their salaries to the future unemployed. There was also a proposal to consider a way of switching workers from enterprises facing closure to the countryside, where there is a manpower shortage. And it was said that the republic must be ready to introduce a ration system for food and primary necessities...

That was how the discussion went in parliament. But at the Sajudis congress the next day I was astonished to hear an appeal to the inhabitants of Lithuania and to the republic's Supreme Soviet and government which, if the simultaneous translation is to be believed, contained the following words: "Sajudis urges people not to succumb to rumors about future unemployment..." The following was also said: "Possibly it will be necessary to endure one or two years of temporary difficulties, but those who fear them condemn the country to the plight of perpetual poverty..."

Life in the republic is taking its course. The Council of Ministers holds several sessions a day where it is explained that the USSR Government's sanctions are being joined by the absolutely unlawful independent action of railroad workers, who are virtually blocking the movement into Lithuania of trains bringing freight for the republic's enterprises, food, and commodities—even goods supplied under direct contracts. The republic's government has reported to Moscow that in the next few days many enterprises in Lithuania will close, thus halting the supply of a whole series of goods and products—television sets and cement, cable equipment and chemical fibers, cardboard and electric motors, mineral

fertilizers and food. In reply to a journalist's question on the principle governing the closure of enterprises, C. Jursenis, the government press spokesman, replied that politics has nothing to do with it here: When the supply of raw materials and components dries up, an enterprise will close.

Lithuania is a small republic, of course, and its resources are not very great compared with the Soviet Union as a whole. But for our extremely unbalanced economy any loss is keenly felt. So the losses will be mutual.

The atmosphere at the Sajudis congress did not seem out of the ordinary. Only the regularly adopted appeals—to citizens of the USSR in Lithuania, to "Democratic Russia," and so forth—demonstrated that tension is mounting and that the congress is no longer concerned solely with Lithuania's distant future but also and primarily with the current state of affairs and current problems. The congress decided that Sajudis will remain in the republic's political arena as a mass sociopolitical movement of the people, unconnected with any power structures. This movement also needs to decide what it is urging the people to do in the conditions that have been created and what path to take.

Just before midnight on Sunday a provisional action program was put to the congress. Briefly this document may be characterized as follows: There must be no compromise but unity and a readiness for difficulties and deprivations. That is the path that Sajudis is offering the Lithuanian people.

The situation is complex and tense. The republic's government is urging parliament to show common sense but parliament is afraid that the people—or more precisely Sajudis—will not support such common sense. On the other hand, the ending of energy supplies will begin to keenly affect the republic's daily life in the next few days and no one knows how the population will react to that. Sajudis' former leaders, now members of parliament, are no longer able to influence its decisions: Under the rules they do not even have the right to be members of the Seimas.

Lithuanian Prime Minister K. Prunskiene has returned from a tour of Scandinavia. A session of the government has been scheduled to discuss the results of the foreign trip and the situation in Lithuania.

Contrasting Views on Lituanian Moves Reported

90UN1437B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
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[Report on comments by Vytautis Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council; Vladislav Shved, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania (with the CPSU Platform); Arturas Paulauskas, republic prosecutor; Army General V. Varennikov, commander of USSR Ground Forces; Romualdas Ozolas, Lithuanian deputy prime minister; and Mindaugas Stakvilyavichyus, member of

the Lithuanian Supreme Council, first secretary of the Shyaulay city committee of the independent Communist Party of Lithuania: "Lithuania. The Alarming Spring of 1990"]

[Text] Each year R7.5 billion worth of goods are shipped into Lithuania and R6 billion worth are shipped out.

People walk along the streets under the clear Vilnius sky—local residents and people who have come here—quite a few of them, although there are fewer since the introduction of the "passport" system of trade. Institutes and plants, transportation and cafes are all functioning. The granite Lenin is extending his hand as usual, but the avenue on which he is standing bears not his name but that of the great Lithuanian prince Gediminas. And right next door it has been almost a month now that the new republic parliament has been meeting, the one that during the night of 11-12 March made the decision: Lithuania would withdraw from the USSR.

Some people consider the changes taking place in Lithuania to be a revolution while others call it a counterrevolutionary uprising. Our correspondent visited Lithuania last week, attended the meetings of the session of the republic Supreme Council, and met both with the leader and with the rank-and-file residents. Here are some excerpts from a couple of interviews that represent the most diverse viewpoints concerning the events that are taking place.

Vytautas LANDSBERGIS, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian republic:

Unfortunately, our neighboring country, the USSR, does not wish to recognize our independence and is doing everything possible to continue the conflict. Our sovereignty is constantly being violated. The Constitution of Lithuania is the only one in effect on the territory of Lithuania and they want us to observe the USSR Constitution, that is, the Constitution of another state. The government of the neighboring country is instructing its authorities to intervene in our internal affairs and to impose its policies. And still, although we can see that within the framework of the continuing conflict only unfavorable situations are possible, our position will be the traditional one—peace, social order and, I think, a refusal to resist force with force. In my view, moral, civil resistance would be more expedient.

Moscow recommended to all foreign embassies that they recall their citizens from Vilnius and in general to temporarily restrict their entry into the republic. And now we have learned that they have abolished the simple crossing of the Lithuanian-Polish border without a visa. This cannot be called anything except intervention in our internal affairs. Such actions on the part of the Soviet Government can undermine the process of detente throughout the world and cause a return to the times of confrontation and "cold war."

They brought me a copy of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA, published abroad as an organ of

the Communist Party of Lithuania. I went to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania and was told that they had nothing to do with it. On our agenda was a discussion of the law on political parties and we had to give a lot of thought about whom to consider a party, whom to consider a group, and whom to consider a branch of the foreign press, and to determine their rights accordingly. Moreover, we must look at the activity of certain parties in light of the new law on anti-state activity.

Vladislav SHVED, second secretary of the temporary Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania (with the CPSU Platform):

The USSR Constitution and laws have been violated in Lithuania today, the rights of Soviet people are being encroached on every hour, and all the republic's achievements over a half century are being nullified. Our main demands are not to adopt any laws that contradict Union laws and to protect Soviet citizens and their rights. But what is the republic Supreme Council doing? It is adopting a law on criminal liability for anti-state activity, a local variant of the notorious Article 58. Now a person who advocates a free socialist Lithuania as a part of the USSR can receive up to 10 years for this! There is your democracy and pluralism a la Sajudis!

We are accused of calling in the Soviet Army and therefore the buildings of the Central Committee and the city committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, the House of Political Education, and the Higher Party School were seized by paratroopers. There were no "takeovers"—you cannot take over something that already belongs to you by law. These buildings were built with the money of all members of the party of the Soviet Union, and the leadership of the independent Communist Party of Lithuania decided to give them to various institutions, centers for national problems, and cooperatives. We cannot allow this.

The republic leadership did not find it possible to allow the 40,000 communists of Lithuania to publish their newspaper—there was neither paper nor ink. But we were able to resume the publication of SOVETSKAYA LITVA, although, true, it was in Minsk. In the first issue we addressed the readers: "The newspaper is becoming an organ of the Communist Party of Lithuania. We are eliminating the words: 'with the CPSU Platform'... We do not need any additions or clarifications to the name of the party. They are needed by the so-called 'reorganized' Communist Party of Lithuania which has completely rejected Marxist-Leninist ideology and philosophy..., and has come under the thumb of blatant nationalists and apologists for the bourgeois system."

Arturas PAULAUSKAS, republic prosecutor:

Recently the leadership of the Soviet Union has been constantly making accusations that people's rights are being violated in our country, that crime is increasing, and it has become unsafe to live here. There is no serious

substantiation for any of these accusations. The commission of the USSR Procuracy which arrived in the republic is also making these reproaches. And the facts? I recently visited Shalchininskiy Rayon and checked to see how the requirements of our Constitution are being met and the rights of citizens are being protected. There was an appeal to residents in the press about this. But during these two weeks I found only one female citizen who had complained about the executive committee which would not allow her to purchase a home...

On the other hand, the laws are being violated in the grossest way by the Soviet troops. Supposedly at the request of the leadership of the Communist Party of Lithuania (on the CPSU Platform) divisions of paratroopers in Vilnius took over the buildings of the Central Committee and gorkom [city party committee] of the Communist Party of Lithuania, the House of Political Education, and the Higher Party School. And during the night of 26-27 March the soldiers broke into the hospital in Kaunas and Nuovo-Vilnya, and beat up and took away Lithuanian boys who had returned from the Soviet Army to their homeland and were temporarily under the protection of the Red Cross.

Army General V. VARENNIKOV, commander of USSR Ground Forces:

Indeed, a regiment of paratroopers did enter Vilnius at night. Why at night? So as not to impede the movement of the city traffic and not to disturb the peaceful residents. We are under orders from the president and the government of the USSR to increase protection of our state facilities on the territory of Lithuania. And we did not come here to increase tension but to placate the population and prevent possible disturbances.

Will the laws adopted in the parliament that conflict with the USSR Constitution really not lead to destabilization? And the inflammatory actions of the deputies and the statements in the press which encouraged soldiers of Lithuanian nationality to abandon their posts in the military service? The republic, as they declared in the parliament, would take them under its protection. Moreover, V. Landsbergis also gives the deserters the fatherly advice: Do not go home to your friends but bury yourselves in the churches, they will not get to you there. Good advice if you consider that desertion threatens these boys with criminal liability. I think the purpose is quite transparent here. Throughout the republic Sajudis is leading volunteers into the so-called regional detachments.

Romualdas OZOLAS, deputy prime minister of the republic:

The government is still being formed but at the same time a large amount of work is being done to carry out reforms in the economic and financial policy. We have already met with the new ministers in order to develop the foundations of the new budget and to reveal the common interests of Lithuania and the USSR. There are many of them and this could be a good prerequisite for

initiating negotiations. Mutually advantageous economic cooperation would be a solid basis for relations with the USSR. Unfortunately, Moscow is still refusing to negotiate.

And here is the opinion of a member of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, Mindaugas STAKVILYAVICHYUS, first secretary of the Shyaulay city committee of the independent Communist Party of Lithuania:

The first two weeks of the work of our parliament, unfortunately, remind me of the work of the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies: We are in a hurry, we are not always sticking to the earmarked regulations, and we are not always tactful. In brief, I do not like the tone of our parliament very much. In my opinion, the very process of separating from the USSR could be organized, to put it mildly, in a civilized way. On the second day after the adoption of the act of declaration of independence I was in Moscow and I cannot say that the so-called "strong center" was especially hostile to me at that time. If we had shown more flexibility, we could possibly have found an easier path to negotiations. In a difficult time like this we need unity more than ever before. Well, I can only regret that the process of achieving independence is not proceeding according to my plan but now I can really do nothing but approve of the decisions that have been made. Otherwise the people would not understand us and this could only do harm to our common cause.

Ban on Newsmen Entering Lithuania Lifted

LD2404105490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0930 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Vatican Radio, citing unconfirmed reports by news agencies, stated yesterday that there are reports that the Soviet Government has lifted the ban on foreign journalists to visit Lithuania because the situation there is calm.

Kaliningraders Voice Concern Over Lithuania

90UN1549A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 16, Apr 90 p 4

[Article by P. Antropov, EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN correspondent, Kaliningrad Oblast: "What Deputy A. Obolenskiy Failed To Mention"]

[Text] I listened with amazement to Deputy A. Obolenskiy's speech at the county's special Third Congress of People's Deputies. He asserted that he has no information from the oblast (from Kaliningrad Oblast—author) about the fact that a tense situation developed recently on the border with Lithuania, rather quite the contrary. And this "quite the contrary," judging from everything, was to be understood in this way: The Kaliningraders are taking the development of the situation in Lithuania quite calmly.

Perhaps there was someone who believed this assertion, but it did not convince me. The deputy's opinion was

very different from those assessments of the situation in Lithuania which I had occasion to hear from the residents of Kaliningrad Oblast themselves. They have long been following with concern what is taking place in the neighboring republic, which geographically separates the oblast from the rest of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

And the decision of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] concerning the "restoration" of the independence of the Lithuanian state outside the framework of the USSR has repeatedly intensified the anxiety of the Kaliningraders. In one evening, if you follow the decisions of the Lithuanian parliament, the Kaliningraders found themselves abroad in their own country. After such a decision, it is not easy to remain calm, even for a person who is far from politics. And this makes it more difficult to understand A. Obolenskiy's calm. Like it or not, one begins to wonder whether information from the oblast is not reaching the people's deputy, and whether Kaliningraders have suddenly changed their opinion on the situation in Lithuania.

"I do not know what sources of information the people's deputy uses," explained A. Khmurchik, secretary of the Kaliningrad Obkom [oblast party committee] and editor of the oblast newspaper KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, "but the Kaliningraders have not changed their negative attitude toward the separatist actions of the 'Sajudis' leaders who are in the top echelons of power. But then the assessment of the activity of A. Obolenskiy himself in the oblast changed drastically recently. And by far not for the better."

This conclusion is eloquently affirmed by letters and statements of Kaliningraders that arrive at soviet and party organs and the editorial offices of local newspapers.

"It is not true that everything in Kaliningrad is calm," V. Mukhortov and G. Pravilenko write in the newspaper MAYAK. "A people's deputy, if he is really concerned about the position of the electors, should know that the decision of the Lithuanian Supreme Council concerning secession from the USSR caused great anxiety among the residents of the border city of Sovetsk."

"One heard faint notes in Obolenskiy's speech that events in Lithuania do not worry us," Kaliningrader A. Zaborskiy said with amazement. "This is far from the case. Obolenskiy deceived us, asking us to vote for him and promising to defend our interests. He did not warrant the trust of many Kaliningraders. The question must be raised about depriving him of his deputy's seat."

The statements of the people's deputy are given a negative evaluation by voters in the cities of Slavsk, Sovetsk, and Krasnoznamensk, which border Lithuania and which I had occasion to visit immediately after the Third Congress of People's Deputies. There is a collection of signatures concerning the immediate recall of Deputy Obolenskiy.

But, perhaps the voters are moved by emotions?

"The mood of the Kaliningraders should not be dramatized," believes Yu. Titov, first deputy chief of the Kaliningrad Glavsnab [main supply administration]. "But one must also not underestimate their fears. Too much in the life of our oblast depends on the situation in Lithuania. All of the transportation arteries that unite us with the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] pass through the republic."

"What is worse," adds O. Fedotov, deputy chief of the oblast trade administration, "an abrogation of previously concluded contracts has started. For example, it is already known that this year we will not receive R3 million worth of furniture from Lithuanian subcontractors."

"After the decision of the Lithuanian parliament, the possibility of laying a second gas pipeline through Lithuania is in doubt," V. Molchanov, the director of the "Kaliningradgazifikatsiya" PO [Kaliningrad Gasification Production Association], is convinced. "And I cannot even begin to imagine how the Kaliningrad TETs [heat and electric power plant] can be built without it!"

It is also not difficult to understand the alarm of those residents of Lithuania who work in Kaliningrad Oblast enterprises. Among these is chauffeur Stasis Budrikas.

"Times have become difficult for my family," he complained with anguish. "I do not even know what to do. I live beyond the Neman in the Lithuanian village of Panemune, and I go to work across the bridge to Sovetsk. We go to stores there, and to the bathhouse and the theater. We take our surplus agricultural products to the bazaar there. But what will we do if a border is laid down? At present, the Sajudisites have changed only the name of the republic on the signpost, and they have hauled in a booth for a customs post. But later on?"

The people are concerned, and they are worried not only about themselves, but also for their children, for their future. And it is difficult for them to understand Deputy Obolenskiy's carefree lack of concern.

"I voted for him at one time," V. Zimin, a metal worker in the Gusevskiy lighting fixtures plant, said to me in a conversation.

"It seemed to me that he was a serious and responsible person. But after Obolenskiy's speech at the congress, I sensed that he was apparently disturbed not so much out of concerns for Kaliningraders as for his own reputation in the eyes of certain deputies and groups of the population."

Not the speeches of deputies, but life convinces one that separatism does not promise anything good either for the Kaliningraders or the Lithuanians.

It turns out that a quite realistic economic basis underlies the concerns of the Kaliningraders. For the sake of fairness, it is necessary to recognize that there is no less

reason for concern among a number of Lithuanian economic managers. Because enterprises that operate in the Lithuanian SSR receive from Kaliningrad Oblast saw timber materials, cellulose, mineral fertilizers, and spare parts for cellulose equipment, and they do not want long-standing economic ties to suffer because of the ambitions of shortsighted "Sajudis" politicians.

On the whole, common people even today believe that economic interests and common sense will prevail.

Deputy Notes Concern Over Gorbachev Threats

LD2404110290 Tallin Domestic Service in Estonian
0900 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] First of all we go over to the Toompea [Supreme Soviet building] and ask [reporter] Raul Malk to survey the work of the people's deputies this morning.

[Malk] [passage indistinct] What, then, is causing concern to [People's Deputy] Tiit Made?

[Made] There is plenty causing concern. Already the report of esteemed Arnold Ryuytel [chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet] in this hall was troubled, very cautious, and I think that if the Supreme Soviet is to support our negotiators in Moscow, then in order to generate this support and any ideas, we need to know in some detail which way and how the talking is being done in Moscow, what the reaction is to our issues, what is being said in response. Up to now we have not obtained any precise information. I said, too, that the Estonian mass media have indeed been selflessly interviewing our negotiators with Moscow and beseting them with questions, but they have remained determined.

But what is causing concern to me—and I think not only to me but to the whole of the Estonian population—is that Mikhail Gorbachev's direct threat was that if we do not go back on our statements or if we do not declare our transition period invalid, then he will take steps to install a special situation here. I asked Mr. Ryuytel to explain specifically what this special situation will constitute, what it will be like, and it seems that seeing it through President Gorbachev's eyes it will be harsh, it will underscore the subordination of a minion to the master, it will underscore the relationship between the slave and his superior, it is rubbing a naughty child's nose in the dirt in order that it understand its mistakes. There is no understanding attitude, no friendliness of any kind. It is the sound of an empty barrel from the Kremlin which still wants—at whatever cost—to put a brake on those processes towards democratization which are taking place in the USSR.

[Malk] How is one in such a situation to combine the firmness of our goals with flexibility?

[Made] The firmness of our goals is indeed now quite clear. We cannot take any kind of step backwards nor retract what we have said; we would then not be a people

but a wet rag. But naturally, one must be flexible, and it is along those lines that we must take into account who is our opponent and who is our partner: it [the Soviet Union] is a big, big world power with its own reputation and image. And we naturally cannot push it into a corner with our wants, but we must provide it with an opportunity to retain a nice clean face in this game. Or, as a number of radio listeners will know, having been subordinated to a strong chief: Present this chief with your idea, then let him say it for himself. Then it will be implemented much more quickly than if you yourself come out with this idea. Perhaps we too will try to get the thoughts we have thought and the ideas we have planned expressed by Moscow and then we will attain the final result quicker. [passage omitted]

So one essential question of mine remained unasked: Namely, I also wanted to ask if the Estonian delegation was offered the same kind of version as the Finnish pre-1917 model, the so-called autonomy model, which was offered to Latvia. And this question did not get an answer. But I hope that our press will ask this question now and in the future of those people who are now holding talks in Moscow. [passage omitted]

Political Situation in Estonia Reported

LD2404150890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1400 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Report from Estonia by Heimar Lenk]

[Text] It has not been so easy lately to provide dispatches from Estonia for the all-Union listener when even the republican newspapers, of which we now have dozens, are unable to give a reasonably unambiguous assessment of the political processes taking place in the Baltic. The views of the press do coincide on one thing: that the peoples of the Baltic republics need sovereignty of both the economic and the political kind. Views diverge, however, as to the means by which this should be achieved.

Two main issues are currently under discussion at the republic's Supreme Soviet: what policy to engage in with the central authorities in Moscow, and how to react to the latest decisions of the Lithuanian parliament and to events in Lithuania.

Yesterday evening in Tallinn's (?old) Town, outside the government building, a large demonstration was organized by the Estonian People's Front. Those taking part in the demonstration expressed support for the Lithuanian people in their struggle for independence. Participants in the demonstration were also addressed by newly elected members of the republic's government, a government in which there is an absolute majority of ministers adhering to the positions of the People's Front and in which the youngest minister is not yet 40.

Military Protests Attacks on Commissariats

PM2404173790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Colonel A. Yurkin report: "Anxiety On St. George's Night"]

[Text] Tallinn—The celebration of St. George's Day in Estonia ended with an attack by extremists against the Tartu combined city military commissariat. Near midnight several dozen young people carrying torches attacked the commissariat building and stoned it. All attempts to break into the building were foiled. Captain I. Strashnov, the duty officer at the commissariat, did not resort to weapons but called a militia detail. It arrived 25 minutes later but no one was detained. On the morning of 24 April Colonel A. Laaneots, the city military commissar, delivered a protest to the mayor of the city, who replied that compensation must be paid for the damage caused. The local mass media, which are quite accustomed to insulting the Armed Forces, did not report the nighttime attack.

Yesterday, however, the Raplavskiy Rayon Military Commissariat was besieged by ralliers. Speakers protested against the draft into the "occupation" Army and urged people to join the "Geneva-49" movement and support the "Kaitseliit" defense union, whose members' actions disrupted the draft of young people on that day. Out of 45 people summoned to appear, only 10 managed to enter the military commissariat, the rest were prevented from entering the building by participants in the Kaitseliit rally.

I was also surprised in civilized Tallinn by a procession to the jail where people convicted of military crimes are being kept. Before the procession began there was a rally, one of whose banners bore the slogan "Call the red butchers to account!" The rally was incited by the "Antenna" radio program, which gave instructions on how to act against the "regime of occupation."

The St. George's Day extremism also found support in the speech by E. Savisaar, chairman of the Estonian government, at a celebration organized near the Big Hermann Tower. He stated that Lithuania is an example for Estonia and that they have one road—to freedom. However, the founding father of the People's Front did not specify whether he meant by destruction or creation.

Recent events show that the principles of civilized behavior promised by democrats here are increasingly frequently turning into an orgy of passions and extremism.

Estonia Establishes Foreign Trade Bank

LD2404152690 Moscow World Service in English
0700 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Estonia has set up a commercial foreign trade bank whose founders are the Union of Estonian International Banks and a very wealthy organization, the Union

of Fishing Cooperatives. The first stockholders of the new bank include some 40 organizations and 300 individuals. According to the board of directors the main goals of the bank will be determined by the development of the economic and political situation in the Baltic region.

Latvian Deputies Explain 'Soyuz' Policies

PM2404132990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Apr 90 Morning Edition p2

[Dispatch by correspondent Irina Litvinova under the rubric "Direct Line": "'Soyuz' in Favor of Union"]

[Text] Riga—The constituent congress of the "Soyuz" association of Latvian deputy groups has been held. USSR People's Deputy V. Alksnis has been elected chairman of the association. The congress has adopted its statute and platform, and also resolutions on various topical problems of the republic's political life.

Latvian People's Deputy S. Dimanis had this to say:

"The 'Soyuz' movement is based on human rights and democracy. It is only through these principles that a nation's rights can be fulfilled. We are not against any of the republics, Latvia included, seceding from the USSR. But, in our view, it would be premature to raise this question at present. The restoration of independence is still only a political slogan which is not underpinned by any calculations. The work of our minority, which forms the opposition in the republic's parliament, will focus on showing the kind of conditions in which people's lives can be improved and on preventing political speculation on and manipulation of the people's interests."

T. Zhdanok, Latvian people's deputy and Riga City Soviet people's deputy:

"Approximately 35 percent of the republic's inhabitants voted for deputies from the Latvian People's Front who won the elections to the republic Supreme Soviet. Consequently, they cannot speak on behalf of all the people of Latvia. 'Soyuz' delegates are in favor of equal rights for all inhabitants of Latvia, regardless of their nationality, language, religious beliefs, and length of domicile in the republic, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We are in favor of forming a unified all-Union market, and we regard the economic independence of the producer as the foundation for the republic's economic independence. Ill-considered political decisions could lead to a deterioration in living standards and will inevitably intensify interethnic conflicts."

The congress adopted the resolution "On Combining Republic and Union Citizenship." Believing that, in a renewed socialist federation, the only acceptable status for its inhabitants is combined republic and Union citizenship, the "Soyuz" association of deputy groups has urged the USSR president and the USSR Supreme

Soviet to accelerate the adoption of the USSR Law on Citizenship, which provides for this principle.

The resolution "On Human Rights and the Rights of National Minorities in the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic" stresses that the rights of a nation must not be regarded as rights of a higher order than "ordinary" human rights.

The "Soyuz" constituent congress said that broadening Latvia's sovereignty can only be a realistic proposition if a course of action is followed that has been agreed with the USSR. Any unilateral actions in this respect should be regarded as a crude manifestation of legal nihilism contributing to the creation of a situation of chaos and anarchy and loss of respect for the law.

People's Front, Soyuz Differ on Latvian Statehood

PM2504075990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Lieutenant Colonel M. Ziyeminsh report: "All-Latvian Assembly of Delegates"]

[Text] Riga—On 21 April, 8,086 newly-elected people's deputies representing soviets of all levels gathered at the Daugava stadium for an all-Latvian meeting of people's deputies sponsored by the Latvian People's Front Duma. Daynis Ivans, chairman of the Latvian People's Front, who opened the meeting, called the rally a "political referendum on the question of Latvian independence." Representatives of other political and social movements also expressed their opinion and views on it.

The question of opportunities for the further development of Latvian statehood is the main political issue fueling passions in the republic today. It is due to be included on the agenda of the first Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session which begins work in Riga 3 May.

The People's Front deputies' group adheres firmly to the position of "restoring the Latvian republic's state independence." The appeal of the All-Latvian meeting of people's deputies to the republic's Supreme Soviet and Latvian people was couched in that vein (8,003 deputies voted in favor, 41 against, 42 abstained). The "justification" for that decision was also expressed in terms which have become traditional recently: "In 1940 the Soviet Union, in flagrant breach of international legal norms and reciprocal treaty obligations, brought about the resignation of the Latvian government, occupied its territory, and created a compliant apparatus of state power and administration which was used as an instrument to incorporate Latvia into the USSR. Latvia was forcibly deprived of its state autonomy."

But by no means all people's deputies think that way (there are about 14,500 deputies in the republic in total. Admittedly, some are deputies of two soviets simultaneously). The constituent congress of "Soyuz," the association of Latvian SSR deputies' groups, was held at the

Political Enlightenment Center in Riga 22 April. There were 307 people's deputies of different levels present. Speakers said that the restructuring of the economic and political foundations of Soviet society is being accompanied by a destabilization of state structures. This has been exploited by nationalist and separatist forces who have managed to disorient a politically inexperienced section of the population, which has lost confidence in the traditional forms of power.

In these conditions, those present said, the urgent task is to coordinate the actions of Latvian SSR deputies who adhere to positions of federalism and the protection of human rights and support the platform of the "Soyuz" group formed by USSR people's deputies. The congress adopted the association's platform and rules.

The near future will show which path Latvia will take.

Latvian Officials Comment on Presidency

90UN1325B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 20 Mar 90 p 1

[Report on interviews with Ya. Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party; R. Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet; V. Bakatin, USSR Minister of Internal Affairs; and People's Deputies A. Dambis, A. Klautsen, and V. Alksins by Vadim Smetannikov, SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA parliamentary reviewer: "What Do We Expect From the President?"]

[Excerpts] There are in the history of our state moments which are marked not only by the date but also by hours and minutes. Such a "shining hour" for the Soviet Union was the establishment of the office of president of the country. This issue was decided by roll-call vote. Only 133 deputies voted against the constitutional office of chief of state. [passage omitted]

When the post of the presidency had been announced I immediately took up a hot trail, as they say, and interviewed Ya. Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee.

[Smetannikov] In your view, what should the president's first steps be?

[Vagris] That, of course, is a matter for the president. But to use the standard expression "if I were director," in that case the president should simultaneously bring order and discipline into the country and set about designing a new model for the Union. A Union treaty is needed, and representatives from all republics are talking about this at the present congress. This is the most important foundation.

[Smetannikov] The parliament has already reviewed many pieces of draft legislation. The Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet is also active in the sphere of political creativity. But by no means all the new laws are operating, and some of them have already been almost forgotten or new radical changes...

[Vagris] Correct. And I therefore say that it is necessary to start with a model for the Union. Proceeding from this, when we also confirm it jointly, the laws will really be able to operate. Up to now the opposite has been the case: We are distracted by the day-to-day situation and are creating laws, but the executors of those laws are being pressured by departmental and territorial interests. Everyone wants all the blankets for himself.

[Smetannikov] What is your attitude as leader of the republic Communist Party toward the new edition of Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution?

[Vagris] This congress decision is not producing any kind of adverse reaction in me. For we ourselves have already changed the corresponding article in the Latvian SSR Constitution. Further, this was also incorporated in the republic Communist Party program for action and the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress. Real things must be looked at realistically. I disagree with those who say that we are already working under conditions of a multiparty system. We still do not have such a system. But a multiparty situation is a fact. And to preserve an article of the Constitution that affirms power for just one party would be the essence of non-democracy. We communists must show that our vanguard role is not just declarative but real.

In contrast to previous congresses, the extraordinary congress was dynamic in a rare way. Obviously the report on events in Lithuania announced right at the start played the role of a unique catalyst: yet another (and how!) alarming argument for confirming the post of president of the USSR. It was not happenstance that in the end the debate on the draft resolution relating to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet decisions of 10-12 March 1990 lasted almost four hours. And the deputies incorporated in it their first assignment for M.S. Gorbachev as president, namely, to guarantee, together with the country's Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, protection for the legitimate rights of each person living in Lithuania, and equally to observe on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR the rights and interests of the USSR, and also of the union republics. In general the final accord of the congress was a stormy one. [passage omitted]

[Smetannikov] What can we expect from the president? I managed to talk with many of those who attended the congress. And now, listening to the recordings, I have tried to select the most significant responses.

[Dambis] I expect a great deal from the president. I want to see the hopes of the Latvian people realized. Matters pertaining to Latvia's sovereignty will be raised for the president, obviously at a new and higher level. I listened attentively to M.S. Gorbachev's oath and his program speech. And I think that urgent problems will be resolved more quickly. I am sure that all the peoples of the Soviet Union expect this. As a working man I hope that no new fires will arise in any part of the country with respect to interethnic relations.

[Nishanov] If we talk about "fires" in Baku, Armenia, Georgia, Fergana, then the law should act against the criminals there. But will the overwhelming majority of each nation—Russian, Uzbek, Tatars and all the rest—live in peace and tranquility? What is to be done? For in 1944, when the Meshket Turks settled in Uzbekistan, there was a difficult social situation: It was wartime and there was destruction and hunger. Even under those conditions the resettlement was calm. It was a human problem. But here neither side should urge on events. We must work according to a well-considered state program.

[Klautsen] One of the main ideas heard at the congress was the paralysis of power. In my opinion this paralysis is accompanied by centrifugal processes throughout the Union. It is not only in Lithuania that the thought is being persistently put forward that the federation is in no state to eliminate the problems that have arisen. And so, they say, it is necessary to seek out other ways: Let us split up, let us determine our opportunities ourselves.

It seems to me that the main condition for stability in the Baltic region is the stability of the Union. The presidential form of government should significantly improve the situation in the country and insure the normal development of perestroika. It will help bring order to the economic and social fields and in the sphere of interethnic relations.

[Bakatin] In the first place I would conclude a Union treaty as quickly as possible. Then, establish a multiparty system. Of course, political culture cannot be brought to everyone quickly: Now all kinds of new social groups, organizations, and movements are springing up like mushrooms after the rain... We must abandon extreme positions on the left and the right. What is needed is the unity of the peoples. The new parties do in fact exist. And they already enjoy influence. It is time to direct their efforts toward a common goal in order to extricate the country from the complex situation in which it finds itself.

[Alksins] The main problem now is, unfortunately, the danger of the disintegration of our state. And no matter what decisions we may reach or take in the field of the economy, political issues will always stand in the path of their embodiment. We cannot feed and clothe the country until we resolve the problems of our multinational system.

It is only by preserving a unified and integrated state that we will be able to deal with the interethnic conflicts. We have wise people to do this, and enormous resources; what we need is just peace and tranquility. Under these conditions the idea of presidential power is one whose time has come. True, I do think that we have come to it late. The collective responsibility about which we have talked so much has in many cases become collective irresponsibility. And it is essential that one man make the important decisions. The president will be accountable to the people for weighing those decisions carefully.

[passage omitted]

RSFSR

Reportage on Gorbachev Visit to Sverdlovsk

To Meet Workers, Managers

LD2404161990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Report by Yan Khutoryanskiy]

[Summary] President Mikhail Gorbachev is scheduled to arrive in Sverdlovsk on 25 April. He is awaited with keen interest. Many issues of local concern will be discussed. The president will visit the Uralmash works tomorrow. Gorbachev will also visit construction sites and stores, the Institute of the Physics of Metals of the Urals branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The president will not stay in the oblast for long. He will visit only Nizhniy Tagil, the second most important city here, where the Lenin Metallurgical Combine and the Urals Wagon Building Works are situated.

"During the trip meetings with workers, the soviet and party aktiv and economic managers are due to take place."

Visit Previewed

LD2504085190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0400 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Text] The Urals await Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the USSR and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He is arriving in Sverdlovsk. Over to our correspondents.

[First unidentified correspondent] Well, I would like to note that the Urals visit, which begins today, is Mikhail Sergeyevich's first trip within the Soviet Union since his election as president of the USSR. I think that there is a lot of symbolism in this trip. In a complex period of perestroika the president, who initiated perestroika, wants to familiarize himself with the affairs of one of the most industrialized regions in the country, the Urals. On the one hand, this almost entirely industrial region must be brought out of its rut—let me note that it produces 86 percent of group-A products. On the other hand, the agricultural sector must be revived, a sector like this in Sverdlovsk Oblast. Apart from the oil, only oats and rye grow in the north, for example, and the sector only employs 6 percent of the able-bodied population.

[Second correspondent] It is a business trip, and there is a very businesslike attitude to the trip here. They are awaiting the president, and they want to talk to the president.

[First correspondent] I would ask you to talk about what is expected in terms of the visit, what is proposed for the president's trip to Uralmash.

[Second correspondent] Yes, it is proposed.

[First correspondent] Have you spoken to Uralmash?

[Second correspondent] Yes, I have just spoken to Boris Dmitriyevich Kotelnik, chief engineer at the association and party committee secretary; and the following program is proposed:

Well, first of all Uralmash is the symbol and heart of the working Urals, and it is natural that it should be here that the president should begin his familiarization with the working class. The gates of Uralmash open onto Imeni Pervoy Pyatiletki [first five-year plan] Square, which reflects, as it were, our times and history. There are buildings which, like the works itself, were built during the years of industrialization. At the entry to the square there are Uralmash's 10 orders awarded for work and battle, and a monument to those who did not return from the war, the 45th anniversary of the end of which we will soon be marking.

Uralmash determines the fate of perestroika in the economy to a large extent. The most advanced technology is born here; fairly advanced, anyway, and it goes to thousands of recipients in all Union republics from Transcaucasia to the Baltic, from the Far East to the West, too; and Uralmash fulfills its contractual obligations.

Today it is proposed to show the president a welding engineering metallurgical production unit, where a great deal of new equipment has recently been acquired; and to acquaint Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev with problems, specifically those relating to the development of an affiliate branch in (Bulmash), which is of great social significance.

And I would like to stress that Uralmash is not just a place where modern equipment is born. The Uralmash working collective is the most politicized detachment of the Soviet working class, and I am convinced that the site of the first president's meeting in the Urals has been very accurately chosen. They believe in perestroika here, they understand that success depends on each and every one, and they are awaiting solutions to problems which should not be prolonged.

Gorbachev Greeted at Airport

*LD2504084190 Moscow TASS in English 0836 GMT
25 Apr 90*

[By TASS special correspondents]

[Text] Sverdlovsk April 25 TASS—President Gorbachev has arrived in the Urals city of Sverdlovsk today. This is his first trip in the country as Soviet president.

City residents warmly greeted Gorbachev at the airport and at crossroads en route to the city. He has a packed programme of the visit: meetings at major enterprises and with party activists.

He will also inspect the country's first youth housing neighbourhood and meet machine-building workers, steelmen and scientists.

New Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Leaders Elected

*LD2104104390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0521 GMT 21 Apr 90*

[By TASS correspondent Nadezhda Potapova]

[Text] Sverdlovsk, 21 Apr (TASS)—The new leaders of the CPSU oblast committee, who were elected at the party conference which took place at the demand of the oblast's communists, are beginning to operate in Sverdlovsk oblast (Urals).

A vote of no-confidence was expressed at the three-day conference, in which 680 delegates participated. Four CPSU oblast committee secretaries, who are now former secretaries, were told bluntly of their professional unsuitability in the conditions of perestroika. Leonid Bobykin, first secretary of the previous oblast committee, was earlier forced to resign for the same reason. The communists criticized those leaders for incompetence, for lacking a desire to conduct a dialogue with the grassroots links in the party and with new democratic movements, for an administrative style of work, and for apathy to progressive forms of economic management.

A heated discussion flared up at the conference about the role of the party in society, and about ways of restoring the prestige of and trust in the CPSU. Opinions were divided, of course. The conservative-minded section of the apparatus attempted to defend certain past realities in the party structure, and they were opposed by radical-minded delegates, whose ranks incidentally were not homogeneous. In other words, pluralism of views and opinions was displayed in full measure. And it proved impossible to reconcile all the opinions which were expressed.

But compromises were found on specific agenda issues. Nine candidates contested the post of oblast party leader. Aleksandr Gusev won the sympathies of a majority—a 47-year-old candidate of technical sciences who only recently embarked on party work and who came to the conference as first secretary of the CPSU city committee and chairman of the soviet of people's deputies of the small town of Asbest. It was he who became the new leader of the largest party organization of the Urals.

The conference delegates elaborated proposals on changing the structures of party committees at all levels and gave them over for discussion by the oblast's communists. The second stage of the conference, planned for early June, will finally endorse them.

Aleksandr Gusev proposed candidates for secretaries and new members of the bureau of the party oblast committee—mostly radical-minded communists. All his proposals were adopted. The new "command" in the oblast committee is to implement the reforms, upon which the inhabitants of Sverdlovsk oblast place so much hope.

Kaliningrad Oblast Fuel Supplies Examined

LD2404104690 Kaliningrad Maritime Press Service
in Russian 1500 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] The pumping of raw material to the Mazeikiiai oil refinery has been halted. It supplies gasoline and diesel fuel not only to Lithuania but to other areas, including Kaliningrad Oblast. Won't the current situation affect the fuel supplying our area?

There are no particular causes for concern, says V.V. Kurgalimov, general director of the Kaliningradnefteprodukt association. We have sufficient fuel reserves to provide a normal supply for state and private transport and for farm machinery. The question arises as to whether we will fillup vehicles with Lithuanian plates. Yes, we will, but only those that are carrying freight between enterprises [po mezkhkhozyaystvennym svyazyam], and also private cars if they are brining us food products to sell in the market. Naturally, our reserves are not unlimited. For that reason measures are being taken to increase them. In particular, the question of supplying fuel from other oil refineries in the country and delivering it to supply the fishing fleet have been solved.

Deputies Seek Consensus on Congress Procedures

PM2304112190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 21 Apr 90 Single Edition p 1

[V. Mamontov report: "Logic of Consensus. Russian Deputies' Preparatory Commission Has Concluded Its Work"]

[Text] The deputies of the new Russian parliament can easily be tracked down in the large, official building of the republic House of Soviets from the heated discussions they are holding today even in the lobbies and the halls. The Congress of People's Deputies is being prepared in a specific atmosphere: Its procedure, agenda, and hundreds of issues large and small are being considered not by the "apparatchiks," as was the case previously, but by the elected representatives themselves.

"Our task is ensuring that they have the best working conditions, assisting them with timely advice, and resolving any technical questions," N. Brovkin, chief of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium General Department, said. "We are not imposing our own viewpoint. But all our experience and knowledge is at the deputies' service."

A congress preparatory commission has been formed which, in turn, is divided into six subcommissions. These subcommissions have drafted proposals on forming the working organs of the congress and the session, and they are concerning themselves with setting up an information service and with the press, which intends to report on this event more broadly than ever before.

All the deputies who were nominated to the commission from their oblasts and republics are agreed on the fact that the crisis situation must be overcome, and measures to improve the economy and ensure a new political quality in Russian life must be developed as soon as possible. But everyone has their own conception of these measures. Hence the stormy debates.

"We would like to bear in mind the experience of our colleagues in the country's Supreme Soviet, the Moscow Soviet, and the Leningrad Soviet, where the 'procedural section' of the sessions turned out to be excessively long," Yu. Rudkin, a deputy from Yaroslavl, who chairs the coordinating group, said.

I happened to be present at one of the sessions of this group, which was formed through force of circumstances, as saying goes. Some of the points on the future agenda and the procedure for holding the congress proved to be a stumbling block. Even ordinary and seemingly routine questions change their aspect when seen from the new angle of perestroika. For example: Does the congress need a keynote report? "Yes, it does," some of the deputies believe. "We would like to know in what state the previous soviet and its executive organs are handing the republic over to us." "That's as may be," other deputies think, "but will this report not turn into another list of shortcomings, miscalculations, and deficiencies?"

Another dilemma: Should the chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet be elected immediately following the formation of the congress working organs or should questions such as Russian sovereignty, people's power, and a new Union treaty be discussed? The following are excerpts from the deputies' discussions:

S. Shakhrai: It seems to me that we must adopt documents on sovereignty, the treaty, and amendments to the republic Constitution, and then hold elections for a chairman and his deputies...

P. Zerin: There is no need to overemphasize questions of sovereignty—they will inevitably appear of their own accord in the discussion. After all, the report, as we have more or less agreed, will include questions of Russia's political situation. And without a chairman we will reach deadlock and create a situation of anarchy.

S. Kyshtymov: Maybe we should elect a constitutional commission which would start drawing up the most serious documents such as the congress resolution on Russian sovereignty. After all it is important that we think everything over and predict all the political consequences. It is important to understand how everyone envisages the concept of "sovereignty," and what the electorate thinks about this matter.

After lengthy debates the commission came to an interim conclusion (the congress will naturally have the last word): First and foremost is the election of the chairman and the Supreme Soviet itself.

"All the sides have political logic," Rudkin believes. "But maybe the most valuable thing that is taking place now is the painstaking process of finding mutually acceptable solutions. We must grasp the logic not just of struggle but also the logic of consensus and the surmounting of personal and group ambitions, for the sake of Russia, its welfare, and its people."

"We must prevent the congress sliding onto the path of long and unproductive debates. That is the opinion of the majority of the deputies and the opinion of all Russians," Deputy O. Tiunov, doctor of legal sciences, believes. "We are expected to be businesslike and sober-minded. The deputies' intellectual potential is very high."

Chairman Vorotnikov Previews RSFSR Congress

*LD2404200290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1545 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Interview with Vitaliy Ivanovich Vorotnikov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and CPSU Central Committee Politburo with all-Union radio correspondent Vladimir Korablev; place and date not given; from the "Toward the First Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation" program—recorded]

[Text] [Korablev] Vitaliy Ivanovich, the population of this, the biggest of our country's republics, is linking great hopes with the work of the forthcoming First Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation—hopes for serious changes in the socioeconomic sphere, for the strengthening of rights and the moral rebirth of the Russian Federation. How are preparations now going for this important political event?

[Vorotnikov] Of course we are all awaiting the congress with great interest and with enormous hope. The main task amounts to this: We should prepare this congress in such a way that it fully reflects the feelings and processes taking place in our country and in our republic linked with the renewal of society and with the changes that are taking place in the economy, in the social and moral sphere and so on. We understand and share a concern and the worry of the peoples of Russia, with its many nations, that the role of the republic should be raised, that its sovereignty should be strengthened and developed, that people's living conditions should be improved: That is to say, all the goals that people link with the congress—and naturally this includes us communists—are aimed at enabling the person to live better. That is the level upon which preparations for the congress have been proceeding.

We decided to use some of the experience built up by previous congresses of people's deputies of the USSR. Therefore, taking into account the fact that in accordance with the Constitution this work is entrusted to the Supreme Soviet in its present composition and to the presidium, we in the presidium decided to form a preparatory commission to have in this commission a representative from every oblast, from every kray, from

every autonomous republic, from every autonomous oblast and from every autonomous okrug. They were elected at meetings of deputies' groups in their territories and they came to Moscow. Our first session has taken place, at which we agreed on the program for the activity of this preparatory commission and the tasks that were set were to work out proposals for the agenda, for the standing orders of the congress, on matters connected with the work of deputies at this congress; there were questions concerning preparations for the work of the forthcoming session of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, the forthcoming session of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, the formation of the Supreme Soviet itself, the chambers, and so on. That is to say, in short, the whole range of issues connected with the preparation of the congress.

I have to say the commission worked in a very active way, very fruitfully. Of course, it was not unanimous in its approach to the issues. There were various points of view, because there were deputies there representing not just different regions but deputies holding positions that did not always coincide.

[Korablev] In this regard I would like to ask you a question: Alongside the commission currently making preparations for the congress, there is also the Democratic Russia deputies' bloc. Is there a common approach on all of the issues on the agenda between these commissions? Are there differences between them?

[Vorotnikov] We have not had any talks about coordinating the works of the preparatory commission with other groups of deputies. When we have met the leaders of this bloc and have discussed a number of issues and representatives of this bloc have taken part in the work of the preparatory commission the question did not arise in that way, that we should coordinate, so to speak, our efforts like that. We operated within the framework of the Constitution, within the framework of the law, and I have to say it is not only the so-called Democratic Russia bloc but a whole range of other groups of deputies have also been preparing their proposals. We know about this; they will be put forward by them to the presidium or they will be put forward to the conference of representatives of the delegations which has to take place in accordance with the standing orders or they will be proposed directly at the congress. We have not, therefore, set the task of comparing positions on individual issues, but the fact that these do not coincide in a whole range of areas is a fact.

[Korablev] What is your own personal attitude toward the appearance of different public groups? Are there differences of view between them? On what questions? Is this serious or not?

[Vorotnikov] Since your question goes beyond the issue of preparations for the congress, in the way you put it, it is evidence generally of a situation coming about in the political movement in the country.

[Korablev] Yes, but what we are talking about here is the multiplicity of parties and for that reason the question is a perfectly legitimate one perhaps?

[Vorotnikov] I am not refusing to answer it, I am simply pointing out that the question has a much wider ring to it. The fact that we have a lot of movements now and political and social structures, there is nothing wrong in that at all. The same goes for the fact that their positions do not always coincide. Each one of them, therefore, must substantiate and prove the correctness of that position and convince its opponents that it is right. It is up to the voters or the people or the session to determine whose position is more objective and more realistic and to what extent, and whose position is less realistic regarding its implementation, so to speak. As far as my attitude is concerned, I think it is all right; everyone each of these social formations has the right to exist. True, many of them do not have a clearly expressed platform and clear rules; and again within the framework of these socio-political organizations themselves there are also different positions and different points of view. Under present conditions this is undoubtedly a natural process.

[Korablev] No doubt the main thing in the successful work of the congress will be that all deputies' groups represented will find common accord on the main problems that exist in the Russian Federation which today have to be solved, and which have to be solved first and foremost by those who have been elected by the people?

[Vorotnikov] Yes, I would like that to be the case. I would like us deputies, elected as the new people's deputies of the Russian Federation, to devote more time to the specific problems which concern the people. Of course, procedural questions are also important. At the preparatory commission in particular the main objections and contradictions did not concern the question of whether or not particular issues should be included but the arguments were about the procedure for considering these issues, about how this issue should be formulated in precise terms, say the issue of Russia's sovereignty. Without question this will certainly be raised at the congress and it will have to be discussed. Russia, however, is an enormous state and its role amounts not just to achieving its own sovereignty but to promoting the unification of the whole union, together with the other republics. It is natural, therefore, that at the congress at the same time as discussing the question of the sovereignty of Russia we are going to have to call upon the other republics, too, to cooperate with Russia and to contribute to strengthening our Union, to strengthening our Federation.

[Korablev] Vitaliy Ivanovich, is it expected that a president of Russia will be elected at the first congress? If the answer is yes, what will be the procedure for this election?

[Vorotnikov] The widest variety of proposals are going around in connection with this. But at any rate, the election of a president of the Russian Federation is not

envisioned within the Constitution which currently operates, the Constitution which is now in effect does not provide for the election of a president. But I cannot rule out circumstances in which someone might raise this issue at the congress. But my personal position is that we should have just one president in our country, and that Russia should have a chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

[Korablev] The process of perestroika has set our society the task of restoring the sovereignty of the soviets of people's deputies. How is this question being resolved following the elections that have taken place to the soviets at all levels?

[Vorotnikov] The question of the sovereignty of the soviets has already been discussed and debated in our country for a number of years. The main task amounts to providing this discussion with a base, with a legal foundation, and also with an economic foundation. Now, following the adoption of a decision on local self-government and local economic management, with laws going to be adopted determining relations between the Union republics and the Union, the Union government, and with new people, charged, so to speak, with this sovereignty, having come to lead the soviets in a majority of regions, I think broader possibilities are of course opening up before us here for the status to be raised in the localities. This is both from the viewpoint of the legal norms and legal possibilities, and also from the viewpoint of the economic ones, extending from the rural soviets to the republics, and particularly, let me stress, the autonomous formations. But one has to go on learning how to use these legal possibilities. That is another question. We need cadres and people who do not just declare the sovereignty of the soviets in their words but who find forms whereby the rights that they have been given and the economic opportunities that are opening up before them may be used sensibly in the interests of the people and in the interests of the matter in hand.

[Korablev] Vitaliy Ivanovich, your personal point of view, please: What questions are the deputies likely to raise as being the most important ones during the period of the work of the congress?

[Vorotnikov] I think the range could be very great and unpredictable. The task is to concentrate the attention of the congress upon the most important questions, upon questions concerning the republic's sovereignty, upon questions concerning the republic's economic independence, upon questions of equivalent exchange and mutually advantageous links with the other republics, upon questions of national and interethnic relations—particularly for Russia this is very important—upon raising the status of the autonomous formations, upon strengthening a whole range of legal norms connected with strengthening order and discipline and responsibility, something we are currently very short of. There are others; questions might arise that go so far as changing the Constitution. I, therefore, see the range as being very great and the deputies are going to have to

choose the most important ones from them. I think there will be a very serious and wide-ranging discussion on all problems. There are very many problems that have accumulated in Russia.

[Korablev] All of these questions have to be resolved very quickly?

[Vorotnikov] All the problems must be resolved, and we all want this: but this is the point - Kozma Prutkov said in his day that it is impossible to embrace the unembraceable. Therefore, one has to determine what has to be in first place, what in second place, and what in third place to solve the issues in real terms, in order not simply to talk around the problems. We have enough talk, you know. We have enough declarations and statements. We have enough media talk. We need to concentrate attention upon specific problems and to solve them so that people can feel the results and the return on the investment. Because the essence of the decisions of the congress must be directed toward the person, toward our Soviet person, the citizen of Russia, toward his getting the results.

[Korablev] Thank you very much for the conversation.

Leningrad Congress Initiates 'Russian' Party

*PM2504075390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Apr 90 First Edition p 4*

[Colonel V. Streltsov report: "Voice of Russia's Communists"]

[Text] Leningrad—More than 50 oblasts, krais, and autonomous formations were represented in Leningrad by the participants in the initiative congress of the Russian Communist Party within the CPSU. On 21-22 April, 615 delegates representing 1.5 million communists from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic declared their determination to revive the republic's Communist Party.

The congress participants spoke with anguish about the fate of the communist movement, about ways to overcome the crisis situation in the country, and about the decisive, consolidating significance of Russia's communists in all this.

The resolution adopted by the congress speaks about its participants' recognition of the existence of the Russian Communist Party within the CPSU and the need to complete its organizational formation before the 28th CPSU Congress. To that end it has been decided to hold the second stage of the initiative congress 9-10 June, with the constituent congress of the Russian Communist Party within the CPSU on 19 June. If it proves impossible to stage the constituent congress on 19 June it is proposed to elect the Russian Communist Party's leading organs during the second stage of the initiative congress.

It has been decided to conduct all the work in the organizational formation of the Russian Communist

Party in close contact with the committee for the preparation of the All-Russian party conference, which will enable Russia's communists to go to the 28th CPSU Congress ideologically and organizationally united and capable of consolidating the whole country's communists around them.

More Details of Medvedev Visit to Leningrad

*PM2304094390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 21 Apr 90 Single Edition p 3*

[Unidentified TASS correspondent report: "Meetings in Leningrad"]

[Text] Leningrad, 20 Apr—V.A. Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has been taking part in the preparations for the forthcoming joint 29th oblast and 27th city conference of the Leningrad party organization. He concluded his four-day stay in the city on the Neva [Leningrad] today.

Leningraders' opinions about the position in the party, the country, and their city, and their proposals about ways out of the sociopolitical and economic crisis are what interested the CPSU Central Committee secretary above all. He started his stay with a meeting with engineers, workers, and shop party organization secretaries at one of Leningrad's largest enterprises—the "Elektrosila" Association. Addressing them, V.A. Medvedev stressed that the party and the government are now taking decisive measures to solve the most acute socioeconomic problems. A change for the better will have to be achieved in the next few months. The CPSU Central Committee secretary visited the "Pozitron" Association, talked with representatives of the city's creative intelligentsia at the Hermitage, and met with academics, lecturers, and students at Leningrad University.

V.A. Medvedev took part in the bureau session and joint plenum of the Leningrad Oblast and City Party Committees. In his speech at the plenum he said that on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress it is particularly important for party organizations to determine their principled policy line. That is the call contained in the CPSU Central Committee open letter to the country's communists, which has as its aim to consolidate the party on a principled basis and to rid it of people conducting splittist activity. It is by no means aimed at limiting freedom of intraparty debate or at persecuting dissidents.

The radicalization of the economic reform, the program for which will have to be implemented not over three to four years—as had previously been planned—but on a tighter timescale, is inevitable. The party cannot stand on the sidelines on this, and its main task in this area is to take the interests of working people and the entire Soviet people—particularly the less well off—into account as much as possible, the CPSU Central Committee secretary stressed in conclusion.

V.A. Medvedev spoke in the Smolnyy Assembly Hall at the Lenin readings commemorating the 120th anniversary of the birth of the founder of the Communist Party and the Soviet state.

A meeting was held with the first secretaries of city and rayon committees in the Leningrad oblast party organization.

Daghestan Elects Supreme Soviet Chairman

LD2404225690 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 24 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The first Daghestan Congress of People's Deputies opened in Makhachkala today, and at the same time, the autonomous republic's supreme soviet, formed by the congress, began its work.

The most urgent economic problems which Daghestan faces are on the agenda. (Muhammad Ali Muhammadov) was elected chairman of the republic's supreme soviet.

Cherkessk Nominates Gorbachev for Delegate

LD2104115690 Moscow TASS in English 1120 GMT
21 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Styazhkin]

[Text] Cherkessk, South Russia, April 21 TASS—Communists of a chemical factory in Cherkessk, Stavropol region, today unanimously included president and communist party leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the lists of candidates for delegates to the 28th party congress.

Secretary of the factory party organization Viktor Mankevich told TASS that Gorbachev's nomination "is not homage to the old tradition of automatically nominating party leaders."

"Cherkessk chemists have known Gorbachev since when he headed the regional party organization," he said. "Already then he displayed his talent of an organizer and the ability to listen to people and make decisions, relying on their opinion."

"We value the personal qualities of communist Gorbachev and want him to represent us at the party congress."

Delegates to the congress are elected in Stavropol region in party constituencies. Gorbachev's candidacy was supported by all speakers at a general meeting of communists of the Cherkessk chemical factory.

The meeting unanimously decided to ask Gorbachev to agree to run for delegate to the congress in the Cherkessk party constituency.

Candidates for congress delegates, nominated in other party constituencies in Stavropol region, include a mechanic of a collective farm, a railwayman, the rector of a pedagogical institute and tens of other party activists.

Most of them will face tough competition as the elections are being held on a multi-candidate basis.

Ivanovo Obkom First Secretary Reassigned

PM2004150190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report under the general heading: "Plenums Held"]

[Text] Ivanovo, 19 Apr—A plenum of Ivanovo CPSU Obkom [oblast committee] took place today to consider an organizational question. The plenum satisfied M.A. Knyazyuk's request to be relieved of his duties as CPSU obkom first secretary in connection with his transfer to other work. The plenum thanked him for his work in the oblast party organization.

V.N. Krikhunov, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Party Building and Cadre Work Department, took part in the work of the plenum.

Lukyanov Tour of Smolensk Oblast Detailed

LD2404225290 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 24 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Comrade Lukyanov was in Smolensk 21-24 April. In labor kollektivs [collectives], in party and local soviet bodies, and in contacts with inhabitants of the town and oblast, the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman answered numerous questions. He congratulated the people of Smolensk on the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War and laid a wreath at the burial mound of glory where 15,000 soviet prisoners of war and Smolensk inhabitants were shot by the occupiers in the years of the war are buried.

Okhotsk Fishermen Push Demands, Threaten Strike

PM1704085190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by I. Zhagel under the "Topics of the Day" rubric: "Warning Protest"]

[Text] With increasing frequency editorial office teleprinters carry terse and blunt announcements of the intention of various labor collectives to call strikes. Let me note that strikes are a legitimate means, but one which is justified only if all other legitimate means have failed to produce any result whatsoever.

Yet, if this means is resorted to at the very beginning of the dialogue, is it not clearly being used as a means of applying pressure to the partner?

"The draft law on taxation published in April 1989 is on infringing our interests... As a sign of protest we are forced to organize a strike committee... We ask you to let us know within the set deadline that our demands have been looked into."

These are quotations from a teleprinter cable received at the IZVESTIYA office a few days ago. It was signed by members of the new strike committee on behalf of 361 ship crews of the Okhotsk sea fishing area.

Please note, the law does not exist yet. Only a draft. However, this seems to be enough to organize a strike committee; stir up the entire fishing fleet, it would appear; and from this position of strength to protest and make demands, while threatening a strike.

"We too have received a cable from the strike committee," G. Shapovalova, secretary of the Fish Industry Workers Union Central Committee, told me. "And neither do we understand why this question has to be raised so categorically right now. After all, four of the six main amendments submitted to us earlier by fishermen in respect of the draft law have already been adopted. We will seek to ensure that the others are also taken into account."

Why does the strike committee show such displeasure with this procedure? What is there in this procedure that deserves such a powerful and resolute protest? For objectivity's sake I must say that the trade union's Central Committee cannot agree to one of the main demands of the strike committee. Specifically, the demand that the "northern" and various other additional payments be exempt from taxation. Allow me to note that regional coefficients apply to more than 50 percent of the country's working people. How can you go about trying to wrest privileges for one category of the working people—the fishermen, for instance—while ignoring the others? This is not an easy question.

However, the strike committee is in a hurry. And under its pressure, radiograms continue to arrive at the trade union's Central Committee, and not just from the eastern, but also the northern, western, and southern basins of the country. According to the strike committee, the trade union Central Committee and IZVESTIYA should join in applying pressure on people's deputies who have the choice of taking the demands into account or facing a strike. This is what it has come to: If in the past laws were rubber-stamped under the pressure of the administrative system, an attempt is now being made to get them passed under the diktat of specific clients—in this case, the fishermen.

As if we had not burned our fingers on such legislative intolerance before.

Let us display restraint and responsibility. Let us jointly seek optimum solutions rather than thwarting them by ultimatums and threats.

Western Republics

Lvov Party Chief on 'Democratic Bloc' Deputies

PM2404140390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Apr 90 Morning Edition p2

[Own correspondent Vladimir Vukovich dispatch under the rubric "Direct Line": "Oblast Party Committee Proposes Dialogue"]

[Text] Lvov—V. Sekretaryuk has been elected obkom [oblast party committee] first secretary at a plenum of the Lvov Ukrainian Communist Party Obkom.

The Lvov communists' new leader is director of the Household and Radio Electronic Appliances Research Institute and a candidate of economic sciences.

"A different political climate has developed in the oblast since the last election campaign," V. Sekretaryuk said. "Deputies from the 'Democratic Bloc' have secured the majority of mandates in a considerable number of local soviets. But something has happened. At the election meetings, some candidates from the bloc talked about tolerance, pluralism, and respect for laws and human rights. However, they began to take a quite different tone at the very first soviet sessions. Denying everything that has been done for socioeconomic development with the active assistance of other Union republics, some are now saying that Lvov Oblast has been reduced to a state of ruin and collapse. Clearly, this is being done to absolve themselves of responsibility for the future.

"Nor can we ignore the fact that some people invested with deputies' powers are trying to take the credit for the current democratic changes. They totally ignore the indisputable fact that, were it not for bold reformist forces in the CPSU, we would have neither democratic elections, nor free rallies, nor the new political thinking.

"Having taken their place in the soviets, some deputies from the 'Democratic Bloc' have also forgotten their promise to always respect the political views of the electorate. Communists are beginning to find themselves the target of intolerance, and some people are demanding that executive committee members leave the CPSU. They are proposing the closure of schools where classes are conducted in Russian and the formation of 'purely Ukrainian' youth organizations. This is also making the situation heated.

"Intensifying confrontation with rivals is not the solution to the present situation," the obkom first secretary believes. "We believe that there are realists in the 'Democratic Bloc' who take a sober view of the present and the future. That is why we have set party committees and primary party organizations the task of overcoming the psychological barrier, conducting a constructive dialogue instead of engaging in confrontation, and doing everything possible to find ways to assist the formation of new structures of power in the name of the main task:

to bring universal benefit to the oblast's population. We have appealed to communists and enlisted their support."

Militia Show 'Restraint' During Kiev Demonstrations

*LD2304123490 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian
2100 GMT 22 Apr 90*

[Excerpts] A meeting and demonstration devoted to Earth Day was held in Kiev today. Editor Dmtryo Palamarchuk reports:

[Palamarchuk] The meeting was sanctioned by the first session of Kiev's newly elected city soviet and took place within the framework of the Chernobyl Forum in connection with the fourth anniversary of the incident at the Chernobyl power station. It was convened by the joint committee of public organizations, such as the Green World Association, the Chernobyl Society, Rukh, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, and others.

Nearly 60,000 people participated in the meeting, which was opened by Volodymyr Yavorivskyy, USSR and Ukrainian people's deputy, and afterwards addressed by USSR people's deputy Yuriy Shcherbak. [passage omitted]

Yuriy Shcherbak stated in his speech: [Begin Shcherbak recording] It is precisely today, on Earth Day that I would like to announce the creation of the Ukrainian Green Party [applause]. The idea of creating such a party has been supported by USSR people's deputies from Chernovtsy, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, and other regions. [end recording]

[Palamarchuk] Following this, Yuriy Shcherbak acquainted the meeting with the manifesto of the Ukrainian Green Party and informed that the constituent congress of this party will be held in the fall. [passage omitted]

Then the microphone was given to writer Serhiy Plachynda, who urged the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, which will meet on 15 May, to declare the political and economic independence of the Ukraine. Then he announced that the Ukrainian Peasants Party is in the process of being created. At present, the initiatory groups for creating such a party are actively working in Kiev and Lvov. [passage omitted]

However, gradually the ecological meeting has turned openly political one. Many speakers subjected the republic's leadership and communist party to sharp criticism. The event was concluded by a demonstration, with nearly 100,000 Kievites and guests of the city taking part in it. It was headed by USSR and Ukrainian people's deputies and deputies of the Kiev city soviet and of the soviets of other oblasts and towns of Ukraine. That it was an ecological procession one could only learn from posters carried by participants. But the slogans chanted by those in the moving columns, consisting mostly of members of the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth

and the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, lent this procession an essentially anticommunist and anti-Leninist character. On reaching the monument to Lenin, the participants threw down Lenin's works and text-books on Marxism-Leninism. The lines of militiamen and internal troops which encircled the monument did not respond in any way. The monument to the October Revolution in the center of Kiev and also the Lenin museum, outside of which participants of the demonstration, again mostly members of the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth, burned a portrait of Lenin; were guarded similarly. The militia detachment showed great restraint here as well.

More on Demonstrations

*LD2304210490 Moscow TASS in English 1644 GMT
23 Apr 90*

[Text] Kiev April 24 TASS—"No to second Chernobyl," "Protect the earth from ecological disaster," "Clean air to Ukrainian cities," were the calls on placards held by people during the Sunday rally and procession devoted to Earth Day in Kiev.

The event was organized by the Green World, the Chernobyl Union, the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika, the memorial and other public organizations.

Earth Day was an occasion of special significance for residents of Kiev and many regions in the Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Belorussia. The Chernobyl disaster, which shook these regions four years ago, made people acutely aware of the vulnerable and dangerous environment around them. It is not surprising, therefore, that many speakers at the rally focussed on problems relating to the Chernobyl disaster.

They voiced concern over the future of the present and upcoming generations. The Chernobyl disaster is an issue of concern not only for Soviet People—it is a universal human tragedy. International cooperation is needed to eliminate its consequences, speakers stressed.

Participants in the rally said that a comprehensive approach is needed to solve ecological problems. The expansion of atomic power stations operating in the Ukraine must be halted, the Chernobyl power plant should be shut down and the people residing in the zone adjacent to the plant resettled. The government should reimburse their material losses, speakers insisted. Other calls were for closing down economically obsolete and environmentally harmful enterprises, freezing the planning and construction of new industrial installations, especially chemical, which threaten the environment and people's health.

Speakers voiced support for the reduction of lumbering and the halting of the construction of gigantic land-improvement projects. They blasted those who insisted on draining water reservoirs and polluted rivers.

At the same time some speakers at the rally were excessively vociferous in airing their emotions, they had

no constrictive proposals to make. Ecological problems were replaced by political ones in some addresses. Some speakers attacked the Soviet and Ukrainian Communist Parties and the republican government.

After the rally closed, participants marched along downtown streets.

Demonstrations Note Chernobyl

PM2404113990 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 24 Apr 90 p 4

[Own correspondent G. Dolzhenko report under the rubric "We Report the Details": "Chernobyl Memory"]

[Text] At the initiative of many Ukrainian public organizations "Chernobyl Week" began as of 21 April in the republic.

Its participants conscientiously worked on the Leninist communist subbotnik, and in some cities the money earned was handed over to the veterans' association for eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station [AES] and to the "Children of Chernobyl" society. On 22 April, worldwide Earth Day, a Ukraine-wide ecological rally sanctioned by the city soviet's first session was held in the republic's capital and a demonstration passed along the downtown streets. Traffic on the Kreshchatik, with the exception of the ecologically clean trams and trolley-buses, stopped for almost the entire day—as a sign of the united efforts against environmental pollution. Similar actions are being staged in all the republic's large centers.

A scientific-practical and humanitarian conference is planned for 24-25 April in Kiev. The next day the state flags of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] will be lowered to half-mast on the Supreme Soviet, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and local soviet executive committee buildings. Rallies and pickets are planned around the AES and establishments responsible for the Chernobyl tragedy. In the evening of 26 April there will be public prayers in the central squares, and at 8 pm people and transportation will freeze for five minutes' silence, in national mourning for all those who died and suffered on that bitter day; sirens will sound, bells will toll, and thousands of candles will burn. The memory of Chernobyl must be for all of us a final warning for the future.

Chernobyl Week Marked by Conference, Meetings

LD2404132290 Moscow *Domestic Service in Russian*
1000 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Chernobyl Week is in progress in the Ukraine. A scientific, practical, and humanitarian conference is planned for Kiev today and tomorrow. The following day the state flags of the Ukrainian SSR are to be lowered on the buildings of the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and the executive committees of the local soviets. Meetings and pickets are planned next to the nuclear plant and the

establishments responsible for the Chernobyl tragedy. There will be public prayers in the central squares on Thursday evening and at 2000 people and traffic will stop for a five-minute silence of national grief for all those who died or suffered on that sad day. Sirens will sound, bells toll and thousands of candles will be lit. The memory of Chernobyl must be the last warning for the future for us all.

Scientists Demand Closure

LD2204232490 Moscow *World Service in English*
2100 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] It is nearly four years since the accident occurred at the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl. The Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has decreed 26th April as Chernobyl Tragedy Day in the republic. Local experts have been discussing the prospects of building a complex to process the radioactively contaminated trash accumulated in the 30-km zone around the nuclear power station. Ukrainian scientists are demanding that the Chernobyl station be stopped altogether. The president of the republican Academy of Sciences, Boris Paton, insists on the closure because, in his view, the construction of a concrete sarcophagus has only localized the dangerous process but not put it under full control. The Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers has approved a government program of urgent measures to eradicate the aftermath of the accident. The program will cost R16 billion.

Chernobyl Effects Viewed

LD2404043490 Moscow *TASS in English* 0428 GMT
24 Apr 90

[By TASS Correspondent Aleksei Petrunya]

[Text] Kiev April 24 TASS—The radiological situation in the Ukraine remains complicated despite large-scale decontamination measures that were carried out at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant during the four years that have passed since the disaster.

Speaking at a news conference held at the Ukrainian Public Health Ministry on Monday, Ukrainian Public Health Minister Yuriy Spizhenko emphasized that medical workers had carried out a package of measures to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl tragedy.

Persons submitted to radiological contamination are recorded. Persons who suffered during the Chernobyl disaster undergo regular medical checkups. The system of radiation monitoring over population has been established in contaminated areas.

The level of incidence of diseases in the contaminated zone has been stable over the past three years and has even lowered in some areas as the result of improved medical care and the system of health-improvement measures.

However, more and more adults in contaminated regions are developing the disease of the thyroid and hypertension.

Taking into account these factors, Spizhenko said that the Ukrainian Public Health Ministry will focus its activities on resettling people from contaminated territories and creating safe conditions of habitation for those who want to remain in those areas, in the years 1990-95 and the years after.

Chernobyl Children To Be Sent to Cuba

90UN1340B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
1 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by T. Mayboroda: "A Press Conference at the Ministry of Health: Charity and Glasnost"]

[Text] People from various countries are now giving a helping hand to those who have suffered from the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. The manner in which these gifts of charity are managed in the Ukraine was discussed at a press conference held on 27 February which was jointly sponsored by the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Ministry of Health, the republic Red Cross Society, and the People's Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroika.

The discussion transcended the designated topic of distributing drugs, vitamins, foodstuffs, and clothing delivered to Kiev from the United States and Canada. For example, the journalists were interested to learn who selected the children suffering from the accident for a curative trip to Israel and in what manner, and how a similar group for treatment in Cuba is being formed.

Representatives of a group of post-Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station accident cleanup workers who are now being treated at the All-Union Scientific Center for Radiation Medicine attended the conference. They announced the resumption of a discontinued hunger strike, which was caused by failure to meet their social demands.

Yu.P. Spizhenko, Ukrainian SSR Minister of Health; I.I. Usichenko, chairman of the Red Cross Society of the Ukraine Central Committee; and G.P. Antonyuk, representative of the People's Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroika, responded to questions from the audience.

Belorussian Party Official Addresses Minsk Rally

90UN1311A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 27 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[From the "People in the Squares" column by BELTA and SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA correspondents]

[Excerpt] The nearer last weekend approached, the more tension grew in the cities of the republic, large and small. Rumors about pogroms, hooligan activities, mass conspiracies and the ouster of the authorities which were in

preparation were passed on from house to house. In such a tense situation no meetings were allowed to be held in some places. Elsewhere they were held. And it should be mentioned at once—practically no serious excesses or offenses were recorded. This is what correspondents of SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA and BELTA report from various cities of the republic.

Minsk

Having applied to the city soviet executive committee for permission to hold a mass meeting-demonstration, the organizers formulated the subject of discussion: "Protest Action Against the Violation of Election Law." True, numerous leaflets calling on citizens of Minsk to come to Lenin Square on Sunday shifted the emphases in another direction—expressing no confidence in the republic government. The participants in the demonstration had arrived at V.I. Lenin Square by 1400 hours.

The organizers' opening remarks set a sharply critical tone. A call for the work of the Central Electoral Commission to be considered not competent and a protest against the refusal to register a number of candidates from informal organizations were heard.

M.I. Lagir, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission for the election of Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies, mounted the platform. He noted that he was largely in sympathy with those who were criticizing certain provisions of the Election Law.

"I have already written about this in the press, and, following the elections, the Central Commission will submit its proposals to the republic Supreme Soviet. I wish to state with all due responsibility that the commission is operating in accordance with the law. Representatives of the mass media and persons with an interest in the solution of this question or the other are constantly present at our meetings. All the decisions of the commission, I stress, all, are adopted openly, by way of a ballot and without any outside pressure. At its meetings the commission has studied over 70 complaints connected with the registration of candidates for deputy. In nine instances it was suggested that the district electoral commissions for the elections of Belorussian SSR people's deputies who had been in breach of the Election Law register the nominated candidates. We met with Z.S. Poznyak in the Central Electoral Commission, where we answered in detail the questions put to us."

Whether these arguments were heard by all those gathered in the square we do not know. The whistling and shouting of "Off! Off!" competed with powerful loudspeakers.

Activists of what is, perhaps, the republic's youngest movement, "Democratic Accord," had assembled two hours before the start of the meeting in Lenin Square at Minsk's Political Education Center. They formulated a resolution, which was expounded by K. Ostrinskiy, secretary of the Belorussian Leninist Communist Youth League Central Committee. The "Democratic Accord"

public action committee believes that only on the basis of accord, compromise, and tolerance of one another is it possible to extricate the republic from the crisis. It is essential to create a body of public supervision of the "Chernobyl in Belorussia" United Front and create a committee for Belorussia's protection against radiation under the aegis of the IAEA. We demand that proceedings be instituted against those guilty of concealing information about the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe and the registration of all public and political movements, including the Belorussian People's Front, aside from those which call for violence and national enmity. A call for a "roundtable" with all democratic movements of the republic was heard.

N.I. Dementey, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, was unable to join in the discussion right away. Those assembled reacted ambivalently—many with clamor, hollering and whistling—when he was called upon to speak. N.I. Dementey began his speech with a comment on this reaction:

"Diversity of forms of communication between people and free exchange of the most varied viewpoints on the most pressing problems troubling everyone may rightly be called a principal conquest of perestroyka. But on one condition: Each of us must be prepared to listen to his opponent and soberly comprehend his arguments. We have come here not to level at one another merely rebukes, mutual accusations and insults, although, of course, reasonable, cogent criticism does no harm.

"Let us take the Election Law.... Naturally, not everything in it is ideal, and various interpretations of individual articles are possible. But it needs to be said objectively that the law, as a whole, is democratic and permits the election of people's deputies on a broad democratic basis. There are approximately five candidates currently per seat in the republic Supreme Soviet. There are electoral districts where 10 and more candidates per seat are registered. There are also those where there is just one. And we should not look for an individual's machinations here, this is not contrary to the law, which permits the nomination of any number of candidates.

"We are about to live in accordance with the laws of a state based on the rule of law. And for them to be formulated we need to elect the people's deputies who will determine these laws."

Many people were expecting a speech from nuclear physicist S.S. Shushkevich on the Chernobyl problems. However, the USSR people's deputy cautioned that on this occasion he would not touch on the nuclear tragedy but would dwell on the political situation in the republic.

The speaker accused the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission of having done nothing, as a deputy of the republic Supreme Soviet, to improve the Election Law and demanded his resignation and also the registration of the Belorussian People's Front.

The difficult job of answering many of the questions which arose during the meeting on behalf of the political leadership of the republic was undertaken by Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee. His appearance on the platform evoked a clamor which went on for a long time. Those conducting the meeting were forced repeatedly to call on those assembled to behave decently and uphold standards of debate.

"When I made the decision to take part in this large meeting," Ye.Ye. Sokolov said, "I proceeded from the fact that we would try all together to deliberate and exchange opinions as to how to improve the life of the people of Soviet Belorussia from now on. I believed that we would raise serious problems concerning the economy and culture and the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl tragedy. I believed that you would put forward specific, convincing proposals.

"There is today a mass of problems. And the first is the transition to our republic's self-financing and self-management and the acquisition of economic independence, which we have never had. And if today our government has the right to maintain under its control more than 50 percent of the enterprises located on its territory, this is a big victory in itself. Another important problem is the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. A major state program for elimination of the consequences of the accident has been drawn up in our republic for the first time. It will be examined at the USSR Supreme Soviet session. It is contemplated allocating R18 billion to this end."

The first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee went on to dwell on problems of health care and the search for paths of the republic's transition to economic independence. He emphasized that progress toward a living standard worthy of us would depend on how everyone worked in his outfit.

...Zenon Poznyak, leader of the "Adradzhenne" Belorussian People's Front, mounted the platform. He essentially posed the question of power in his speech.

"Our society is divided into two parts," he emphasized. "On the one hand the CPSU, on the other, the Belorussian People's Front, the democratic organizations and the entire democratic community. Such a situation cannot be deemed useful because tension may grow to the point where conflict occurs. For this reason it is necessary to do everything to raise issues opportunely. Power is in the hands of the CPSU, in the hands of the monopoly party schedule. The trouble, further, is not only the fact that the Belorussian Communist Party is the most conservative, most reactionary and most antipopular, the problem is that its ideology is national nihilism. This is the only one of all the republic parties whose ideology is based on nonrecognition of its own people, its own culture, and its own language. Over dozens of years they have brought our society to a place where we have lost our history, have forgotten the

priests, and are forgetting our language. Throughout man's history there has been no more pernicious organization than that based on the ideology of Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, and Maoism. They have drunk the blood of half the planet, wiped out tens of millions of people, destroyed whole nations, trampled culture, and trampled religion and our morality. But God made man sturdy, and we are recovering."

Z. Posnyak sees an opportunity for the party's continued existence in its repentance. He categorically rejects the possibility of dialogue. The leader of the Belorussian People's Front formulated his position in this form.

Of course, the meeting in Minsk was far from exhausted by the speeches, fragments of which have been presented above.

The meeting adopted an appeal which expresses no confidence in the Central Electoral Commission and the leadership of the republic and contains a call to the electorate to vote for candidates adhering to a democratic platform, a demand that Belorussia be declared a disaster zone and others.

The appeal was read out in full on republic television by the organizers of the meeting shortly after it ended.

Belorussian Leaders View 25 Feb Minsk Rally

*90UN1340A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 1 Mar 90 pp 1, 3*

[Report on TV program in which Belorussian party and government leaders discuss the authorized rally in Minsk on 25 February 1990: "Balancing Emotions and a Constructive Approach"]

[Text] As previously reported, a citywide rally organized by a number of informal movements was held in Minsk on 25 February. It adopted an appeal, which the leaders of the Belorussian People's Front [BNF] presented on Belorussian Television.

The same night, the leaders of the republic who took part in the rally came to the TV studio. A detailed conversation took place touching on many issues debated in the course of a heated discussion in Lenin Square. We are publishing an abbreviated stenographic record of this conversation at the request of our readers.

Anchorman:

We have in our studio Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia; N.I. Dementey, chairman of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium; M.I. Lagir, chairman of the Central Commission for the Election of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies; A.A. Malofeyev, first secretary of the Minsk Communist Party of Belorussia Oblast Committee [Obkom]; V.A. Pechennikov, Communist Party of Belorussia Central Committee secretary; N.N. Mazay, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers; V.K. Kondratyev, first deputy prosecutor

of the republic; V.G. Tikhinya, Belorussian SSR Minister of Justice; and M.I. Misuno, first secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia Minsk City Committee [Gorkom].

Ye.Ye. Sokolov:

Esteemed fellow countrymen, our meeting today is necessitated by the events that occurred in Minsk. An authorized rally was held in Lenin Square in which 12,000-15,000 people participated. It is hard to discuss my first impression. It is ambiguous. Not one of the speakers stated considerations of his own with regard to the problems, big or small, that concern the people of Soviet Belorussia at present. Essentially, the issues of our economy, including industry and construction, the social sphere, education, and language were not raised. The particularly important topic of eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident was not outlined constructively. If anyone raised one of these issues, it was only in the aspect of condemnation and stoking up passions. There were no constructive suggestions.

I also had to take the platform. It could be seen that a small group situated right next to the platform was particularly unhappy with the participation in the meetings of the leadership of the Central Committee, Supreme Soviet, Council of Ministers, and the oblast and city committees of the party. It could also be seen that quite a few people did not share the point of view of the organizers of the rally.

I reject entirely and completely all the accusations that were made from the podium of the large gathering in Lenin Square and subsequently in the studio, and primarily the one to the effect that the party, soviet, Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], and trade union organs and organizations attempted to aggravate the situation and even scare the populace. I will stress that not one communist, Komsomol member, or honest trade union member has ever engaged, is engaging, or will engage in this. We have been doing, are doing, and will do everything that is now necessary for the people.

I have met with the residents of Stolinskiy Rayon a great deal recently. Why? This is one of the many rayons in our republic that have been affected by the Chernobyl accident. I must say that the people expect actual, practical work by all who are capable of easing their pain to at least some degree, rather than rallies and hollow long-winded speeches.

The fact that even those who know how the endeavor of eliminating the consequences of this misfortune in our republic is progressing try to distort everything causes very mixed feelings. After all, the Council of Ministers of the republic, in cooperation with scientists and practitioners, did compile an extensive program for eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. It is an expensive program worth R18 billion. The Supreme

Soviet of our republic carefully considered this program, confirmed it, and submitted it to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

At the request of people's deputies from our republic, this issue was included in the group of priority issues, and will be considered at the current session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. What is the objective? To set up a unified state program that would make it possible to successfully absorb all of these tremendous capital resources in terms of both financing and materials. A colossal effort by the peoples of not only Soviet Belorussia but of the entire Union will be required.

What have we done, and what are we doing now? Until recently, many local construction workers were assigned to various regions of our country, including Pskov and Bryansk Oblast, Tyumen, the Baykal-Amur Main Line, and Armenia. I must tell you that by now they have been recalled from all regions, with the exception of Armenia, and have been assigned to work in the affected rayons.

We have recalled almost all of them from Armenia. Just a small number of specialists remain because we cannot transport our equipment from there due to the absence of regular railroad traffic.

Improving the operation of health care in the republic is the second problem which likewise was not addressed in the square. The most sensitive issues include the supply of medicines and production of the equipment needed in order to outfit hospitals and polyclinics. What is being done? In Drogichinskiy Rayon, a very large enterprise for producing protein for animal husbandry was under construction. Last year, on the suggestion of the central committee and the government of the republic, this plant was changed over with a view to turning out 200 million disposable syringes and 500 million needles for them. Early this year, a plant in Gomel Oblast began operations which will also produce 200 million disposable syringes a year. Thus, in the course of this and the following year the republic will produce 400 million disposable syringes and 500 million needles for them.

What next? There is the issue of cadres. We may produce equipment, we may master the production of various medical preparations, but who is going to practice diagnostics? The task we are facing is to have a branch of a medical institute in every oblast that does not have a medical institute at present, counting on it becoming an independent medical establishment in a year to one and a half years. This is the most significant issue for Belorussia.

Sometimes, they make great claims against us, I would even say accuse the republic leadership of turning down the funds which the country allocated for eliminating this misfortune in the initial period after the accident at the Chernobyl AES. I must say that those who make such statements are either uninformed, proceed from rumors, or just know nothing. In the initial period after the accident there was only one task—to subdue unit four and avert the danger of an explosion at the three other

units of the station. After all, there was a real danger that the three other units of the nuclear power station would explode. The contaminated zone could have been considerably larger had they not taken harsh, rapid measures at the time. By now, the issue of curtailing the operation of the Chernobyl station has been resolved.

Belorussia, the Ukraine, or Russia did not have an opportunity to use the main resources because they were marshaled for this purpose, the common purpose of subduing the reactor. When the time came for further actions, it turned out that in essence neither the union nor our republic scientific establishments had any data. There was no such experience in the world practice either. Only recently not even a science but rather the beginnings of a science have appeared in the union academy and in ours.

Thus far, we have taken this path: There should be no settlement where clean products cannot be obtained for everyday life. I consider this requirement to be correct. This is why all those who so wish are given an opportunity to leave the zone.

Anchorman:

BNF representatives put the number of participants in the rally at 100,000, and you mentioned a completely different number. Which one is correct?

Ye.Ye. Sokolov:

I mentioned a number based on the data at the disposal of official organs. After all, any counting of people is done on the basis of a particular pattern rather than just getting up on the podium, looking around, and making a statement—500,000, 200,000, or 100,000. According to Ministry of Internal Affairs data it was determined that somewhere between 11,000 and 13,000 people were there, and subsequently, after verification, 12,000 to 15,000 people.

V.G. Tikhinya:

Participants in the rally demanded that the Central Electoral Commission be disbanded. As a professional lawyer, I will say that this is an illegal action. The point is that, as is known, the Central Electoral Commission was elected on 4 November of last year at a session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, and only the Supreme Soviet has a right to repeal its own decision. A serious charge was leveled against the Central Electoral Commission to the effect that it allowed violations of the Law on Elections to occur in the course of considering the complaints of individual candidate people's deputies. As a member of the Central Electoral Commission, I am stating that this is a lie and slander. I have been present at all the meetings of the commission which were held in an environment of extensive glasnost, with the participation of the public and the press.

More than 70 complaints from candidate people's deputies were filed with the Central Electoral Commission. All of them were carefully investigated. The decisions

were made openly, by a vote. For those who are now rebuking the commission for violating the Law on Elections, I would like to recall an oriental saying which states: It is difficult to find a black cat in a dark room, especially if it is not there. The Central Electoral Commission was guided in its work by the law, and only the law.

As a member of the Central Electoral Commission, I consider today's rally and the rally held in front of the House of Political Education in Minsk on 10 February to be a means of forcible pressure. Putting it mildly, this is an improper action.

Anchorman: Hasn't the Central Electoral Commission explained all of that before?

V.G. Tikhinya:

It seems to me that there has been enough information. Together with Mikhail Ivanovich Lagir we spoke on TV, on the radio, and in the press. The facts are being deliberately manipulated. Those who accused us understood very well themselves that no violations of the law were allowed to occur. I want to voice my personal opinion. The rally makes me depressed. A certain segment of the populace interpreted perestroika as an appeal for permissiveness. I became convinced of this today. This is a dangerous error. Our democracy has nothing in common with lack of discipline, willfulness, and irresponsibility. Democracy outside the law amounts to anarchy. The law is the law for the very reason that all are equal before it, formals and informals alike. I appeal to my fellow countrymen for prudence. In the democratic state which we are building we should obey Soviet laws and be law-abiding in the good sense of the word.

Anchorman:

Dissatisfaction with the actions of the electoral commissions did not come out of nowhere. Even the mail to our television shows that everything was not necessarily done right all the time. However, I believe that these also are the costs of our just learning democracy.

M.I. Lagir:

Indeed, the Central Electoral Commission reviewed 70 complaints. Some of the issues were successfully resolved locally. In nine cases, okrug electoral commissions which allowed violations of the Law on Elections to occur were asked to register the candidates. Thus Comrades Gusak, Tsumarov, and some others were given an opportunity to continue their struggle for the seats of deputies. At the same time, we annulled the registration of 13 candidates in conjunction with grave violations of the Law on Elections.

I would like to discuss in more detail those whose names were mentioned today. Georgiy Semenovich Mukhin, a brigade leader from the Elektronmash Plant. He was nominated Belorussia candidate people's deputy by the collective of the plant in Leninskiy Electoral Okrug No.

One and a meeting of voters at the place of residence in Plekhanovskiy Electoral Okrug No. Four. Mukhin agreed to run, but not in electoral okrug no. one where he would have naturally been registered but in district no. four where he neither lives nor works. Under the law, we cannot register such a candidate. The registration of Mikhail Mikhaylovich Sobol was also discussed. He was nominated candidate people's deputy by a meeting of voters at the place of residence in Mayakovskiy Electoral Okrug No. Two where he neither resided nor worked as of the time the meeting was held. At the meeting, Sobol introduced himself as an employee of ZhES [expansion unknown] No. Nine, although he has not been hired and has not worked a day there. The last name mentioned was that of Viktor Antonovich Ivashkevich, a worker of the Minsk Intrabranche Enterprise of Industrial Railway Transportation. A meeting of voters at the place of residence was scheduled for 20 January but was not held. It was rescheduled for 22 January; however, by the time of voting the voters had left. The okrug electoral commission and the executive committee, i.e., those who are supposed to organize the meetings of voters at the place of residence, considered that holding further meetings was infeasible. However, on 23 January Comrades Khodyko and Poznyak appeared and held a meeting at the vocational school of Soviet trade. The registration of participants was conducted without the participation of the okrug commission. This resulted in more than 30 people being entered on the list who were not residents of this okrug. The main point is that the okrug commission refused to register Ivashkevich on 30 January, but he filed a complaint at the Central Commission as late as 16 February, after all deadlines had passed.

We do not have any bias against these people. They have violated the law, whose requirements we cannot forego.

V.K. Kondratyev:

The topic of the rally was defined in advance as follows: A protest action against violations of election legislation. This is what the discussion should have been about. The appeal says that the sociopolitical situation in the republic was discussed, the anti-democratic activities of the Electoral Commission and the nomenklatura were condemned, as were the inaction of the leadership, the antipeople conservatism of the authorities, and so forth. Why did they need to mislead the authorities in this case? It turned out that the designated main issue became a partial one. Expressing lack of confidence in the republic's Supreme Soviet and the Communist Party of Belorussia Central Committee was emphasized instead. They even "tied" Gdlyan and Ivanov to this. In short, this is an unscrupulous approach on the part of those who applied for permission to hold the rally.

Secondly, concerning the demand for the judicial investigation of certain ranking functionaries. At present, we must have sufficient grounds in order to file criminal charges against anybody. We do not have the findings of

scientists. We are being pushed toward the arbitrary rule of the 1930's through the 1950's, which we now condemn.

Furthermore, why weren't the BNF and Martirolog registered? As far as I know, the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and Law was charged with studying the program and statute of these public organizations from the point of view of legality. The institute, the Ministry of Justice, and the Procuracy stated their opinions. In total, there were more than 10 points in the documents that ran counter to the constitution. This is why the BNF representatives were told: Esteemed comrades, we have nothing against you, we will support you, but bring us your corrected program and statute. However, they have not done this, but at the rally they demanded that antidemocratic ukases be rescinded.

Anchorman:

Actions were committed at the rally that smeared the honor and dignity of individual candidate people's deputies. What steps does the Procuracy expect to take in conjunction with this?

V.K. Kondratyev:

Criminal charges will be filed with regard to all the violations allowed to occur. They will have to answer to the law for insulting a citizen, a candidate people's deputy.

Anchorman:

Valeriy Andreyevich! The appeal adopted at the meeting referred to the party dictating to the mass media...

V.A. Pechennikov:

The speakers who raised the issue of liberating the mass media from party control are not aware of its essence. The party, the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], the trade unions, and other public organizations have their own mass media. In the latter editorial boards operate which are entirely responsible for the content of these publications.

It has now been resolved to expand the editorial boards and to incorporate workers, creative-arts intellectuals, and scientists in them even without waiting for the Law on the Press which, I think, will make everything clear.

I am also a candidate deputy, and during my meetings with the voters I am often asked this question: Why am I guided by the platform of the Communist Party of Belorussia in my preelection activities? I respond: Because this platform is realistic and addressed to the people. We have already begun implementing many of its points. Let us look at the resolution of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers on preferences for soldiers who have returned from Afghanistan. Our republic was the first to do this; for the first time, our government assumed responsibility regardless of the

view they were going to take of us at the top. Decisions have been made concerning improvements in the situation of families with many children and of toilers who have a low minimum subsistence level.

A meeting of the Communist Party of Belorussia Central Committee Bureau was held recently at which the communists who head the government, the State Planning Committee, and the Ministry of Finance were assigned to propose immediate suggestions to the government of the republic with a view to making a decision on eliminating the spread in payments in prices for meat products between the rural and urban areas. This is a great endeavor. Implementing it costs 2.647 billion rubles, but we have taken this step.

We subscribe to the platform of the Communist Party of Belorussia because this is a platform of the Communist Party, which preserved its unity and the unity of the Belorussian people at the most complex time, when a wave of events which are known to all swept many regions.

A.A. Malofeyev:

We envisioned the rally we are now discussing differently: The people will come, share their views, air sore points, and arrive at approaches to solving the major issues that now concern all of us. Unfortunately, this was not the case. It appears that the main goal of the sponsors of this rally was to sling as much mud as possible at both the party and official structures, bring pressure to bear, and show that, supposedly, only proceeding from such positions may we resolve all issues.

Now is not that kind of time. Ours is a time when confrontation brings about very grave consequences. Our country has already had enough sad and tragic experience. At present, we need only the consolidation of forces, the unification of everything healthy around perestroika and renewal. Incidentally, nobody will be able to turn anything back; our society may take only this path. Responsibility, democratic means of solving problems, parliamentary forms of struggle, and obeying the law are the main points along this path. If the law does not do its job, a society is condemned to peril. This means chaos, anarchy, economic collapse, and the wretched subsistence of people.

We have now come to the brink, and if confrontation is stepped up further we will push our society into the abyss. Then the people will not forgive either the right or the left. Hence, the degree of responsibility for all actions should be very high. I felt that the topical scope of the meeting was directed against the party so as to portray it in the most unsightly manner on the eve of the elections. Some say that the party should repent. Like my comrades, like millions of communists, I have never applied a double standard of morality, and I have nothing to atone for. It is another matter that we cannot renounce our responsibility for what is happening with the socio-political situation, for the mounting economic crisis, and

for the deteriorating life of the people. However, who has assumed responsibility for getting out of the dead end?

Anchorman:

I believe that at present no participant in the rally, even the most radically-minded, can name any other force which could replace the party. This is one remark; the second one is that the informals very frequently accuse the party and other leaders of foisting their views on various kinds of meetings. Supposedly, these are the views of the presidium and not of the meeting. Let us look at their appeal, however. Was it really drafted during the rally?

A.A. Malofeyev:

Clearly, the appeal was merely read there. This means that once again the opinion of a certain group of people was imposed.

During this week, I happened to meet with the collective of the Production Association of Computer Equipment, the Plant imeni the October Revolution. There, a certain segment of the communists has difficulty embracing the multiparty system. They view this as a retreat. However, I will say bluntly that this is still the imperative of the time; apparently, this reality has to be taken into account. Still, in the nearest future the Communist Party will fight for the leading role by way of its actual deeds, its authority, which it should gain directly from the people rather than through constitutional guarantees. It is another matter if various parties begin spontaneously mushrooming now in what I would call the environment of a weak state system, lack of adjustment, and unmanageability—in this case, we face the threat of new complications. Apparently, the parties are not going to fight for perestroika, for improving the life of the people, but rather for grabbing power. Meanwhile, the people will have to pay for the results. This is why I believe that at present the question of consolidating the democratic forms of development becomes more than an issue for one side and the other: the BNF, the Communist Party of Belorussia, and so on. All the people, all those who want our society to be happy and healthy, should get involved in this very complex and multifaceted process. Great difficulties, great impediments, and complications await us along this path; however, I am certain that we will arrive at the kind of society we have been dreaming of if common sense prevails. We will certainly not arrive there in the manner indicated by today's rally.

Ye.Ye. Sokolov:

Today in the square it came to the party being blamed for the repressions that occurred in the year 1937 and others, the party which, incidentally, suffered more than anyone else. Let us put the question this way: How can the entire party be accused of the shortcomings and miscalculations that occurred in the country? If, say, Aliyev or Rashidov is guilty, why shouldn't they say that it is precisely Aliyev or Rashidov who is guilty, and what he is to blame for. However, you cannot defame and spit

upon the entire party. Nobody has a right to do that. In the 1930's in Belorussia 99 of 101 first secretaries of rayon and city party committees were subjected to repression. The same was the case in all oblast party committees, oblast executive committees, the party central committee, the Academy of Sciences, and all ministries. The party itself faced what they now try to attack it for doing from both the left and the right. On the basis of what? Sometimes, it dawns on the "accusers": I did not know, they say. However, I will never accept that the speaker who came to the podium today did not know this.

Anchorman:

If he does not know this he has no right to come to the podium.

N.I. Dementey:

When I went to the rally today I thought that the best forces would be there, that the best minds would show themselves. They will show their concern for the Belorussian people, suggest how the problems should be solved in the economy, in politics, and in the field of ethical relations. However, what happened today indicated that thus far there has been no progress. The organizers of the rally have no concern at all for the people and for the normalcy of their way of life. No matter how they criticize me, I tell them: You are dragging us backward, toward repression, toward violence. There was nothing in the square that resembles the manner in which a democratic society should develop here.

A call was made not to allow a single apparatchik to become a people's deputy. This was also set forth in the appeal. However, a foundation of rights and law is necessary first of all for what was initiated in 1985. The Supreme Soviet of the republic also has to change qualitatively now that the USSR Supreme Soviet has been formed by the Congress of People's Deputies for the first time, and subsequently, the oblast, rayon, and rural soviets will have to change accordingly. However, if people come there who are motivated only by emotions, with no professional or legal expertise or the ability to organize people, nothing will change, and things may even worsen.

The new Law on Elections in our republic, which was adopted last year, emerged with a lot of difficulty. There was a lot of debate and controversial opinion both before the session and during it. Fortunately, the deputies came to a consensus which reflects the requests of our people.

Of the 37 years I have been working, I have been in the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium for 6 months. During this short period of time the deputies—rather than myself—have twice considered the issue of adopting the State Program for Eliminating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident. We have twice returned it to the government for additional work in order to take into account all the requests of the people

residing in this zone. Likewise, the Law on the Belorussian Language was not viewed unambiguously. However, it appears that we have found a version acceptable to all the residents of the republic.

Ye.Ye. Sokolov:

I have several more questions: The first one is about the demand made at the rally that the Bureau and the full Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia resign. This is an in-house party matter. A reports-and-elections campaign will soon be held in the primary, rayon, city, and oblast party organizations, and in the party central committee. This is the way the communists will decide, and they will elect to their organs who they will. There can be no other variant in this matter.

Second, the republic has switched over to self-financing and self-management. This is an experiment. We tried for a very long time to secure this right from the union leadership. What was the reason for this pressing request? Ours is a large republic, its industrial and agricultural potential is very big. At present, only Belorussia and Azerbaijan have a positive financial balance. Why Azerbaijan? It sells oil, whereas in Belorussia we have a very high level of development of industry and agricultural production.

Proceeding from this, I made the following statement at the rally: He who produces is at present not the master, but rather the one who allocates. What did my idea boil down to? Let us look at our tractor plant. It produces 100,000 tractors a year, but the republic has the right to buy only 5,000. After all, the Union ministry gets to distribute them. It turns out that those who produce this machinery are not its masters. But they interpreted my thought in a completely different manner without letting me complete it.

We should also bear another thing in mind: We are not operating in a vacuum. We have to trade, and trade once again. Belorussia purchases 6 million tons of grain, of which 2 million are for human consumption, and 4 million for animal fodder. All the wheat bread on our tables is purchased elsewhere. At present, the operational phrase is: We give them, they give us. Nobody gives anything away or gets it free of charge. We sell things, and they sell them to us. We have to learn how to trade, boost the amount of production, and, based on this, engage in trade boldly and confidently. We will only be successful when we grasp everything that we see around us and come to as much of an understanding as possible.

Belorussian Contamination Concerns Discussed

LD2004212790

[Editorial report] Moscow Television in Russian at 1700 GMT on 20 April broadcasts in its "Vremya" newscast a three-minute report by correspondent T. Komarova on Belorussian concerns over excessive radiation contamination. She reports that "discussion of the state and

republican programs to deal with the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station], has led to great disputes over the main criterion governing resettlement—at present it is based on a maximum radiation dose of 35 rems in 70 years of life."

The correspondent reports from Belorussia, a "rayon that has a high degree of radiation contamination." It is as though nature itself has died, yet life goes on in the villages. While the video shows people and animals going about their daily lives in a nearly deserted village, Komarova asks: "How can anyone live in a place where it is said that there is no hazard to life, but you shouldn't go into the forest, or bathe in the river, or keep a cow?" At best, there is one dosimeter per village soviet, but, she continues, there is more than one way of measuring danger: "The doctors are leaving. In just the past three months, six doctors have left the rayon. There are virtually no doctors in the village hospitals. And so a doctor from the rayon hospital does the rounds as best he can. But in the rayon hospital they are 16 short of the 55 doctors required. Yet it is hard to condemn the doctors who leave here or do not come here. For who knows what effect the radiation will have, even if you don't get 30 rems in your lifetime? What effect will it have on your existing illnesses? And might the stress not conspire with the radiation to cut short your life?"

Komarova goes on to report that the commissions from the USSR and Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Ministries of Health say there has been no increase in the rates of illness. She says: "One might have believed these celebrities had they not then written this, for example," and goes on to read: "There is a definite need to expand immediately the Belorussian Ministry of Health's Institute of Radiation Medicine in order to allow sick people from rayons contaminated by radionuclides greater access to screening and treatment. Signed by Professor Goncharik." While this quote is being read out the video shows a map of Chervikovsky Rayon in Mogilev Oblast.

Correspondent Komarova continues on to report that V.P. Platonov, president of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Sciences, has this to say: "There is a generally accepted concept that rejects thresholds, and states that no dose of radiation is absolutely safe for the human organism. And therefore, the way I see it, the utmost efforts should be made to take account of this concept and reduce the risk to the health of people living in these areas."

Komarova goes on to say that the Chernobyl accident has altered scientific thinking. She says: "Most scientists say that the concept of 35 rems in a lifetime is inhuman. The state must provide financial assistance to everyone who wishes to resettle. Meanwhile, as the dispute goes on, people are losing heart and hope."

As the video shows a peasant stoking his fire, she concludes: "They stoke up their stoves with contaminated wood, and sit by their domestic reactors."

Belorussia Condemned for Sowing Radioactive Fields
90UN1528B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 16, 18 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent for Belorussia A. Kozlovich: "Kamikaze Are Needed"]

[Text] Question: What is spring sowing needed for if it imperils those who sow, reap, and consume?

Answer: "Almost four years have passed since Chernobyl. How long can we wait? The area of agricultural land in our republic has shrunk considerably... Our loaf of bread will turn out to be quite a bit smaller. Meanwhile, on a considerable segment of the affected land we may grow fodder crops, keep cattle, and produce uncontaminated beef... At present, we are responsible for finding out how quickly measures can be devised so that the wounded land can be useful and serve the people."

A.S. Kamay, secretary for agriculture of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, came up with this answer to the burning question at a meeting with journalists in January. Please note: The "measures" have not been devised yet, but the beef is already "uncontaminated."

You understand that once again what is at issue is the Chernobyl trouble or, more precisely, a method to overcome it which has been found in Belorussia. Over there, they simply... went ahead with sowing! Regardless of the clouds of radioactive dust which the spring wind is spreading over the still unaffected fields, meadows, and villages... Of course, over the people as well.

However, we cannot say that Comrade Kamay, who has already become second secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee has no concern for the people whatsoever. Recommendations of the Agroindustrial Committee have been transmitted to the farms: "Row-spacing cultivation is to be reduced to a minimum, and, if necessary, is to be done when the condition of the soil ensures a minimum of dust separation."

A more specific question: How do you sow without raising dust?

Answer: You do not to sow at all. However, the courage and responsibility needed to say this are lacking.

Kamikaze are needed to sow it. They are also necessary for row-spacing cultivation, and subsequently for harvesting and eating.

Chernobyl needs us, it needs us, it needs us....

Moldavian KGB Chairman Interviewed on Glasnost
LD2404165890 Moscow World Service in Russian
0930 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Excerpts] [Presenter] Only good comes from glasnost; these were the parting words of Georgiy Lavranchuk, chairman of the Moldavian State Security Committee, as

we said good-bye at the end of an interview. Before that, he had answered all my questions, and I will now play you a recording of our conversation:

[Begin recording] [Presenter] Georgiy Ivanovich, I know that lately you have had many meetings with residents, not only of Kishinev but of the whole republic. Tell me, what are the questions that concern them today? What are the questions they put to the KGB chairman?

[Lavranchuk] If one looks at all the processes taking place in the country there is the process of politicization, of an enhanced level of activity by the broad masses, and it is natural that increased interest in the state security bodies should be apparent. First and foremost, an absolute majority of citizens are interested in whether the state security bodies have been affected by perestroika, and if so, to what extent. Our answer is yes, perestroika has affected the state security bodies, and it has done so in a deep, fundamental, and serious way.

What form does this take? First, the bodies belonging to the State Security Committee are now on the road of strict observance of socialist laws. And we say forthrightly to citizens: No forces now will push us from this road of strict observance of the law. We will make no concessions, we will bow to no appeals from particular officials or citizens when they try to involve us in dealing with various issues that clearly are outside the competence of the state security bodies. For those grave periods that occurred in the history of our state and of the state security bodies resulted from the state security bodies being dragged into, being forced to deal with a whole series of issues that did not fall within their competence. This led to serious violations of socialist legality. That period has been seriously evaluated, both in party documents and in appropriate legislative acts, so we now have adopted a firm position of strict observance of the law. We do, and will do, only what is envisaged by law, and nothing (?else). [passage omitted]

[Presenter] Another question, Georgiy Ivanovich. I have noticed that here in the capital life has become strongly politicized. In this kind of politicized setting, it is wholly possible that extremist manifestations of one kind or another may arise which could amount to violations of citizens' constitutional rights, in other words which might be criminal acts falling within the competence of the KGB. Tell me, do you feel that this politicization has led to a situation that is more likely to engender criminal acts, or not?

[Lavranchuk] The first thing I would like to say in reply to your question is that there are two accusations which are levelled at us, as a rule. Some see the state security bodies as the chief culprits for all the ills of the past. Others expect all the issues that arise in society to be dealt with only by the KGB: What is the KGB playing at? Why is the KGB not involved? Why is the KGB not dealing with it? In the first place, it is not only, or even mainly, the KGB that is the culprit for all the ills. The culprit was the system that operated at that time, while the staff of the State Security

Committee were only an instrument for dealing with many of those problems. After all, chekists themselves were among those who suffered; it is now known that more than 20,000 of them, too, were shot—they were subjected to repressions—for failing to carry out instructions issued by appropriate bodies.

On the other hand, it is not right today to expect the KGB to deal with all matters arising, even if they are of a political nature.

[Presenter] In other words, in some parts of society the old stereotype is still at work?

[Lavrachuk] The old stereotype, old thinking. Serious changes in legislation have taken place now. [passage omitted]

Today there is pluralism of opinion, in which citizens can voice their own opinions. For this reason, we do not persecute or prosecute anyone for any manifestations whatsoever of a political nature. Ideology and politics have ceased to be an area of activity for the State Security Committee. The basic functions of the KGB bodies are to combat enemy services. As for internal functions, our duty is to bring to book those engaging in public appeals for or actions aimed at overthrowing our system, not by constitutional but by violent means.

[Presenter] Georgiy Ivanovich, you have said that the KGB's basic functions remain combatting the special services of foreign countries, if we can put it like that?

[Lavrachuk] In recent years alone the bodies of the USSR KGB have unmasked more than 30 Soviet citizens who were agents for enemy special services.

[Presenter] If it is not a secret, of course, were any of these on the territory of Moldavia?

[Lavrachuk] On the territory of Moldavia there have not been any cases of that kind in recent years. We play a part in bringing to light those members of special services who come to our area with the aim of gathering intelligence information. We put a stop to such happenings, and block their access to secrets and data which are of interest to the enemy. However, we have not unmasked any Soviet citizens on the territory of the republic. True, there have been several cases in which we have warned people off at the stage when the enemy was trying to recruit Soviet citizens to work for them. These events were exposed by us and preventive action was taken. These incidents concerned both military personnel and specialist staff working at defense industry factories. We managed to nip it in the bud, to expose these events at the initial stage, to warn these citizens off before they engaged in criminal activity, and so prevent the enemy getting access to data that could be prejudicial to our state or the interests of our country. In fact, this is characteristic for KGB bodies, that we do our utmost to avoid things going as far as having to arrest someone. Rather, we feel it much better and more effective to be able to pre-empt, to prevent a crime occurring. So, I would like to say that where we in the Moldavian KGB are

concerned, we have achieved some results in this way, and we consider it (?no worse) than when things have gone as far as an arrest.

Moldavian Rayon First Secretaries Elected

LD2204231390

[Editorial Report] Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLD-AVIYA in Russian on 11 April publishes on page two a report on party report-back and election conferences held in various rayons in Moldavia on 7 April. In these conferences, the following people were elected rayon party committee [raykom] first secretaries:

Basarabskiy Rayon: Ye.M. Beiko;
Kriulenskiy Rayon: V.D. Paladi;
Sorokskiy Rayon: I.A. Mokuanu;
Suvorovskiy Rayon: N.I. Orlov;
Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayon: N.V. Bakherkin;
Sholdeneshtskiy Rayon: Z.P. Bodyu.

Caucasus

Armenians Commemorate 1915 'Massacre'

LD2404143290 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1055 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Report by TASS correspondents Garri Galustyan and Gagik Melkumyan]

[Excerpts] Yerevan, 24 Apr. (TASS)—Residents of Soviet Armenia are today honoring the memory of the victims of the genocide of 1915 committed 75 years ago by the rulers of the Ottoman Empire. More than 1.5 million Armenians died in that wicked act. The day of commemoration instituted by the republican parliament has been declared a non-working day. [passage omitted]

In the town of Echmiadzin, home of the Cathedral Church and residence of the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, a service of mourning has been held, which was conducted by Vazgen I, Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians.

The Armenian chief priest also addressed a message to the people in which he called for the memory of the victims to be preserved as sacred and for prayers for the souls of those who died. The message notes that the political security and strengthening of the mother country's economic might within the family of multinational and sovereign Soviet peoples is the supreme pledge and guarantee of the further existence of the Armenian people.

An international scientific conference "Genocide of the Armenians: History, Theory and Political Responsibility" held in Yerevan yesterday was timed to coincide with the 75th anniversary of the tragic events. [passage omitted]

Those taking part in the conference sent an open letter to Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, asking that the question of official condemnation by the country's supreme body of state power of the genocide against the Armenians be examined. [passage omitted]